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Masooda Bano and Keiko Sakurai
Claims abound of Saudi oil money fuelling Salafi Islam across cultural and geo-
graphical terrains as far removed as the remote village hamlets of the Swat valley 
in Pakistan and sprawling megacities such as Jakarta.1 Assumptions that the 
Iranian state is fighting proxy wars with Sunni Arab states in foreign lands sim-
ilarly tend to be promoted to the status of fact.2 In fact, however, there are few 
empirically grounded studies that explore how those with hegemonic aspirations 
embed their ideologies in locales to which that thought and its accompanying 
practices are very foreign. Questions about how ideas are transported from an 
assumed core to societies viewed to be on the periphery, and how these ideas are 
embedded, if at all, within the complex socio-economic and political milieus 
of their new host societies, are more often answered through the creation of 
hypothetical scenarios than by marshalling scholarly evidence. We still lack 
academically sound responses to certain critical questions, such as: what enables 
a particular brand of Islam to gain centrality among competing positions?; to 
what extent do national governments play an active part in promoting a global 
Islamic discourse?; and in what ways do the Islamic discourses that acquire 
global attention challenge local beliefs and practices? This volume is designed 
to address this gap. It represents a rare attempt to map the complex processes 
of engagement between an assumed core and the peripheries. The volume illus-
trates how this engagement at times dramatically transforms the host societies, 
while in other cases the absorption of new ideas remains partial – the success 
of foreign ideas in transforming local contexts remaining contingent on their 
suitability for the socio-economic and political realities of their host societies. 
In order to unravel the complex processes that underpin the global trans-
mission of Islamic discourses, this volume focuses on the working of the three 
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most influential international centres of Islamic learning in contemporary times: 
al-Azhar University in Egypt; the Islamic University of Medina (IUM) in Saudi 
Arabia; and al-Mustafa International University in Iran. These three universi-
ties, located in the politically influential countries in the Middle East and Gulf 
region, attract students from across the globe. Their graduates carry the ideas 
acquired during their education back to their home communities, and some also 
bring with them a reformatory zeal. These Islamic universities are the modern 
form of Islamic seminaries, which train ʿ ulama of various ranks, including mujta-
hid, scholars entitled to issue legal opinions on matters not explicitly addressed 
in the Qurʾan.3 The significance of these universities is in their hybrid nature; 
they produce ʿulama through their curriculum, as inherited from the seminary 
tradition, while claiming a “modern” space by adapting the formal structures of 
the Western university. To some this model of mixing features of traditional 
and modern education systems might have much in common with Fethullah 
Gülen’s effort to globalise an Islamically conscious modern schooling system 
in Turkey; however, the Gülen schools fall into a different category, since they 
offer pre-tertiary education and do not aim to produce ʿulama. This volume 
argues that we should recognise the distinct potential of these universities in 
globalising specific Islamic discourses for the precise reason that these institu-
tions are state supported, and thus that studying them enables us to examine the 
complex interplay between states’ desires to exercise global legitimacy and the 
emergence of global Islamic discourses.4
Al-Medina and al-Mustafa have, in particular, come to act as the central 
locations for the promotion of Wahhabi-infused Salafism and Iranian-styled 
Shiʿism, respectively: the former particularly associated with encroachment on 
alternative religious spaces and erosion of the localised Islam of Sufi veneration 
and folk religion; the latter associated with transmitting a particularly Iranian 
brand of Shiʿism, which leads to a close overlap of religious and political author-
ity in the spirit of Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h (guardianship 
of the jurist).5 It might at first appear puzzling to situate al-Azhar alongside 
two universities that are associated with two globally dominant, but exclusion-
ary, Islamic worldviews, given its much more complex history and rejection of 
taqlı̄d (lit. to follow, to imitate; strict adherence to a specific Islamic school of 
thought). However, its ability to command an international presence as the 
“moderate voice of Islam”, whereby sound understanding of Islamic principles is 
matched with a willingness to adapt texts to changing times,6 makes it an illumi-
nating case for comparative analysis. These three universities are unique in the 
sense that they all have direct or indirect links with their governments and their 
student base comes from across the globe. These characteristics distinguish them 
from another global centre of Islamic learning, namely, Dar ul-Ulum Deoband 
in India. The Deobandi madrasa network runs completely independently of the 
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government, and its following though large is primarily concentrated within the 
South Asian Muslim communities.7 By looking at the workings of these three 
global centres of Islamic learning, and tracing the activities of their graduates 
and their influence on their home communities, this volume seeks to develop a 
more nuanced understanding than is available in the literature on globalisation 
of Islamic discourses, on how ideas are transmitted from one locale to another, 
and how the ultimate outcomes of this process are rarely fully under the control 
of one single actor or state.
Three reasons make this comparative undertaking a particularly useful lens 
through which to study the working of global and local linkages in the transmis-
sion of global Islamic discourses. First, before setting out to study the processes 
that help a given discourse acquire global standing, it is important to establish 
that the selected discourse does indeed deserve that label. These three univer-
sities easily meet this prerequisite. The influence of these three universities in 
shaping Islamic discourse and practice in contemporary Muslim societies is 
visible across North Africa, the Middle East and Asia, and in diaspora com-
munities in North America and Europe. It is reflected in the diversity of their 
international student populations, with all three universities attracting students 
from across the globe. As analysed in the chapters presented in Part One, the 
senior leadership within all three universities is very conscious of their influence 
in shaping the Islamic discourse for Muslims around the globe, and takes it to 
be their religious obligation to provide global leadership due to their recognised 
status as a prominent seat of Islamic learning.
Secondly, a comparative analysis of these three universities presents a rare 
opportunity to compare the global working of the three dominant strands of 
contemporary Islam that rival each other for supremacy in the international 
political and religious arena: Wahhabi-styled Salafism, Iranian-inspired Shiʿism 
and the voice of “moderate” Islam. Academic scholarship on global Islamic net-
works, as well as Western policy discourse, remains centred on understanding 
the ways in which these three major strands of Islam shape Muslim societies 
and how they determine their relationships with the West. What is meant by 
these terms is contested, however, given that any scholarly attempt to define 
such labels as “liberal”, “moderate” or “orthodox” Islam remains open to critique 
depending on what is viewed to be the most important criterion in defining 
such terms. As a general norm, Salafism has come to be associated with the 
puritanical and rigid interpretation of Islamic texts often associated with Saudi-
styled Wahhabism. However, as we see repeatedly in this volume, the term 
“Salafism” becomes complicated in the Egyptian context,8 where modernists 
such as Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1935) and his student Rashid Rida (1865–
1935), who were in fact arguing for very modernist interpretations of the Islamic 
texts, also defined themselves as Salafis, and are indeed referred to as such by 
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many scholars. They rejected taqlı̄d, or blind following of the four schools of law 
(madhāhib, sing. madhhab), and argued for direct and constant engagement with 
the Qurʾan and hadith in order to interpret them directly,9 as do the Salafis in 
Saudi Arabia. However, in practice their Salafism has had very different theo-
logical and societal implications to those of Wahhabi Salafism, where the latter 
also argues for going back to the original sources, but instead of reinterpreting 
those texts in the light of modern needs seeks doctrinal purification often result-
ing in the total rejection of Western influence. Thus, the papers looking at 
al-Azhar and al-Medina both refer to the influence of these universities in terms 
of spreading Salafi ideology, but these are two very different conceptions of 
Salafism.10 Although the common denominator is the willingness of both groups 
to go back to the original texts, they take very different approaches on how to 
engage with those texts.
Defining “moderate” Islam is an equally challenging task given the variations 
within the organisations that claim a modernist outlook. But, as in the case of 
the term “Salafism”, certain features have come to be recognised as important 
in defining moderate Islam. The two most popular criteria used here are a 
willingness to adopt more context-bound, as opposed to literal, interpretations 
of the text, and to allow for a pluralistic outlook in terms of following several 
madhāhib rather than taqlı̄d of one school. Defining the Iranian brand of Shiʿi 
Islam is similarly complex, but its underlying feature is its close association with 
Khomeini’s political doctrine of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, which leads to a much closer 
merger of religious and political authority than was associated with the Najafi 
seminaries that traditionally led the Shiʿi Islamic discourse.
The cases selected for this volume present these three distinct conceptions of 
Islam. Thus, al-Medina has been selected because it is today recognised as repre-
senting the popular conception of Salafism, which is seen as being conservative 
and associated with Saudi Islam; few ordinary Muslims, and not just in the West, 
are aware of the modernist style Salafism of ʿAbduh. Al-Azhar is today viewed 
globally as a leading example of moderate Islam due to its emphasis on teaching 
of all four Sunni madhāhib and its willingness to support both the Egyptian and 
Western states in their decisions to adapt Islamic injunctions to suit the changes 
induced by modern lifestyles. Al-Mustafa is the obvious case for studying the 
workings of Iranian Shiʿism, since it is the primary institution in Iran providing 
religious education to international students. Thus, in this volume, the selection 
of the three cases is based on their ability to present the three dominant strands 
of Islam today, as defined in the popular discourse. Individual chapters do, how-
ever, show quite clearly that many of these terms are complex, and that they can 
be applied to opposing organisations. The reason for starting from these broader 
categories, however, is that they do help to capture the dominant positions 
within Islam, even though there are variations within each position.
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Given that these three conceptions of Islam can lead to quite varying out-
comes for the shaping of Muslim societies and their relationships with modernity 
and Western societies, much of the global policy discourse is aimed at curtailing 
the influence of Saudi-style Salafism and the Iranian brand of Shiʿism, and 
instead galvanising support for the spread of a more tolerant Islam.11 Looking 
at these three major centres of Islamic learning – where each is clearly aligned 
with one of the three influential Islamic discourses in the international arena 
– thus presents a unique opportunity to study the micro-level working of dis-
courses that have acquired global hegemony and the factors that contribute to 
their rise. Such a comparative approach also affords an opportunity to inquire 
whether the underlying mechanisms of engagement between the core and the 
assumed peripheries are the same across the three influential discourses, or 
whether the nature of the discourse (taqlı̄d versus a pluralist outlook) itself ends 
up impacting the nature of the engagements between the two sides – taqlı̄d 
arguably demanding a one-way transmission of ideas if the purpose is to promote 
adherence to specific ideals.
Notwithstanding the growing scholarly debate on the fracturing of Islamic 
authority due to the rise of alternative platforms, the power of those who con-
trol the teaching of Islamic texts remains paramount with regard to shaping 
global Islamic discourse. There is indeed a mushrooming of online imams, and 
some have come to command a reasonable level of authority among ordinary 
Muslims; but more often than not, in order to gain that attention, they still need 
a stamp of higher approval, in the form of a degree certificate from one of the 
orthodox centres of learning. This continued importance of the knowledge of 
the written texts in staking a claim to religious authority makes these universi-
ties, with their focus on the teaching of Islamic texts, central to the training of 
serious Islamic scholars who will continue to speak on behalf of Islam in coming 
decades.12 Thus, while multiple platforms can be used to promote certain reli-
gious ideas globally, centres of Islamic learning that train the ʿulama or scholars 
in their ability to interpret the text remain central to advancing any globalising 
Islamic mission.13 Looking at the universities that have emerged due to the 
direct or indirect support of the theocratic state14 – especially al-Medina and 
al-Mustafa – thus enables us to decipher how certain institutions can cultivate 
allegiance to very narrow interpretations of the Islamic texts while discrediting 
other equally influential sources. The case of al-Azhar, on the other hand, helps 
to elaborate how the same texts can be used to promote a pluralistic outlook 
where critical engagement with multiple sources is prioritised over the taqlı̄d of 
a particular madhhab.
By looking at the working of these three global centres of Islamic learning, 
and tracing the activities and influence of their graduates on their home com-
munities, this volume thus argues for a nuanced understanding of how ideas are 
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transmitted from one locale to another, and how the process of transmission 
results in making adjustments to those very ideas in the process of winning 
followers. By showing that the hegemonic discourses have to be flexible in 
engaging with counter-discourses if they are to win a following beyond their 
original set of adherents, the volume counters simplistic assumptions about 
the mechanisms that shape the global transmission of ideas and also checks 
the exaggerated claims sometimes made about the power of theocratic states. 
What becomes very clear in the volume is that while the Saudi or Iranian states 
might invest heavily in the promotion of their religious ideology, the extent to 
which they succeed in this mission is contingent on a number of factors at the 
receiving end, most importantly the local political context, historical patterns 
of religious affiliation, and the existing cultural and aesthetic sensibilities of the 
recipient community. When studying the processes of the global transmission 
of ideas, it is thus not only important to map the “attempts at influence”, but 
equally important to examine the “adaptations for influence”. As we will see 
throughout this volume, this adaptation is essential both to winning students 
over to a particular ideology, and equally important for preparing the students 
to meet the counter-arguments of other madhāhib or sects. The chapters in this 
volume show that in the cases of al-Medina, al-Mustafa and al-Azhar, there is 
always a dialectical engagement between those who want to influence and those 
being influenced, with both sides having an impact on the other.
More importantly, the volume also illustrates that there is a natural limit 
to which religious adherence can be cultivated by design – despite concerted 
efforts, not all students enrolled in the three universities absorb the ideas and 
attitudes associated with these institutions. Rather, many students use their 
education at these universities to advance material rather than religious inter-
ests. What becomes clear is that the appeal of the extreme puritanical practices 
associated with Saudi-styled Salafism or Iranian Shiʿism can never totally crowd 
out the appeal of alternative or more pluralistic platforms, as many individuals 
are inherently more inclined towards one approach over the other. Despite all 
efforts at expanding its following, Saudi-styled Salafism cannot totally eradicate 
the appeal of the more moderate voices of Islam as represented by al-Azhar, 
just as the Iranian brand of Shiʿi Islam cannot eliminate the influence of the 
seminaries in Najaf, which to date have had limited enthusiasm for Khomeini’s 
conception of vilāyat-i faqı̄h. Thus, one of the important correctives offered 
by the volume is to put the concerns about the hegemonic tendencies of any 
discourse, religious or secular, in perspective – and to note that while financial 
commitments do indeed help to cultivate religious allegiance, the ultimate 
appeal of a religious worldview is shaped equally by the inherent appeal of the 
ideals associated with it and its relevance to the historical practices, as well as 
the everyday realities of the believers, and their individual dispositions.
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The volume maps out the details of how the centres of learning act as the 
basis for three critical interactions that eventually shape these apparently 
hegemonic global Islamic discourses: (1) between the teachers and the students 
at the university; (2) between the state and the management of the university; 
and (3) between the students and their communities on their return home. 
The chapters in this volume show that students gain appreciation for an idea 
if the teacher is able to convince them, and the teacher in turn will be more 
effective in spreading an idea if he is himself convinced of it. A state wanting to 
promote a specific agenda thus has either to appoint the teachers and select the 
students using very narrow parameters to assess their prior affinity to the given 
religious outlook, or show sufficient flexibility such that the teachers as well as 
the students can gradually develop ownership of those ideals. To illustrate these 
complex dynamics, the volume presents eight chapters organised in three parts.
The chapters in Part One highlight the strategies adopted by the three uni-
versities to advance their influence. It takes the reader inside these universities 
and provides an account of their evolution, the extent of recognition of their 
authority globally, their teaching methodologies, and, most importantly, the 
nature of their association with the state. Part Two presents three original 
case studies illustrating how ideas flow from these global centres of learning to 
communities across the globe via their graduating students. Most importantly, 
the section illustrates how the relevance of these ideas to local political devel-
opments and traditional practices has direct bearing on how extensively these 
ideas reshape the local context. Part Three then spells out more vividly how 
the spread of the ideals within the home communities depends not just on the 
effectiveness or zeal of the messenger, but even more importantly on the specific 
characteristics of the community, such as the relationship between the state and 
religion, the nature of existing religious elites, and contemporaneous political 
developments. The importance of context is addressed in all the chapters, how-
ever it is in Part Three that the most explicit evidence is presented. The analysis 
presented in this section of the overwhelming influence of al-Azhar in Malaysia 
and Indonesia during the twentieth century illustrates how a complex set of 
factors have to come together to enable the large-scale diffusion of foreign ideals 
in a new context. It is therefore understandable why in most cases the diffusion 
remains limited to isolated pockets.
International Islamic Universities within the 
Structure of Islamic Authority
The scholarship on Muslim societies has long acknowledged the societal impor-
tance of the orthodox centres of Islamic authority, namely, the mosque and 
the madrasa, since the ʿulama within them define what it means to be a good 
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Muslim. While in theory Islam has no clergy, those who are able to interpret 
Islamic texts come to command great influence in shaping Muslim societies. 
Much of this religious authority was traditionally transferred through an infor-
mal system of knowledge accreditation in form of an ijāza (a traditional method 
of authorisation for a student to start independent teaching) rather than the 
issuance of formal degree certificates. The colonial encounter led to the emer-
gence of the first major fracturing of the traditional structures of authority, 
whereby graduates from Western-style universities started to speak on behalf of 
Islam, thereby establishing significant followings.15 The changed profile of those 
exercising Islamic authority had major implications for the socio-political pro-
cesses within these societies: the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaʿat-i-Islami, the 
two most influential political reform movements in the Middle East and South 
Asia, respectively, were established by such Islamic modernists.16
What is less studied in terms of the changing structures of Islamic authority, 
however, is the shift towards the establishment of international Islamic univer-
sities as an alternative to mosque- and madrasa-based centres of learning. While 
al-Medina was established as a state-sponsored university from the beginning, 
al-Mustafa gradually emerged as a university, albeit a private one. Officially, 
al-Mustafa is a private university drawing its budget mainly from the profits of 
the factories it owns, as well as from investments, religious endowments and 
government funding. However, as Chapter 2 illustrates, the post-revolutionary 
Iranian state has played an active role in the gradual emergence of al-Mustafa 
as the leading platform for the global dissemination of Iranian-style Shiʿism. 
Al-Azhar, whose origin goes all the way back to 970 and was historically more 
independent, similarly underwent a major administrative transformation when 
it was nationalised in 1961 by the Nasser regime. This conscious preference 
by these modern states to invest in Islamic universities, whether by bringing 
them under state control or indirectly supporting them, partly reflects their 
aspiration to modernise the traditional Islamic education system. Rather than 
drawing on the informal personalised method of teaching,17 where the scholars 
normally studied a major book at a pace that was tailored to the capabilities of 
the individual student, the shift towards the establishment of universities led to 
the introduction of a standardised system of education, whereby a standard syl-
labus, a pre-planned and standardised examination process, and state- accredited 
degree certificates replaced the personalised teaching model, informal assess-
ment methods and issuance of an ijāza that marked the madrasa system.
The move towards supporting universities, however, has equally been shaped 
by the states’ desire to have greater control over the teaching of Islamic texts. The 
most explicit difference between these universities and the traditional structures 
of Islamic authority revolves around the nature of the relationship they have 
with the state, as compared with the madrasa system. The latter experienced a 
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much higher level of autonomy than is available to a modern university because 
of the greater degree of financial autonomy it enjoyed. Historically, the Muslim 
empires patronised madrasas in order to gain religious legitimacy, which also 
remains the primary motive for the modern states to engage with the interna-
tional Islamic universities. However, state patronage for the bigger madrasas or 
mosques normally took the form of waqf endowments, which provided an inde-
pendent income to the ʿulama even in cases where the state might also have 
provided for the salaries of teachers. This gave the ʿulama within the madrasas 
a certain degree of autonomy from the state – this, for instance, was the case for 
al-Azhar, which until nationalisation was supported through waqf income. The 
nationalisation of al-Azhar resulted in the confiscation of its waqf properties, 
making the ʿulama directly dependent on salaries from the state. This greatly 
curtailed their authority. Similarly, a number of changes in the post-revolution 
Iranian context decreased the ability of independent marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d (see Chapter 
2) to collect khums (religious tax), making most leading seminaries in Qom 
highly dependent on the state to provide stipends to instructors and students. 
Al-Medina university, on the other hand, was founded with a university charter 
whereby the scholars appointed to university positions directly draw govern-
ment salaries and thus are bound by the university regulations. These univer-
sities are thus part of the modern educational network, which is much more 
tightly regulated by the state in terms of what is taught, and also how it is taught 
and examined, than the prestigious centres of Islamic learning historically were.
What is interesting to note, however, is that being influenced by a theocratic 
as opposed to a non-theocratic state does have different implications for the 
level of religious independence that these international Islamic universities 
can exercise. As we see in Chapter 3, the nature and extent of manipulation 
by a non-theocratic state is different to that by a theocratic state, because the 
latter comes to realise that it is important to allow the religious institution 
some autonomy if it is to retain the public legitimacy needed to be useful for 
the state. The Mubarak regime in Egypt thus realised early on that al-Azhar’s 
religious endorsement would be effective for gaining popular legitimacy only if 
al-Azhar continued to command popular respect as an independent mediator on 
Islamic matters: the Egyptian state has thus tolerated the existence of dissenting 
ʿulama18 within al-Azhar to counter the damage caused to al-Azhar’s reputation 
when the Shaykh al-Azhar has been obliged to issue controversial fatwas in sup-
port of the state. The religious state, on the other hand, has a different basis of 
engagement with places of religious education. A theocratic state is less depend-
ent on institutions such as Islamic universities to gain legitimacy for its actions; 
rather, it needs them to propagate its specific religious worldview. In this case, it 
is the state’s religious legitimacy that is extended to the universities rather than 
the other way around. Thus, in the case of al-Azhar, the state used the Islamic 
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status of the university to seek popular legitimacy for its actions, while in the 
case of the other two universities the states had clear religious identities which 
the universities were courted to advance.
These international Islamic universities thus represent a very complex case of 
religious authority. In order to advance their worldview globally they must have 
some following and legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims, yet their heavy reliance 
on the state instead of independent sources of survival makes them suspect in 
the eyes of more critical followers, who start to see these universities as an exten-
sion of the state apparatus. Unpacking the complex processes that help these 
universities to balance the complex demands of retaining legitimacy in the eyes 
of their followers while also meeting the needs of the states that support them 
is thus at the heart of the analytical puzzle addressed in this volume. In order to 
resolve this puzzle, it is useful to begin by asking what makes certain places and 
institutions acquire the status of the core, and what shapes the interaction of 
this core with the alleged peripheries?
Becoming the “Core”
Looking at the three universities it is clear that whether they were deliberately 
established by the state, indirectly supported or gradually taken over, the idea of 
these universities being core centres of Islamic learning is central to their capac-
ity to advance a certain viewpoint at the global level. What, however, defines 
this core? The chapters in this volume show that while the three universities 
might have made conscious efforts to exert their identity as the core locations 
for the exercise of Islamic authority, there has also been a corresponding willing-
ness on the part of the so-called peripheries, lands geographically at a distance 
from these central locations, to recognise the superior status of the core. As 
Chapter 7 illustrates in detail, going to the Middle East to pursue higher learn-
ing has historically been important in the view of Muslim scholars located in 
other lands. There is a recognition that because of their sacred location or other-
wise geographical importance, a certain location comes to have a confluence of 
scholarship that leads to establishing its right to speak on behalf of Islam. Thus, 
the modern Egyptian, Iranian and Saudi states have made conscious efforts to 
exert their influence globally, and the locations they are using to exercise this 
authority have a pre-modern legacy or global following.
Not surprisingly, hosting the sacred spaces is one of the key credentials for 
acquiring the status of the core. In the view of many Muslims, by virtue of being 
the guardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the Saudi state has a nat-
ural right to guide Muslims across the world. The sites themselves, however, 
are not the only claim to authority; rather, the formation of authority is more 
complex. These sacred sites traditionally attracted scholars from all corners of 
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the Muslim world. Eventually, the confluence of a large number of prominent 
scholars at a sacred site leads to the emergence of that location as a core centre 
for Islamic learning. Often this confluence is directly linked to the existence of 
a sacred site, but in other cases it is also simply a result of geographical location. 
This was the case for Cairo, which, due to its central location within the Muslim 
lands during the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, became host to many promi-
nent scholars on their way to Mecca for the holy pilgrimage, or a place of refuge 
for reputed Muslim scholars escaping persecution in lands where Muslim power 
was on the decline. These natural credentials of certain geographical locations 
thus lend them a level of legitimacy that attracts state attention. Provision of 
state resources does in fact help to increase the outreach of these places that 
come to acquire the status of the core, but, as indicated above, this association 
with the state also poses serious questions with regard to their authority by those 
who believe that religious authority should stay independent of state authority.
These complex dynamics shaping the relationship of these universities with 
their multiple constituencies, including the state and their students, form the 
focus of analysis in Part One of this volume. The chapters in this part take the 
reader inside the three universities and provide an account of their evolution, 
their global standing, their conception of their role in shaping global Islamic 
discourses, and, most importantly, their relationship with the state. Chapter 1 
presents a thoughtful analysis of how the IUM was from its very inception meant 
to function as a Saudi-state-backed Salafi missionary project with global reach. 
Eighty-five per cent of the places among its entirely male student body were 
reserved for non-Saudis, and within decades the university had disbursed tens 
of thousands of scholarships to applicants from all over the world under a gen-
erous funding programme covering everything from transport, to tuition, living 
expenses and the cost of books. The goal was for students to return to their home 
countries or to travel on elsewhere after graduation for duʿa, or as missionaries, to 
promote spiritual commitment and “correct” religious knowledge and practice. 
As the university president and future Grand Mufti ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz wrote 
in a prospectus published in 1971, emphasising the sacred geography of Medina 
and suggesting a parallel between this Saudi-backed project and the Prophet’s 
own mission, the university was to operate as “a source of modern Islamic prop-
agation from the source of the first Islamic propagation”. In addition to the 
diverse student body, for much of the early period of its existence a majority of 
the university’s faculty also came from beyond the kingdom – particularly from 
Egypt, but also from locations as distant as Morocco and Pakistan. The chapter 
sketches key aspects of the IUM’s genesis and evolution over the course of half 
a century. Unpacking this history serves to underscore the extent to which the 
university and its morally conservative missionary project, far from reflecting a 
timeless “Wahhabi” anachronism isolated from the sweep of twentieth-century 
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history, were in fact deeply involved in far-reaching contemporary dynamics of 
religious revival and reform, globalisation and geopolitical rivalry.
Chapter 2 presents an insight into the rise of al-Mustafa International 
University, including its two preceding institutions and its globalisation 
agenda. Tracing the evolution of the university, it shows how the emergence 
of al-Mustafa was a result of the rivalry among the marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, the high-
est-ranking Shiʿi authorities, in post-revolutionary Iran. It also elaborates the 
attributes and strategies of al-Mustafa that helped this institution to establish 
itself as the key international platform for Shiʿi scholarship and to differentiate 
itself from its Shiʿi rivals in Najaf and their Sunni counterparts. This univer-
sity is a product of the complex internal political battles within Iran as well as 
the state’s global agenda known as “the export of revolution”, whose mission 
is to propagate the Iranian version of Shiʿism which places special value on 
Khomeini’s concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h. Owing to the direct patronage of the 
current supreme leader, this university has been able to update its curriculum 
and education system to meet the expectations of foreign students, including 
females. However, this very attempt to adjust the curriculum to the level of the 
majority of the foreign students discourages them from studying up to the level 
of mujtahid, which perpetuates Iranians’ monopoly on the position of mujta-
hids and leaves non-Iranians as their followers (muqallid) in the Shiʿi religious 
hierarchy. The uniqueness of al-Mustafa is its strategies to reach out to youth 
in other countries through its numerous overseas branches, aiming to counter 
the spread of anti-Shiʿi “Wahhabism” and ensuring its uncontested dominance 
over its rivals, especially the seminaries in Najaf. Although the “Iranised” and 
“politicised” form of teaching remains controversial among Shiʿa outside Iran, 
the al-Mustafa graduates are maximising the functional as well as symbolic ben-
efits of their degrees and adapting the knowledge obtained in al-Mustafa to meet 
the needs of their local communities.
Chapter 3 shows how al-Azhar, established by the Shiʿi Fatimid empire in 
970, was eventually to become one of the most respected centres for Sunni 
Islamic learning around the globe. Today, more than 30,000 foreign students 
are enrolled in the Islamic Studies and other related faculties of al-Azhar at any 
given time. The chapter shows how the emphasis on a “middle way”, as reflected 
in al-Azhar’s emphasis on teaching all four Sunni madhāhib, has been central 
to the rise of al-Azhar as a global centre of learning. The chapter notes that a 
number of factors led to the rise of the university to this prominent leadership 
position within Sunni Islam, including its location in Cairo, the exodus of 
scholars from places such as Andalusia due to political instability and their set-
tlement in Cairo, the university’s ability to harbour multiple discourses, and the 
controversial state-led reforms enacted since the 1960s. The chapter analyses 
the challenges al-Azhar has faced in retaining legitimacy in the eyes of believers 
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at home and abroad since Nasser’s decision to nationalise it, and what has ena-
bled it to survive these challenges. The chapter further shows how, post-Arab 
Spring, al-Azhar acquired a new zeal to play a prominent role as the moderate 
voice of Islam both within Egypt as well as globally. It shows how these ambi-
tions are bound to be checked by the return of political authority to the hands 
of the military – a move which ironically had the active support of the Shaykh 
al-Azhar.
Cultivating the Local: Agency of the Students
As in the case of the universities, we see that the dual process involving strate-
gies of influence and adaptation for influence is equally applicable to the gradu-
ates of these universities when they return to their home communities. At least 
some of the graduating students do indeed absorb the ideas they are exposed to 
during their time at university. However, the spread of these ideas within local 
communities is heavily dependent on their skills and ability to adapt the ideas 
to the local context. Part Two looks at these issues and presents three original 
case studies illustrating how ideas flow out from these three global platforms to 
communities across the globe via their graduates. Most importantly, the sec-
tion illustrates how the relevance of these ideas to the local context, political 
developments and traditional practices has direct bearing on their success in 
changing the local context.
Chapter 4 profiles a network of prominent preachers, the “Ahlussunnah” 
(People of the tradition of the Prophet) of contemporary Kano, northern Nigeria. 
Of these preachers, roughly half are graduates of the IUM. By looking at leading 
figures within the network, the chapter shows how exposure to new thinkers and 
texts at the university, as well as physical distance from the bitter struggles in 
northern Nigeria, launched a process of reflection that culminated in the Medina 
graduates’ decision to break with the anti-Sufi movement Izala (Jamaʿat Izalat 
al Bidʿa wa Iqamat al Sunnah; The Society for the Removal of Heresy and the 
Instatement of the Prophetic Model), to which they had been affiliated before 
leaving for Medina. Izala, the students felt, had become too rigid in its approach 
and was excluding non-members. Upon their return, the graduates established 
themselves as independent, though still anti-Sufi, preachers. Study in Medina, 
the chapter argues, increased these preachers’ intellectual self-confidence and 
led them to seek models of leadership based more on individual reputation than 
on the backing of hierarchical organisations. Next, the chapter examines how, 
in their preaching at home, the Medina graduates relate events in Nigeria to 
struggles in Muslim communities at other times and in other places. The chapter 
argues that study in Medina helped to shape the doctrinal positions, intellectual 
interests and rhetorical strategies of these preachers, and notes that lasting ties 
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to Saudi Arabia provided them with material support. However, the chapter 
concludes that the popularity of these preachers among different sections of 
Kano society, especially youth, is owed largely to their mastery of new media, 
particularly recorded sermons, and their ability to present sectarian identities 
and allegiances in ways that address local quotidian concerns. These preachers, 
finally, were drawn deeply into local electoral politics and into struggles with the 
Sufi brotherhoods and traditional Muslim authorities of Kano, and thus local 
issues loomed large in spreading the Ahlussunnah network.
Chapter 5 explains how returnees from al-Mustafa International University, 
including those from the International Centre for Islamic Studies, its preceding 
institution, have played a significant role in the development of the Shiʿi com-
munity in Sunni-dominated Indonesia. Pursuing Islamic education at Qom is a 
post-1979 phenomenon made popular by al-Habsyi, an Indonesian scholar of 
Arab descent, who gained the trust of religious leaders in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. To date, there are more than 200 Qom alumni in Indonesia. Following 
a detailed account of the educational background of Indonesian students who 
went to Qom, the chapter illustrates the activities of the graduates in their home 
towns, such as their creation of the Association of al-Mustafa International 
University Alumni, missionary activities through various Shiʿi institutions, and 
educational activities in religious schools, including the Islamic College Jakarta, 
a branch of the university. Emphasising the contribution of Qom alumni in 
making the Shiʿa a dominant force in Indonesian Islamic movements, the chap-
ter also sheds light on the commitment of Qom alumni to connect Indonesian 
Shiʿi to the world’s centre of Shiʿi orthodoxy in Iran, and on the competition 
and conflict that arose within the Shiʿi community in Indonesia as a result of 
their endeavours.
Taking a historical approach, Chapter 6 discusses the impact of al-Azhar 
University on the Moroccan nationalist movement and specifically its independ-
ence leader Allal al-Fasi, whose ten-year exile in Egypt exposed him to the ideas 
of Muhammad ʿAbduh and influenced the ideological position of the Moroccan 
independence party, Istiqlal. The chapter emphasises the impact that ʿAbduh’s 
ideas had on the educational policies of the independence party and their con-
tinued importance in Moroccan educational politics throughout the twentieth 
century. Graduates of the university in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, including Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi and Abu Shuʿayb al-Dukkali, 
brought ideas of Islamic modernism back to Morocco. These ideas were shared 
with Moroccan religious students through lectures at the Qarawiyyin University 
in Fez and flourished into a movement for religious reform. The emphasis shifted 
from religious to political reform after the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930, which 
provided Berbers with different courts from those for Arabs. An outcry among 
the community of religious scholars over the weakening of Islamic law and the 
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attempt to divide the Muslim umma led to demonstrations across the Arab 
world. Al-Azhar University again became a centre for Moroccan dissidents and 
exiles to meet and find support as they protested this decree. After returning to 
Morocco, al-Fasi led the country as prime minister and ʿAbduh’s ideas formed 
the basis of his party’s educational platform. Those ideas continue to have sig-
nificant influence on Moroccan educational politics of the twenty-first century. 
The chapter thus traces the relationship between Islamic modernism and the 
Moroccan nationalist movement, highlighting the role of al-Azhar as the insti-
tutional link between these two groups. It concludes by discussing the contin-
uing legacy of the relationship between Islamic modernism and the Moroccan 
nationalists in terms of educational policy in twentieth-century Morocco.
Transforming the Local: The Significance of the Context
While the above chapters help to illustrate the multiple ways through which 
students carry the influence of these universities back to their home communi-
ties and the challenges they face, the chapters in Part Three illustrate how in 
a few cases the transformation of the local context in response to the foreign 
ideas can be quite extensive, as has been the case with the Azharisation of Islam 
in Malaysia and Indonesia. The chapters show how such widespread influence 
occurs only when, by a rare coincidence, the independent consensus of the 
religious scholars in that community converges with the strategic interests of 
the state, forging a wide-ranging support base for the adoption of that external 
ideology.
Chapter 7 draws on rich historical evidence to demonstrate how exposure to 
al-Azhar, starting in the early twentieth century, led over time to the complete 
transformation of the methodology adopted by independent ʿulama and state 
religious platforms to issue fatwas in Southeast Asia. It examines the main-
streaming of Salafi methodology – inspired by the work of Muhammad ʿAbduh 
– in place of the taqlı̄d of the traditional Shafiʿi School in Southeast Asia for 
the issuing of fatwas. Until the middle of the twentieth century, a majority of 
influential ʿulama in Southeast Asia studied in Mecca and were followers of the 
Shafiʿi School. From the end of the nineteenth century, a number of factors, 
including the establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led to a shift to 
al-Azhar as opposed to Mecca being the base for Southeast Asian Muslim schol-
ars. By comparing Southeast Asia fatwas of the early twentieth century against 
those issued in the 1970s, the chapter shows how the transition from Mecca to 
Cairo – and especially towards al-Azhar – led to the mainstreaming of Salafi 
methodology.
Chapter 8 discusses the relationship between al-Azhar and the govern-
ment policy of ʿulama training in Malaysia. The chapter traces how, during 
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the twentieth century, a number of factors led to al-Azhar becoming one of 
the most popular choices for Malaysian students wanting to major in Islamic 
Studies. The chapter shows that, initially, ʿulama adopted al-Azhar’s reformed 
curriculum by choice, as the mixed curriculum introduced by al-Azhar, starting 
with Muhammad ʿAbduh’s modernisation project, helped the religious schools 
in Malaysia to compete with the state-run modern schools. However, with time, 
to demonstrate its commitment to Islam, the Malaysian state also started to 
invest in al-Azhar education. Under a series of policies intended to emphasise 
Islam, religious education and religious administration expanded rapidly, thus 
providing increased job opportunities for al-Azhar graduates. In the 1990s, the 
state religious governments began to directly import al-Azhar’s curriculum and 
examination system, and the federal government introduced a secondary school 
Islamic education certification system that is accepted by al-Azhar. The Islamic 
education system in Malaysia today is thus heavily inspired by al-Azhar. This 
standardisation of the Islamic curriculum has in turn helped to legitimise gov-
ernment control over ʿulama training. In the name of following the al-Azhar 
system, the religious schools were modernised and transformed, thus becoming 
a part of the national education system. Thus, a host of local social and political 
dynamics, and not any proactive globalising agenda of the Egyptian state, has 
led to the wide-reaching absorption of Azhari Islam in the Malaysian context.
Despite the breakdown of authority and the rise of individual imams in this 
age of online fatwas, it is very clear that these centres of authority will remain 
important. The reason for this is that the concentration of scholars in these 
institutions gives them a mark of authority and quality. Under the conditions 
of modernity, with competing time pressures on the daily lives of believers, the 
search costs for a valid interpretation of the Islamic texts are best minimised 
by looking for quick markers of quality and identity. Thus, the online imams 
that become popular often need to get these markers of identity first, and these 
centres will always control those markers. Thus, in all likelihood these centres 
will indeed become more rather than less important with time. However, as the 
volume shows, it is also important to be clear about the limits to which these 
centres can promote their agendas and inculcate a global following through 
finance alone. Winning committed converts is a much more complex pro-
cess than is often acknowledged in the literature on the globalising mission of 
 certain Islamic discourses.
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Making of the Global: 




The Islamic University of Medina since 1961: 
The Politics of Religious Mission and the 
Making of a Modern Salafi Pedagogy1
Mike Farquhar
Since its founding in 1961 as a project backed by the Saudi state, the Islamic 
University of Medina (IUM) has offered fully funded, residential religious train-
ing to mostly non-Saudi male students in order that they might then return to 
their countries of origin or travel on elsewhere as missionaries. Their task has 
been to preach to non-Muslims, but also (and especially) to preach to Muslim 
communities around the world that are seen as having strayed from the true 
creed. For many decades after it was established, a large proportion of the IUM’s 
staff also hailed from outside Saudi Arabia, including from the wider Middle 
East and beyond. The IUM thus represents one key node in a lattice of global 
connections and processes that have intertwined with efforts by Saudi political 
and religious actors to extend their influence far beyond the kingdom’s bor-
ders. Yet despite its importance as a centre of migration and as a hub of global 
Salafi proselytising, the IUM has to date been almost entirely neglected in the 
 literature on modern Islamic education.
Given the dearth of research on the history of this influential university, the 
first part of this chapter aims to sketch key aspects of the IUM’s genesis and 
evolution over half a century, and maps this institutional history onto devel-
opments in the realms of national, regional and global politics over the same 
period. Through an overview of such basic issues as staffing, student recruit-
ment and budgets, I seek to show how the IUM and its missionary project were 
imbricated in far-reaching dynamics of religious revival and reform, political 
economy, domestic manoeuvring and geopolitical rivalry.
The remainder of the chapter shifts away from this macro-level concern with 
overarching institutional frameworks to offer a more microscopic analysis of 
some aspects of teaching. Against a common tendency to view Wahhabism as 
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a hermetically sealed and rigid tradition, I argue that the pedagogy that came 
together at this university was in fact partly shaped by a dynamic of unequal 
reciprocity between the Wahhabi institution, on the one hand, and the staff and 
students from all over the world, on the other. This was a process of give and 
take which saw staff and students influencing the university at the same time as 
they were influenced by it.2
I seek to show how this dynamic related to a politics of religious mission – a 
set of struggles for dominance between an array of actors within this sphere of 
cultural production and pious practice. I argue that the processes of unequal 
reciprocity that played out between the university and its non-Saudi staff and 
students were bound up with power relations in two ways. First, they were 
unequal insofar as they occurred within the context of institutional and social 
relations that placed foreign staff and students in a subordinate position relative 
to the Wahhabi establishment and the Saudi state. Secondly, these processes 
of reciprocity themselves had a role to play in forging power relations insofar as 
they were part and parcel of the construction of the IUM’s missionary enterprise 
as a hegemonic project. I suggest that the IUM’s capacity to undergo transfor-
mations in this way, whilst maintaining core elements of its Wahhabi identity, 
created the space for efforts to develop a kind of moral and intellectual leader-
ship capable of articulating with the dispositions and ambitions of a wide array 
of actors, thereby securing their consent for – and channelling their energies 
into – its missionary project.
Institutional History: A Brief Overview
In accounting for the establishment of the IUM in 1961, commentators have 
noted that this new missionary university, with a majority of student places ear-
marked for non-Saudis, stood to serve an important foreign policy purpose for 
the Saudi regime.3 Insofar as it would promote conservative religious thinking 
amongst Muslim communities abroad, it could arguably help to ameliorate a 
threatening regional environment in which Nasserist and other brands of radical 
republicanism were gaining ground. It has also been noted that the Wahhabi 
establishment was at that time calling for the founding of an Islamic higher edu-
cation institution partly as compensation for the establishment of the University 
of Riyadh in 1957, which was to be geared towards instruction in non-religious 
subjects. From this latter perspective, the founding of the IUM can be seen in 
the context of efforts by the monarchical regime to negotiate patronage relations 
with clerical elites who were prepared to support its quest for domestic political 
legitimacy partly in return for status and resources. The university was further tied 
up with the Saudi royals’ quest for legitimacy insofar as it served to embody dynas-
tic and national narratives of royal beneficence and reformist religious mission.
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At the time of the IUM’s establishment, Saudi Arabia was headed by King 
Saʿud. However, Faisal, who would step in after Saʿud was deposed in 1964, had 
been engaged in a power struggle with his brother since 1958, and had wielded 
extensive powers as prime minister for much of the intervening period leading 
up to the opening of the new university. Against this turbulent background, it 
is difficult to say which – if either – of the two monarchs was the driving force 
behind the new missionary project.4
When it first opened its doors, the IUM consisted only of a secondary school-
level department and a university-level department. Students who enrolled in 
the former were usually to spend three years there, while the study programme in 
the latter extended over four years. Besides Arabic language, the subjects taught 
included tawh∙ ı̄d, Islamic sects (al-firaq al-islāmı̄yya), jurisprudence (fiqh), legal 
methodology (us∙ūl al-fiqh), hadith studies, inheritance law, Islamic history and 
Qurʾanic exegesis (tafsı̄r) and recitation (tajwı̄d).5 In 1963, the higher studies 
department was renamed the College of Shariʿa, and the following years saw the 
founding of a range of additional colleges: a College of Daʿwa and the Principles 
of Religion in 1966; a College of the Qurʾan and Islamic Studies in 1974; a 
College of Arabic Language in 1975; and a College of Hadith and Islamic 
Studies in 1976.6 The university also acquired a Department of Higher Studies 
in 1975,7 which would go on to offer training at master’s and doctorate levels. 
In 1964, it absorbed a pre-existing educational institution in Medina known as 
Dar al-Hadith, and in 1971 it absorbed another institution of the same name 
in Mecca.8 Pre-university-level training came to be divided between a second-
ary institute, an intermediate institute and a stand-alone department offering 
Arabic language instruction to non-native speakers.9
While plans to greatly expand the university had been in place since at least 
the late 1960s, its growth must also be understood in relation to the 1973 oil 
embargo, which led to a sharp rise in oil prices and an enormous boost to the 
Saudi economy. Having risen only gradually since 1961, in the wake of the 
spike in oil profits the IUM budget suddenly increased nearly fivefold in the 
space of just two years; from not much more than 40 million Saudi Riyals (SR) 
in 1394/5 h (c. 1975) to over 196 million SR in 1396/7 h (c. 1976). Following 
a slight drop, the university budget shot up again from a little over 180 million 
SR in 1399/1400 h (c. 1979) to a peak of over 381 million SR in 1402/3 h 
(c. 1982).10 This second massive boost coincided with another spike in oil prices 
which came in the wake of the revolution in Iran in 1979. It also came in the 
context of a renewed emphasis on religious discourse in the political sphere and 
increased spending on religious projects across the board in Saudi Arabia around 
this time. These latter moves were intended to burnish the image of the regime 
and shore up its foundations in the face of new threats posed by revolutionary 
Iran, protests amongst Saudi Arabia’s own Shiʿi population, and particularly the 
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occupation of the Haram Mosque in Mecca by a militant dissident group led by 
Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi, who charged the Al Saʿud family with corruption and 
impiety. Juhayman had in fact previously attended classes at the IUM-affiliated 
Dar al-Hadith and, prior to embarking on a militant trajectory, had started his 
activist career in a pietist proselytising and vigilante movement known as the 
Jamaʿa Salafiyya Muhtasiba (Salafi Group that Commands Right and Forbids 
Wrong), which had ties to major IUM scholars including ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz 
and the Algerian-born Abu Bakr al-Jazaʾiri.11
After this peak, the university’s budget dropped sharply over a period cor-
responding with the recession that hit Saudi Arabia from 1982, before broadly 
levelling out in the mid-1980s, around the same time that the most dramatic 
phase of the economic crisis came to an end.
From the start, the IUM was firmly under the control of the Saudi reli-
gious and political establishments and, even in periods when the teaching fac-
ulty has been dominated by foreigners, it has at all times been headed by a 
Saudi. Initially, it was formally presided over by the kingdom’s Grand Mufti 
Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh. However, it was the future Grand Mufti 
Bin Baz, in his role as Bin Ibrahim’s deputy resident in Medina, who is generally 
considered to have been in de facto charge of the IUM in those early years. Bin 
Baz formally took over the university presidency after Bin Ibrahim’s death in 
196912 and remained in the post until 1975.13 Following Bin Baz’s departure, 
de facto control of the university was handed to ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-ʿAbbad, a 
graduate of the College of Shariʿa in Riyadh who had taught at the IUM since 
it first opened, and then from the late 1970s to ʿAbdullah al-Zayid. In the early 
1980s, the university presidency was formally handed to ʿAbdullah bin Salih 
al-ʿUbayd, who held a PhD from Oklahoma State University and had worked 
in various Saudi state posts in fields including female education, military instruc-
tion and the administration of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.14 He was 
succeeded from the mid-1990s by Salih bin ʿAbdullah al-ʿAbbud, who had a 
doctorate from the IUM and had held teaching and administrative posts there 
for many years.15
Beyond these top echelons, for the first decades of its existence a large pro-
portion of the IUM’s teaching staff came from outside Saudi Arabia. In the 
early 1980s, for example, just 149 of 376 faculty members were identified in staff 
lists as being Saudi citizens – and they included individuals who had been born 
elsewhere, but had settled in the kingdom and taken citizenship. Well over half 
of the non-Saudi staff at that stage were Egyptian, with large numbers also from 
Sudan and others from the wider Middle East, North and West Africa, South 
Asia and even Australia.16 Non-Saudis who taught at the IUM included members 
of movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna 
al-Muhammadiyya and the South Asian Ahl-i Hadith. Figures associated with 
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such movements also took up positions on the university’s Advisory Council. 
The latter, which functioned as a kind of board of directors, allowed the IUM to 
draw on the ideas and the reputations of high-profile ʿulama, intellectuals and 
activists from around the world. Those who attended its first session in 1962, 
for example, included such weighty figures as the Indian revivalists Abul Aʿla 
Mawdudi and Abul Hasan ʿAli al-Nadvi, the Salafi scholar Muhammad Salim 
al-Bayhani from Aden, the Albanian-born hadith specialist Nasir al-Din al-Al-
bani, and the top Iraqi Muslim Brother Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf.
For all the cosmopolitanism of its faculty in the early decades, the IUM was 
subsequently affected by the efforts of the Saudi regime to take a firmer grip on 
the kingdom’s education system in the wake of the Gulf War and the increase 
in Islamist political activism which occurred in the kingdom in the early 1990s. 
This included moves to replace figures seen as sympathetic to politically activist 
thinking and practices inspired in part by the Muslim Brotherhood, with sup-
porters of the politically quietist tradition embodied in the figure of the IUM 
scholar Rabiʿ bin Hadi al-Madkhali.17 In a shift that may also have been partly 
linked to efforts to minimise the scope for politically activist foreigners to cat-
alyse dissent in the kingdom, by the early 1990s the IUM faculty was heavily 
dominated by Saudi nationals and their presence as a proportion of the total 
number of staff continued to increase throughout the decade.18
At the time of writing, the IUM is preparing for the launch of new colleges 
specialising in computer studies, medicine, applied sciences, engineering and 
pharmacy.19 These new moves come in the context of what has been celebrated 
in some sections of the Saudi press as an “opening up” (infitāh∙) in recent years 
of a university that had previously been seen as an enclave of exclusivism.20 The 
IUM is also reported to have received approval to accept female students, to be 
planning to implement distance-learning programmes amid efforts to expand 
student numbers, and even to be preparing to employ non-Muslim staff at new 
sites outside the Medina h∙aram boundary.
21 This shift is often connected with 
the person of Muhammad ʿAli al-ʿAqla, an education administrator who was 
appointed director of the IUM in 2007 and whose tenure was extended by 
a further four years in early 2011.22 In the wake of the attacks in the United 
States in September 2001, the wave of religiously framed militancy that hit 
Saudi Arabia from 2003, and the kingdom’s growing role in the production of a 
“reformed Islam” in the context of the US-led “War on Terror”,23 the university 
has also hosted conferences on topics such as “extremism” and “the combatting 
of terrorism”.24
By around 2002 (1422/3 h) the IUM had offered over 28,000 scholarships to 
young men from all over the world.25 Such scholarships included not only free 
tuition, but also material support covering such things as transport from stu-
dents’ countries of origin to Medina and visits home each year, accommodation, 
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books and money towards clothes, and stipends to cover daily costs.26 However, 
factors such as declined offers and substantial drop-out rates meant that the total 
number of graduates in the same period was probably significantly lower. Other 
figures published by the university suggest that the number of individuals who 
had actually secured undergraduate-level qualifications by around 1417/8 h (c. 
1997) totalled 11,781, with the annual crop having increased from a first wave 
of 43 graduates in 1384/5 h (c. 1965) to 609 in 1417/8 h (c. 1997).27 In 2010, 
al-ʿAqla told a journalist that the university had over 30,000 graduates.28 A list 
of the countries from which the first group of forty-three graduates were drawn 
is almost entirely made up of states with Muslim-majority populations, particu-
larly in the Middle East and Arabic-speaking parts of Africa.29 The fact that the 
countries of origin of these first students overlap significantly with the countries 
of origin of the members of the university’s founding Advisory Council suggests 
that recruitment at that early stage may have been conducted partly through 
these and other IUM scholars’ own networks. A list of students’ countries of 
origin from the late 1960s points to efforts to expand the geographical reach 
of recruitment, including in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and 
Africa.30 The geographical breadth of recruitment – measured in terms of the 
numbers of countries from which students were drawn – continued to increase 
in the decades that followed, and the university also eventually began to make 
significant inroads into minority Muslim communities in Europe and North 
America.31 As of February 2011, the IUM was reported to have 13,000 students 
from 160 countries.32
Over time, a great many IUM graduates would go on to achieve prominence 
as high-profile scholars, activists and public figures both within and outside cir-
cles which are commonly labelled Salafi. Within Salafi circles, its alumni are to 
be found all around the world and situated across the spectrum of viewpoints on 
key issues, including the permissibility of political activism and the legitimacy 
of using violent means to achieve political change under current conditions. 
For example, Saudi IUM graduates range from Safar al-Hawali, a key figure in 
the wave of politically activist Islamism known as the Sahwa, which peaked in 
the kingdom in the 1990s, to Rabiʿ bin Hadi al-Madkhali, who also went on 
to teach at the IUM and whose name became synonymous with the neo-Ahl 
al-Hadith tradition whose staunchly quietist stance set up a fierce rivalry with 
the Sahwa. Just a few examples of the diverse range of Salafi figures beyond the 
kingdom who are IUM alumni include Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadiʿi, the father 
figure of contemporary Salafism in Yemen who negotiated an ambivalent path 
between pietist mission and strident positions on key political issues; Jaʿfar 
Mahmud Adam and Muhammad Sani ʿUmar, who became prominent in new 
forms of anti-Sufi activism in northern Nigeria after their return to their country 
of origin;33 the Egypt-born ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿAbd al-Khaliq, who subsequently 
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based himself in Kuwait and has been a key representative of efforts to bring 
together elements of Salafi piety and the Muslim Brotherhood’s style of think-
ing and political practice; and Bilal Phillips, a Jamaica-born convert who is 
now a prominent preacher. Others with looser links to the IUM include the 
Jordan-based Palestinian jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who never 
enrolled at the university, but was informally granted use of its facilities as a 
young man;34 and Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi, the leader of the 1979 Haram Mosque 
siege who, as mentioned previously, had taken classes at the affiliated Dar 
al-Hadith.
Some IUM graduates have been employed by the Saudi state agency Dar 
al-Iftaʾ to undertake missionary work outside Saudi Arabia. Others have played 
leading roles in more autonomous transnational missionary initiatives, examples 
including Bangladesh-born Tawfique Chowdhury of Al Kauthar Institute, and 
Canada-born Muhammad Alshareef and US-born Yasir Qadhi of Al Maghrib 
Institute. Many others do not particularly engage in coordinated preaching 
activities, focusing instead on workaday employment in their countries of origin 
or elsewhere in order to support themselves and their families.
Transnational Exchange, Hegemony and the 
Making of a Salafi Pedagogy
The remainder of this chapter deals primarily with the content and methods 
of teaching at the IUM, with a particular focus on two key subject areas: ʿaqı̄da 
(creed) and fiqh (jurisprudence). Through this exploration of pedagogy, I seek 
to draw out certain broader dynamics which may help to explain the achieve-
ment of the IUM in attracting large numbers of students and winning them over 
to its missionary project. The university’s success, measured in these terms, in 
itself presents something of an empirical puzzle. Previous attempts at Wahhabi 
outreach beyond the Arabian peninsula had faced a great deal of resistance 
from the eighteenth century right up until the twentieth century.35 The Saudi 
religious establishment, moreover, remained relatively exclusivist and inward- 
looking for much of the first half of the twentieth century. The newly appointed 
Grand Mufti Muhammad bin Ibrahim chaired the first formal high-level summit 
with Muslim leaders from outside the kingdom as late as 1954, just a few years 
before the IUM opened its doors.36 It was thus by no means obvious at the time 
of the founding of the IUM that a missionary educational institution controlled 
by Najdi religious actors, who until recently had in many ways been isolated and 
marginal on the global stage, stood much chance of success.
Various factors have already been touched upon that may help to account 
for the IUM’s ability to attract and forge bonds with large numbers of students 
from diverse backgrounds, including a very generous scholarship programme and 
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evidence to suggest a strategy of initial recruitment through existing networks. 
In the discussion that follows, I identify various further factors, but pay particu-
lar attention to the role played by a certain dynamic of unequal reciprocity. 
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, I use the latter term to refer 
to a capacity on the part of the university itself to undergo transformations in 
the process of dialogical engagement with actors from around the world, while 
retaining core elements of its Wahhabi identity. I will suggest that such a 
dynamic had a part to play in efforts to construct a missionary project capable of 
articulating with the dispositions and ambitions of a wide range of actors.
To argue that the IUM was shaped through processes of dialogical exchange is 
not to suggest that it was moulded through open debate and consensus between 
a range of Saudi and non-Saudi actors who were on an equal footing. It is clear 
that from the start there was an imbalance of power in the relationship between 
the university and its students, especially insofar as those behind the IUM had 
access to vast reserves of symbolic capital deriving from the fact that the reli-
gious training they offered was to take place in the city of the Prophet. Students 
were able to spend their evenings studying and socialising in the Prophet’s 
Mosque, and there is no question that the lure of this sacred geography is very 
strong.
The relationship between the university and its students was also character-
ised by a vast imbalance in the distribution of material capital. The ability of 
those behind the IUM to offer fully funded, degree-level religious training with a 
very generous package of additional support, including monthly stipends, played 
a major part in setting the terms of a superordinate–subordinate relationship. 
The real value of this support varied over time. However, at least at some stages 
in the university’s history the financial support available was generous enough 
that students from developing countries were able to save a proportion of their 
maintenance payments towards the cost of projects such as building a home. 
Others used this money and the availability of free flights during the summer 
vacations to go on gap-year-style adventures and see the world.37
To emphasise the part played by these reserves of material capital in shaping 
power relations between the university and its students is not to claim that the 
university simply “bought” its students. In fact, at least some students secure 
access to this capital in a quite self-conscious way, aware of what they stand to 
gain from an IUM training, the costs and risks that attend this process, and the 
scope that exists for negotiating desired outcomes. One South African-born 
graduate, for example, recalled that he had been oriented towards Sufi Islam 
before taking up a place at the IUM in the 1980s. Studying in this Salafi-
oriented environment thus brought many challenges. However, he steeled him-
self in order that he could enjoy the benefits associated with an IUM education, 
including not only advanced Arabic-language training, but also residence in 
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Medina and free flights during university vacations, which he was able to use to 
travel the world. He emerged at the end of the process with qualifications and 
skills that then allowed him to transition to a prestigious master’s course and 
then a PhD programme in Europe.38
The superordinate–subordinate relationship between the university and its 
students was not only defined by a differential distribution of material and 
symbolic capital. The processes of dialogical engagement that are the focus of 
this section also occurred against the backdrop of the uneven power relations 
inherent in any modern, disciplinary educational set-up. Over time, the uni-
versity came increasingly to employ disciplinary educational techniques with 
genealogies that ran through Europe: a campus set-up marking off space that 
was to be dedicated exclusively to the purposes of education, and internal par-
titioning of this space into individual dormitories, colleges and classrooms; syl-
labuses delineating in detail the knowledge that was to be transmitted in class; 
timetables dividing up the days, weeks and years into blocks of time reserved 
for particular tasks; written examinations producing quantitative scores upon 
which depended progression through a series of seamless, consecutive levels of 
schooling; detailed regulations governing student behaviour and graded pun-
ishments for infringements; a system of social supervision, including discussion 
seminars and monitoring of conduct on campus; a university magazine facilitat-
ing debate beyond the classroom of scholarly matters and issues of contemporary 
personal, social and political concern; and so on. Through the use of such ped-
agogical techniques, students’ bodies were ordered in space and time, confined 
and exposed such that their behaviour and performance could be systematically 
observed, examined, ranked, corrected, recorded, rewarded and punished.
Apart from the imbalance in power between the university and its students, 
there was also a corresponding imbalance of power between the Saudi actors 
responsible for the university and those they brought in from beyond the penin-
sula to help staff it. The control over the university alluded to earlier by actors 
within the Saudi religious and political establishments was bolstered by a ration-
alised, hierarchical institutional set-up, enshrined in founding documents that 
mapped out in detail the specific prerogatives and responsibilities of the range 
of actors involved. For example, King Saʿud was named personally as not only 
its founder and benefactor, but also as its supreme president,39 with substantial 
oversight powers such as the right to review recommendations issued by the 
Advisory Council before communicating them to the working president.40
It was within the terms of these unequal relationships – defined by differential 
distribution of material and symbolic capital, the implementation of disciplinary 
technologies, and bureaucratic mapping of powers and responsibilities – that 
certain dynamics of dialogical engagement were to play out: between the uni-
versity and those who were brought in from outside as staff, and also between 
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the university and its students. Such dynamics can be explored in particularly 
rich detail through analysis of the syllabuses in use at the IUM at different times. 
These serve to underline that any description of the university as a Wahhabi 
institution must be considerably qualified.
One area where the label “Wahhabi” might perhaps be usefully employed, 
if very cautiously, is in relation to instruction in ʿaqı̄da. The question of creed, 
and the issue of tawḥı̄d in particular, had been the keystone of Muhammad ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s reformist mission and remained a paramount concern for his 
Najdi inheritors when the new university opened its doors some two centuries 
later. It was their particular conception of tawḥı̄d that grounded the opposition 
of the reformist Najdi ʿulama to traditional religious practices, like seeking the 
intercession of saints, which they saw as amounting to shirk, or polytheism. It 
was thus to be expected that this aspect of teaching at the IUM would be subject 
to a special degree of control.
According to the syllabus that was in place when the university opened its 
doors,41 the course on tawḥı̄d at the secondary level was to involve memorisa-
tion of text from Kitab al-Tawhid, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s own key manifesto on 
the topic, as well as study of a famous commentary on the same text titled Fath 
al-Majid by his grandson, the leading nineteenth-century Najdi scholar ʿAbd 
al-Rahman bin Hasan Al al-Shaykh. In the third year, students were to study 
al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya by Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar who had been a key influence 
on Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab.42 The content of teaching here thus reflects a firm 
situatedness in the Saudi context. The equivalent course at the higher studies 
level was to last three years, with this entire period devoted to the study of a 
commentary by the fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz on Abu Jaʿfar 
al-Tahawi’s al-ʿAqida al-Tahawiyya.43
Syllabuses in use for tawḥı̄d courses in the early 1990s show continuities with 
this earlier set-up, though with signs of some further opening up to influences 
beyond the narrow confines of the Wahhabi tradition. In the intermediate insti-
tute, the subject was again to be taught with reference to Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s 
Kitab al-Tawhid, as well as an introduction to Risalat ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani.44 
Al-Qayrawani was a tenth-century North African Maliki scholar who wrote in 
opposition to the perceived excesses of mysticism and claims of miracle-working, 
concerns which were of course later also prominent in the Wahhabi tradition.45 
At the secondary level, students were again to study the whole of ʿAbd al-Rah-
man Al al-Shaykh’s Fath al-Majid and what seems to be a commentary on Ibn 
Taymiyya’s al-ʿAqida al-Wasitiyya written by Muhammad Khalil Harras, a con-
temporary Egyptian Azhari with links to the Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya 
Salafi movement.46 At the university level, the main texts taught on tawḥı̄d 
were a series of works by Ibn Taymiyya: Shafaʾ al-ʿAlil by Ibn al-Qayyim, a stu-
dent of Ibn Taymiyya who had long been a strong influence within the Wahhabi 
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tradition; the same commentary by Ibn Abi al-ʿIzz on al-ʿAqida al-Tahawiyya; 
and Taysir al-ʿAziz al-Hamid by Shaykh Suliman bin ʿAbdullah bin Muhammad 
bin ʿAbd al-Wahhab, another grandson of the figurehead of Wahhabism.47 At 
this level, these main texts were backed up by a list of additional resources to be 
used as further reference points for study, including works by the South Asian 
forebear of the Ahl-i Hadith, Muhammad Siddiq Hasan and the early twenti-
eth-century Cairo-based Syrian reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida.
While the presence of these latter texts in particular points to some degree 
of transnational exchange in the teaching of ʿaqı̄da and an opening up beyond 
the relatively narrow confines of the Wahhabi tradition,48 other parts of the 
syllabus are even more clearly suggestive of such dynamics. The teaching of 
fiqh offers a particularly neat example and is the focus of the remainder of this 
section.
It is well known that there has long been a tension within the Wahhabi 
tradition as regards deriving legal rulings. On the one hand, there was a com-
mitment in principle to the rejection of straightforward taqlı̄d, the practice of 
simply imitating the substantive legal rulings laid down by any one of the major 
schools of Islamic law (madhāhib, sing. madhhab). Instead, Wahhabi scholars 
have advocated what Frank Vogel has referred to as “dalı̄l theory” – the idea 
that any person, particularly a judge or a mufti, “is obliged to examine the proof 
for legal views to the extent of his capability, and to adopt that view for which 
the proof seems stronger”.49 This proof, or dalı̄l in Arabic, is to be found in the 
Qurʾan, the sunna and the ijmāʿ (consensus) of the first generations of Muslims. 
However, in practice Wahhabi scholarship has been very closely associated with 
the Hanbali school of law. As one top Saudi judge put it to Vogel, the kingdom’s 
judges are Hanbalis; however, their commitment to that madhhab amounts to 
ittibāʿ (acknowledgement of leadership) rather than blind taqlı̄d, since they 
reserve the right to go against the rulings of that school where they find a dalı̄l 
which points to an alternative ruling.50
At the time of the founding of the IUM in 1961, the original syllabus pro-
vided for fiqh to be taught from texts by the twelfth-century Hanbali scholar 
Muwaffiq al-Din ibn Qudama (1146–1223). In the secondary-level department, 
the text used was Ibn Qudama’s al-ʿUmda, and at the higher level it was his 
al-Muqniʿ. This use of Hanbali legal manuals as a basis for instruction makes it 
clear that at this very early point in the university’s history the arrangements for 
teaching substantive law closely reflected the Hanbali leanings that had histor-
ically been very strongly characteristic of Wahhabi legal practice. Works of fiqh 
by Ibn Qudama, including his al-ʿUmda and al-Muqniʿ, had long been a staple of 
Wahhabi scholarship in this field.51 It is worth noting that in the earliest days of 
the IUM, separate courses on legal methodology (us∙ūl al-fiqh) were to be taught 
at the secondary level from a book authored by staff from the Colleges of Arabic 
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 32 —
Language and Shariʿa in Riyadh, and at the advanced level from Ibn Qudama’s 
Rawdat al-Nazir.
In a contemporary description of the teaching of fiqh at the IUM at this 
early stage, Bin Baz sought to downplay the Hanbali leanings in the syllabus. 
In practice, he insisted, teaching staff took a comparative approach to this 
subject that went beyond just this one madhhab. “Teaching of the subject 
of fiqh in the university . . . is not restricted to explaining the matter of that 
madhhab the teaching of which is stipulated [on the syllabus]. Rather, the 
teacher expands as if he is teaching [multiple] madhāhib, not one madhhab, 
and he acquaints the student with the best interpretation according to evi-
dence from the Book and the sunna, or from one of them.”52 That there was 
at least a limited comparative component in the teaching of fiqh at this very 
early stage in the university’s history is also evidenced by an explanatory note 
in the original syllabus, which stipulates that – where possible – instruction 
in this subject should include exploration of cases where there is disagreement 
between the madhāhib and declaration of the preponderant position (tarjı̄h∙) 
on the basis of proof.
However that may be, changes were soon made to the university’s syllabuses 
which took things much more clearly in the direction of an opening up beyond 
Hanbali jurisprudence. An IUM alumnus who was among the first group of stu-
dents from Pakistan to enrol at the university in 1962 recalled that his cohort 
at the advanced level had studied fiqh partly from Ibn Qudama’s al-Muqniʿ, as 
set out in the original syllabus. However, they had also studied another work 
altogether, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid by the Maliki scholar 
Ibn Rushd.53 This text, which would subsequently become the key reference 
point for the teaching of this subject at the IUM, is strongly comparative in its 
approach and includes critical discussion of the positions of each of the various 
law schools on any given matter.54
Syllabuses in use in the early 1990s show that by that time, fiqh was still being 
taught in the intermediate institute from Ibn Qudama’s ʿUmdat al-Fiqh.55 In the 
secondary institute, students were to study fiqh from a commentary on this text 
titled al-ʿIdda Sharh al-ʿUmda and authored by Bahaʾ al-Din ʿAbd al-Rahman 
bin Ibrahim al-Maqdisi. At this level, they were to study us∙ūl al-fiqh from a work 
authored by a number of scholars, including the IUM’s own ʿ Atiyya Muhammad 
Salim, titled Tashil al-Wusul ila ʿIlm al-Usul.56 However, at the university level, 
fiqh was to be taught from Ibn Rushd’s Bidayat al-Mujtahid. What is more, this 
text was to be studied alongside the most important works from each of the four 
madhāhib (ummahāt kutub al-fiqh fı̄ kull madhhab min al-madhāhib al-arbiʿa).57 
Us∙ūl al-fiqh was to be taught primarily from Ibn Qudama’s Rawdat al-Nazir, 
along with a commentary on this text titled Nuzhat al-Khatir al-ʿAtir by Ibn 
Badran.
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It is thus clear that Hanbali texts remained important in the teaching of legal 
methodology at the IUM well into the 1990s, and that Hanbali manuals were 
also in use at this time for the teaching of substantive law at the less advanced 
levels. Some graduates suggest that an implicit Hanbali bias also persists in prac-
tice in the teaching of fiqh even at the higher levels. However, even allowing for 
any such residual Hanbali bias and even allowing for Bin Baz’s insistence that 
fiqh teaching at the IUM in its earliest days included a comparative component, 
the introduction of Bidayat al-Mujtahid as the primary text for the teaching of fiqh 
at the university level soon after the university’s founding nonetheless reflected a 
significant, concrete shift at that very early stage towards a much more explicitly 
comparative approach than had been reflected in the original syllabuses. This 
shift is in keeping with a broader trend in legal practice in Saudi Arabia in the 
twentieth century, which saw judges and scholars becoming somewhat less con-
strained by Hanbali norms.58 Other Saudi institutions founded in this period also 
came to teach fiqh as a matter of comparison between the various madhāhib.59 
Nonetheless, the decision at the IUM to switch from using Hanbali legal manu-
als to a comparative work by a Maliki scholar merits further exploration, as a very 
specific transition occurring in a particular time and context.
This transition might be partly explained in terms of a dynamic of dialog-
ical engagement with those who arrived from outside the kingdom to teach 
and otherwise staff the IUM. As was mentioned above, Wahhabi scholars had 
long been committed to the rejection of taqlı̄d in principle, even if in practice 
they had tended to operate firmly within the framework of the Hanbali school 
of law. This rejection of taqlı̄d was further encouraged by influences arriving 
at the university from beyond the peninsula. For example, the Albanian-born 
Nasir al-Din al-Albani, a formidable figure who arrived to teach at the IUM 
very early on and was a member of its founding Advisory Council, held a pro-
found commitment to the rejection of taqlı̄d that may well have contributed to 
pulling the university away from its early Hanbali leanings.60 Another possible 
influence is the Egyptian Ansar al-Sunna movement, members of which studied 
and taught at the IUM. The former president of Ansar al-Sunna ʿAbd al-Razzaq 
ʿAfifi sat on the IUM’s founding Advisory Council and was apparently involved 
in drawing up syllabuses. As far back as 1949, following a visit to Saudi Arabia, 
the Egyptian scholar and Ansar al-Sunna affiliate Ahmad Muhammad Shakir 
had written to King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz with recommendations for how to organise 
the country’s judicial and education systems. In that report, he had insisted 
on the importance of Bidayat al-Mujtahid and its treatment of the differences 
between the madhāhib, noting that this crucial work had first been published 
in Egypt in the early 1920s in an edition edited by his own father, the scholar 
Muhammad Shakir.61 All this points to ways in which a certain dynamic of 
dialogical engagement between the university and those who were brought 
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 34 —
from beyond the kingdom to staff it might have contributed to shaping modes 
of teaching there.
Quite apart from this dialogical engagement with staff brought from beyond 
the kingdom, the shift in approaches to teaching fiqh also appears to have been 
tied to a certain dynamic of unequal reciprocity between the university and its 
students. In the earliest days of the university’s existence, various voices coming 
both from within and from outside the IUM were critical of what was perceived 
to be the teaching of Hanbali fiqh at the university at that time and called for 
more serious engagement with all four madhāhib. These calls appealed to the 
ideal of rejecting taqlı̄d. However, they also explicitly emphasised the need for 
the university to adapt to the attitudes and expectations of its students – and the 
need to do this specifically in order to secure their consent to, and their active 
participation in, its missionary project.
An example of this kind of argument is found in an article published in the 
newspaper al-Madina al-Munawwara in December 1961 by the Hijazi intellec-
tual Ahmad ʿAbdullah al-Fasi, who had been a vocal public advocate of the 
founding of an Islamic university in Medina in the years immediately prior to its 
establishment. Urging that the university should teach all four madhāhib rather 
than just one, al-Fasi argued that none of the law schools contradicts the Qurʾan 
and the sunna. He also raised practical considerations stemming from the need 
to appeal to a diversity of actors. He reminded his readers that “the students 
who come to the university have studied from madhāhib other than that which 
is taught to them in the university – and that is what they aspire to”.62 Later in 
the article, he added:
In addition, the penetration of these madhāhib in the Islamic regions makes 
it difficult for graduates of this university to guide the public there. It is hard, 
as we know, for a person to be able to convince the public to change their 
madhhab. This is something that is admitted and it must not escape our 
consideration, especially given that our guiding principle is offering reli-
gious guidance to Muslims and providing them with that which illuminates 
for them the way and clears for them the path towards knowledge of their 
madhāhib, as well as their ability to explain to the people in their homes the 
issues of their religion.
Bin Baz took this critique seriously enough to produce a lengthy response, which 
was published in the same newspaper the following month. In it, he insisted that 
“All of us realise what profound benefit and great utility there is in teaching fiqh 
according to the four madhāhib, as long as they are taught according to a correct 
procedure and as long as the teacher possesses penetrating vision with regard to 
the horizons of the shariʿa and the ability to dive into its beloved depths.”63 It 
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was in this context that he offered the description of the teaching of fiqh at the 
university quoted earlier in this chapter, in which he insisted that IUM staff did 
in practice include a comparative element.
Bin Baz gave assurances that the issue would be examined by the university 
council and that a decision would be made according to the common interest. 
He concluded with a critique of what he saw as an unhelpful generalisation in 
al-Fasi’s remark that none of the madhāhib contradicts the Qurʾan or the sunna, 
and that all of them proceed according to the guidance offered by these two 
sources. If al-Fasi meant that the four imams all strove to base their work upon 
these sources, then, of course, that is true. However, if al-Fasi meant that all of 
the madhāhib are free from anything that contradicts Revelation, then that is 
obviously incorrect, “for in matters of disagreement there is one truth and that 
is what accords with the Book and the sunna”.
This lengthy, very public response from Bin Baz did not put the matter to rest. 
As long as the texts on the syllabus remained Hanbali fiqh manuals, the dissent-
ers do not appear to have been satisfied with his claim that teachers went beyond 
these core works to offer a wider perspective. In a memorandum presented to the 
first session of the IUM’s Advisory Council in May 1962, council member Abul 
Hasan ʿAli al-Nadvi – a high-profile revivalist scholar associated with the Indian 
Nadwatul Ulama – again urged that all four madhāhib should be taught at the 
university. He asserted his own support as a matter of principle for a programme of 
study free of the practice of taqlı̄d. However, he also made the separate argument 
that “if the student graduates from this university ignorant of his [own] madhhab, 
or of the madhhab of the society in which he will live and in which environment 
he will undertake his daʿwa, the performance of the burdens of daʿwa will not be 
fitting and there will not be a connection between him and his environment that 
will make it possible to exert influence within it and to win trust”.64
What is particularly significant in these debates in the context of the cur-
rent discussion is that they clearly reflect an explicit recognition on the part of 
actors who moved in the IUM’s orbit that adapting to the needs and attitudes 
of students and those to whom they were intended to preach was important if 
it was to be hoped that these people would invest themselves in the university’s 
religious mission. It was only in this way that the missionary project underlying 
the university could secure their consent. Such considerations thus appear to 
have been one of a range of factors at play in the subtle, but significant, shift 
in the teaching of fiqh that occurred at the IUM soon after it opened its doors.
Conclusion
The institutional structures and pedagogical practices that took shape and 
evolved at the IUM from the early 1960s were far from being a straightforward 
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instantiation of an ossified, timeless set of texts, practices and ideals. Rather, 
they were very much a product of a particular historical conjuncture and a par-
ticular array of contingent political, social and pragmatic as well as theological 
considerations.
In the course of this chapter, I have paid particular attention to the ways in 
which this important missionary university was situated within, and shaped by, 
dynamics of nation and state-building, political economy, geopolitical rivalry 
and domestic protest. I also sought to highlight another kind of politics alto-
gether, involving relations of power and resistance that operated more subtly at 
the level of cultural production and pious practice. At this level, the construc-
tion of the IUM’s missionary project and the kind of modern Salafi pedagogy 
that supported it were about more than just the organic evolution of intellectual 
and spiritual discursive traditions. They also involved struggles for influence 
and dominance between individuals, social movements and state actors, which 
appear to have played out through dynamics including the construction of 
consent to a project of moral and intellectual leadership, within a framework of 
unequal relations defined by disciplinary technologies, bureaucratic structures 
and unequal distribution of material and symbolic capital.
In the past there has often been a tendency to depict Wahhabism as some-
thing unitary and self-propelling. In fact, discursive structures including reli-
gious traditions are surely always porous and prone to continuous evolution 
through the absorption and re-articulation of external influences. In the par-
ticular context explored in this chapter, this permeability and dynamism were 
in fact arguably further catalysed by efforts to expand Wahhabi influence and 
to hegemonise non-Wahhabi Muslims far beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia.
Notes
 1. The author would like to thank the many graduates and former staff members of 
the Islamic University of Medina who have shared their knowledge of, and their 
personal perspectives on, the history of this institution. I am also grateful to all 
those who provided invaluable feedback on draft versions of this chapter or other-
wise shared their expertise during the writing process. They include John Chalcraft, 
Stéphane Lacroix, John Sidel, Neil Ketchley, Hania Sobhy, Lamiaa Shehata, 
Richard Gauvain, participants at the “Modern Salafism: Doctrine, Politics, Jihad” 
seminar convened by Robert Gleave at the University of Exeter in April 2012, and 
participants at the Centres of Islamic Learning conference convened by Masooda 
Bano and Keiko Sakurai at the University of Oxford in August 2012. Finally, this 
research would not have been possible without financial support from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the 
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, the Gilchrist Educational Trust, and the 
University of London Central Research Fund.
The Islamic University of Medina since 1961
— 37 —
 2. I use the term “Wahhabi” throughout this chapter advisedly, conscious that it is an 
exonym considered derogatory by those to whom it is applied. Use of this term is, of 
course, not meant to imply devotion to the figure of Muhammad bin ʿAbd al-Wah-
hab, but rather a location within a heterogeneous and dynamic religious tradition, 
the genealogy of which happens contingently to trace back in part to his thinking 
and practices. I use the term for want of a satisfactory alternative: “Salafi”, for exam-
ple, fails to account for the specificities of the particular modes of Salafi religiosity 
that emerged and evolved in Najd and other areas that now fall within the borders 
of Saudi Arabia; “Najdi Salafi” and other such geographically limited terms fail to 
acknowledge the globe-spanning connections within which Wahhabism was situ-
ated right from the start; and so on.
 3. Henri Lauziere, “The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century Through 
the Life and Thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali”, PhD dissertation, Georgetown 
University, 2008), pp. 334–5; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi 
Arabia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 126.
 4. It is worth noting in this regard that Faisal visited the IUM a year after it was 
founded, well before he became king. Ahmad bin ʿAtiyya al-Ghamidi (ed.), al-Kitab 
al-Wathaʾiqi ʿ an al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara (Medina: al-Jamiʿa 
al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara, 1998), p. 90.
 5. “Al-Nizam al-Asasi li-l-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara”, 9 Rabı̄ʿ 
al-Akhir 1381 h (19 September 1961), reproduced in al-Ghamidi (ed.), al-Kitab, pp. 
52–8.
 6. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, pp. 290, 301, 312, 323, 336. The dates given here accord with 
the issuing of royal decrees giving the go-ahead for the various colleges, which may 
in fact have begun work slightly later.
 7. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, p. 282.
 8. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, pp. 363, 370.
 9. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, pp. 347–60.
10. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, p. 281.
11. For this and more on the Haram Mosque siege, see Thomas Hegghammer and 
Stéphane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman 
al-ʿUtaybi Revisited”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39 (2007): 103–
22. On the subsequent increase in spending on religious projects, see, e.g., Toby 
Jones, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 217–27. In the wake of the Haram 
Mosque siege, the IUM journal ran an article by Bin Baz rejecting the eventual 
militant actions and ideology of Juhayman and his comrades. See Bin Baz, “Hadith 
al-Masjid al-Haram wa-Amr al-Mahdi al-Muntazar”, Majallat al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya, 
45.
12. Muhammad bin Ibrahim died in late 1969, but Bin Baz was not appointed to the 
presidency until late 1970. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, pp. 214, 216.
13. At that time, Bin Baz left in order to take charge of the Presidency for Scholastic 
Research, the Issuing of Fatwas, Islamic Call and Guidance. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, 
p. 217.
14. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, pp. 222–3.
15. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, pp. 224–5.
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 38 —
16. Dalil Aʿda Hayʾat al-Tadris wa-l-Muhadirin wa-l-Muʿidin (Medina: Jamiʿa al-Islami-
yya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara, 1401–2 h), p. 15.
17. For a fuller discussion of the regime’s drive to take a firmer grip on the kingdom’s 
universities, including the IUM, see Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics 
of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, trans. George Holoch (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
18. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, p. 277.
19. Al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara, see at: http://www.iu.edu.sa/
Pages/default.aspx, accessed 26 June 2012.
20. For example, Mustafa al-Ansari, “al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya Taʿud ila ‘al-Waraʾ 
al-Dhahabi’”, Jaridat al-Hayat, 17 December 2010; and ʿAbdullah bin Ibrahim 
al-ʿAskar, “Iʿadat Milad al-Jamiʿa”, al-Riyad, available at: http://www.alriyadh.
com/2011/01/05/article591885.html, accessed 13 August 2012.
21. Falih al-Dhibyani, “Islamic University to Admit Women”, Saudi Gazette, 7 February 
2011; Huda al-Salih, “Mudir al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya: sa-nastaʿin bi-ghayr al-mus-
limin kharij hudud al-haram”, Jaridat al-Sharq al-Awsat, 10 April 2010, available at: 
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=43&article=564559&issueno=11456, 
accessed 13 August 2012.
22. Al-Dhibyani, “Islamic University to Admit Women”. For a biography of al-ʿAqla, 
see “Muʿali al-Duktur Muhammad ʿAli al-ʿAqla: al-Sira al-Dhatiyya”, al-Jamiʿa 
al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara, available at: http://www.iu.edu.sa/AboutIU/
Heads/Pages/Heads-05.aspx, accessed 26 June 2012.
23. Salwa Ismail, “Producing ‘Reformed Islam’: A Saudi Contribution to the US Projects 
of Global Governance”, in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi 
Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (London: Hurst, 2008), pp. 113–34.
24. “Muʾtamar al-Irhab Bayn Tatarruf al-Fikr wa Fikr al-Tatarruf”, al-Jamiʿa al-Islam-
iyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara, available at: http://www.iu.edu.sa/Conferences/
erhaabcon/Pages/default.aspx; and “al-Muʾtamar al-Duwali al-Thani li-Mukafahat 
al-Irhab”, al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya bi-l-Madina al-Munawwara, available at: http://www.
iu.edu.sa/Conferences/erhab/Pages/default.aspx, accessed 26 June 2012.
25. “Juhud Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn fi Taʿlim Abnaʾ al-Muslimin min Khilal 
al-Minah al-Dirasiyya ilati Tuqim-ha al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya”, Majallat al-Jamiʿa 
al-Islamiyya, 118 (1423 h, ad 2002/2003).
26. ʿAbdullah bin Salih bin ʿAbdullah al-ʿAbbud, Juhud al-Mamlaka al-ʿArabiyya 
al-Suʿudiyya fi-l-Daʿwa ila Allah Taʿala fi al-Kharij min Khilal al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya, 
2 vols (Medina: al-Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 390–401. In 1397–8 h 
(c. 1977), for example, the standard monthly stipend for undergraduate-level stu-
dents was 525 SR.
27. Al-Ghamidi, al-Kitab, p. 387.
28. Al-Salih, “Mudir al- Jamiʿa al-Islamiyya”.
29. The countries listed are Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Yemen, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Indonesia, India and “Turkistan”. Dalil al-Jamiʿa 
al-Islamiyya fi al-Madina al-Munawwara (1971), p. 59.
30. Ninety graduates in 1388/9 h included individuals from nearly all of the same 
countries (except Tunisia and “Turkistan”), and also from Lebanon, Morocco, the 
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Chapter 2




Qom, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, is the world’s largest centre for Shiʿi schol-
arship, and is also a popular site for pilgrimage.1 The city as a whole has a resi-
dent contingent of about 50,000 Iranian seminary students, including women,2 
as well about 12,000 students from outside Iran.3 Most of the foreign students 
are studying at one of the seminaries belonging to al-Mustafa International 
University (MIU) (in Persian, Danishgah-i Bainul-milali-yi al-Mustafa; in 
Arabic, Jamiʿat al-Mustafa al-Alamiyya), an umbrella organisation that coordi-
nates seminaries, schools and educational centres exclusively for non-Iranians, 
operating both inside and outside Iran. The growth of non-Iranian students 
studying at Iranian seminaries is a post-revolutionary phenomenon facilitated 
by the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic, who were eager to promote their 
ideology overseas.
Though MIU itself was only recently founded, it has more than two decades’ 
previous history under the name of the International Centre for Islamic Studies 
(ICIS) (Markaz-i Jahani-yi ʿUlum-i Islami) and the Organisation for Overseas 
Seminaries and Schools (OOSS) (Sazman-i Hawza va Madaris-i ʿIlmiyya-yi 
Kharij az Khishvar). The former was established in 1986 as a supervisory organ-
isation for non-Iranian students admitted to Iranian seminaries, and the latter 
was founded in 1991–2 to supervise the schools and seminaries established 
outside Iran for non-Iranian students.4 According to the MIU’s official prospec-
tus of 2009, it had about 18,000 non-Iranian students, 10,000 of whom were 
studying in Iran while the remaining 8,000 were housed in affiliated institutions 
across the world.5
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Despite the MIU’s growing investment in the education of non-Iranians, 
its activities have not yet been the subject of scholarly examination. Although 
Iranian seminaries in the revolutionary period, including their management 
styles and curricula, have been the subjects of some outstanding studies by 
Western academics,6 and certain books in Persian have described the changes 
that took place in post-revolutionary domestic seminaries,7 recent works on the 
development of transnational Shiʿi networks have not yet paid attention to the 
activities of MIU, including ICIS and OOSS.8 This chapter aims to fill this gap, 
and thereby to gain a better understanding of how clerical leaders of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran have tried to make the Qom seminaries the world centre of 
Shiʿi scholarship.
This chapter draws on observations of the activities of MIU and its fore-
runners (ICIS and OOSS), as well as documents issued by MIU and related 
organisations, secondary sources, and interviews with professors, administrators 
and graduates of ICIS and MIU in Iran, Pakistan, Thailand, Indonesia and else-
where. It presents an examination of MIU, including ICIS and OOSS, which 
focuses on the following aspects: first, the internal and external factors that 
allowed MIU (including ICIS and OOSS) to become a powerful institution in 
post-revolutionary Iran; secondly, the organisational features of ICIS and MIU 
and the attempts that have been made to develop a new model of seminary 
education for non-Iranian students; thirdly, MIU’s strategy for reaching out 
to the rest of the world through its various branches and affiliated institutions; 
fourthly, the way graduates of ICIS and MIU utilise their education in local 
communities; and, fifthly, the implications of the increasing prominence of 
MIU within Muslim societies, especially in the Shiʿi world.
The central argument of this chapter is that MIU’s model of education, like 
that of ICIS, has diverged from that of traditional seminaries: first, in empha-
sising the training of propagators of religion, rather than mujtahids (experts who 
can issue authoritative opinions on Islamic law); secondly, in the provision of a 
segregated space for non-Iranians; thirdly, in the adoption of a highly central-
ised and bureaucratic form of management; fourthly, in providing special cur-
ricula and university degrees for non-Iranians; and, finally, in globalising a new 
form of denominational education under the patronage of the Supreme Leader 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Shiʿi Scholarship before the 1979 Islamic Revolution
In order to clarify the contextual factors that shaped the emergence of MIU, I 
begin by giving a brief account of the nature of Shiʿi scholarship and its relation 
to the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d (pl. marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d), the highest authority in Islamic law 
prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Shiʿi branch of Islam is distinguished 
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from the Sunni by its “informal” religious hierarchy under the leadership of 
the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d.9 The institution of marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d emerged in the mid- 
nineteenth century in the Iraqi shrine city of Najaf, where in 1846 Hasan 
Najafi (d. 1850) was recognised as “the source for emulation in the Shiʿi com-
munity”.10 From the time of Najafi till the late 1940s, Najaf was the seat of the 
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, with some exceptions.11
One characteristic of the Shiʿi hierarchy is the lack of an institutionalised 
procedure for identifying who is the most learned. A marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d cannot 
be identified either by election or by appointment, let alone screening. The 
“tacit agreement” of the community of experts composed of seminary students, 
instructors and scholars is crucial in allowing a scholar to “emerge” as a marjaʿ-i 
taqlı̄d.12 The lack of an official procedure for identifying the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d 
contributes to the unique character of the Shiʿi hierarchy, because it allows for 
the existence of multiple marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d when the community fails to identify a 
single individual to fill that role.13
It is worth noting that Najaf was located on the periphery of the Sunni 
Ottoman Empire. Being a minority religion lacking state support, Shiʿism devel-
oped its own religious hierarchy while depending on the religious endowments 
of its lay community. The most important financial source was a religious tax 
called khums (meaning “one-fifth”), paid to a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d by faithful laypeo-
ple. Half of the khums goes to support poor sayyids (descendants of the Prophet), 
and the other half, called the sahm-i imām, or the share of the imam, is for cler-
ical institutions.14
The disciples of a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d normally serve as his representatives in their 
communities and collect khums on his behalf. The ability of a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d 
to collect revenue therefore greatly depends on the number of his reliable dis-
ciples, as well as on his popularity among laypeople. The collection of khums is 
important for seminaries because both these institutions and their students are 
financially supported by the sahm-i imām along with the revenues from endow-
ments and income from legal and clerical duties.15
This financial independence has allowed seminaries to remain outside state 
control, even while having been marginalised in the process of the expansion 
of state-controlled schooling both in Iraq and in Iran. The minimal state inter-
vention allowed seminaries to retain their own management and teaching style, 
which is characterised by the absence of a defined curriculum or standardised 
examination and evaluation systems. In addition, there are no age restrictions 
on admission into the seminaries, nor any limitation on the duration of study.16 
It is worthy of note that financial independence from the state and financial 
dependence on laypeople are two sides of the same coin: seminaries have to 
meet the expectations of khums payers, who tend to be conservative about 
social change and oppose reform.17
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Before the spread of universal primary education, boys who completed their 
basic studies at local Qurʾanic schools could enter the seminaries in Najaf or 
Qom at around 12–14 years of age. The first level of study in these seminaries 
is called muqaddamāt (preliminaries), comprising the study of grammar, rhet-
oric and logic. The middle level of study is called sut∙ūh∙  (texts), in which stu-
dents learn theology, law and jurisprudence based on textbooks. Only a limited 
number of students are able to proceed to the third and most advanced level of 
education, called dars-i khārij (studies beyond textbooks), wherein they receive 
training to become a mujtahid. When a mentor is satisfied that his student has 
acquired the ability to issue a competent legal opinion, he grants a certificate 
authorising the student to be a mujtahid in his own name.18 In other words, it 
is not an institution, but an individual who certifies the transmission of knowl-
edge, and this “personalistic nature” has clear links with the system of patron–
client relationships.19
Iraq’s shrine city of Najaf had long been regarded as the most prestigious 
centre of Shiʿi learning. In the early twentieth century there were about twenty 
seminaries in Najaf 20 and around 8,000 students studying therein. In addition to 
Arab students from Iraq, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, there were many non-
Arab students such as Iranians, Turks and Indians.
The early 1920s was a turning point for Shiʿi scholarship. ʿAbd al-Karim 
Haʾiri-Yazdi (d. 1937), regarded as one of the marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, arrived in Qom to 
restore the historical Faydiyya seminary. Haʾiri-Yazdi’s success in revitalising that 
institution facilitated the transfer of seminary scholars and students from Iraq to 
Iran,21 and this marked the beginning of the rise of Qom as a new centre of learn-
ing in the Shiʿi world. The rise of Qom and the decline of Najaf became decisive 
when Qom resident Ayatollah Burujirdi (d.  1962) was singled out as the sole 
marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d of the Shiʿi religious hierarchy in the late 1940s, after the death 
of Ayatollah Isfahani (d. 1946). Interestingly, both Isfahani and Burujirdi were 
Iranians, but Isfahani resided in Najaf, while Burujirdi was in Qom. Burujirdi’s 
presence enhanced the prestige of Qom as a seat of Shiʿi scholarship.22
After the death of Burujirdi, the Shiʿi community reverted to the position of 
having plural marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d: in 1975, Khomeini (d. 1989) and Khuʾi (d. 1992) 
were in Najaf; Gulpayigani (d. 1993), Shariʿatmadari (d. 1986) and Marʿashi-
Najafi (d. 1991) in Qom; and Khunsari (d. 1985) in Tehran.23 Among them, 
Khuʾi24 was known as an opponent of Khomeini’s principle of vilāyat-i faqı̄h (the 
government of the jurist), and he remained in Najaf until his death. In Qom, 
Azeri-born Shariʿatmadari25 was the main challenger to Khomeini’s principle, 
and he, like Khuʾi, found a significant following outside Iran by offering edu-
cation to non-Iranian students. It is little wonder, then, that Khomeini wished 
to weaken the overseas influence of his rivals by bringing non-Iranian student 
affairs under his control.
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According to Fischer, there were over 6,500 seminary students in Qom in 
1975, and although the percentage of foreign students was small, they repre-
sented diverse ethnicities. As well as the Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis, Iraqi 
Shiʿa exiled by the Baʿth regime had a considerable presence in Iranian sem-
inaries.26 Others were from Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Lebanon, Tanzania, 
Turkey, Nigeria, Kashmir and Indonesia. Foreign students came to Qom through 
the personal connections between local clerics and high-ranking mujtahid in 
Qom. It is worth noting that marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d in Iran were competing over their 
reputations outside the country. Ayatollah Shariʿatmadari, who found many 
followers outside Iran, enhanced his profile abroad by hosting foreign students 
at his own seminary, named Dar al-Tabligh (House of Islamic Propagation), as 
well as by distributing Shiʿi literature throughout the world.27 Dar al-Tabligh 
was established in the mid-1960s, and, unlike traditional seminaries, it offered 
a five-year programme using a credit system with course examinations. Its cur-
riculum included secular subjects such as psychology, philosophy, mathematics 
and English, and the language of instruction was Arabic. According to Fischer, 
Shariʿatmadari accepted visitors from as far away as Lucknow and Karachi in 
the east, and from Cairo and Fez in the west.28 Ayatollah Gulpayigani launched 
overseas activities in the 1970s, including the distribution of monthly stipends 
to students in India and the purchase of land for a madrasa in Kashmir.29
Concurrent with the rise of Qom has been a decline in the number of semi-
nary students in Najaf. The decrease in the number of students during the 1950s 
continued in subsequent years due to the Iraqi Baʿth government’s pressure on 
the Shiʿi population, especially Iranian nationals living in the Iraqi shrine cities 
known as the ʿatabāt.30 Among those deported to Iran were clerics and seminary 
students.31 Accordingly, the total number of students and teachers in Najaf 
decreased to less than 150 in the mid-1980s.32
Restructuring the Seminaries for the “Export of the Revolution”
The Islamic revolution brought fundamental changes to the traditional reli-
gious hierarchy in which the marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d enjoyed autonomy from the state. 
Returning to Iran after fifteen years in exile, Khomeini, who had distinguished 
himself as a political leader through the anti-monarchist movement, launched 
his project of establishing a regime based on his principle of vilāyat-i faqı̄h 
through two referenda: the first, held in March 1979, on the creation of an 
Islamic republic; and the second, in December 1979, on the approval of the 
constitution of the Islamic Republic. Both were approved, and Khomeini suc-
ceeded in creating a state based on his principle, under which he was bestowed 
absolute political and religious authority, and the major government posts were 
occupied by fellow clerics. Though Khomeini seemed to be in an incontestable 
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position, Shariʿatmadari nevertheless questioned the referenda on the ground 
that the concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h was not indisputably established in Shiʿi 
jurisprudence. His opposition to Khomeini heightened the tension between 
his supporters, mostly living in Azerbaijan, and those of Khomeini. Khomeini 
ended Shariʿatmadari’s challenge by stripping him of his rank as marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d 
in April 1982. Backed by state power, Khomeini pressured the other competing 
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d not to publicise religious interpretations that were at odds with 
vilāyat-i faqı̄h, and thus give it an unchallenged status.33
In this context, the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic established the 
Management Council of the Qom Seminaries (Shura-yi Mudiriyat-i Hawza-yi 
ʿIlmiyya-yi Qom) in 1980 in order to extend control over the existing seminar-
ies. The council formulated various proposals for restructuring the management 
style and curricula of seminaries, but it failed to effect substantive changes due 
to resistance from the seminary heads, who were circumspect about accept-
ing grants from the state treasury due to the possible consequences for their 
autonomy.34 Facing resistance from the seminary heads, the clerical leaders of 
the Islamic Republic started their project of asserting control over seminary 
affairs and reforming the curricula, especially through the management of the 
affairs of non-Iranian students. It was in this context that Shariʿatmadari’s 
Dar al-Tabligh was confiscated by the regime and became a base for the 
Islamic Propagation Office of the Qom Seminaries (Daftar-i Tablighat-i Islami-i 
Hawza-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Qom) in charge of the training of Iranian preachers of 
both genders.35
Although the number of non-Iranian students studying at Qom on the eve 
of the Islamic revolution was relatively small, the clerical leaders of the Islamic 
Republic expected them to act as ambassadors who would disseminate the revo-
lutionary message, believing Iran’s Islamic revolution to be a universal model for 
the emancipation of the oppressed from despotic rule.36 Iran’s foreign policy in 
the 1980s was known as “the export of the Revolution”, this being the political 
manifestation of the underpinning belief. Iran tried to pursue this goal by its 
own example, by supporting liberation movements and through propagation.37 
Acceptance of non-Iranian students into Iranian seminaries fell under the first 
and third methods for the export of the revolution, and the clerical leaders 
prioritised seminary education for non-Iranians both inside and outside the 
country.38
To fulfil this agenda, Hujjatiyya Seminary, established by Ayatollah Hujjat 
Khukamari39 in the early 1940s, was transformed into an international semi-
nary for non-Iranian students by Ayatollah Muntaziri (d. 2009), a disciple of 
Khomeini. Hujjatiyya Seminary served as a major host of non-Iranian male 
students in the 1980s and taught five schools of Sunni and Shiʿi jurisprudence, 
though it laid great emphasis on the Shiʿi Jafari school of jurisprudence.40
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In conjunction with the creation of a seminary exclusively for non-Iranian 
students, the clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic established the Council for 
Supervising Non-Iranian Seminary Students (Shura-yi Sarparasti-yi Tullab-i 
Ghayr-i Irani) in 1979, aiming to monopolise the recruitment of non-Iranian 
students. This council operated until it was reorganised into the ICIS in 1986.41
Institutionalisation of the Education of Non-Iranian Students
The establishment of ICIS strengthened the unified management of non-Ira-
nian students’ affairs and facilitated the systematic recruitment of non-Iranian 
students, especially Shiʿi youth from regions such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Lebanon and Gulf countries, where Shiʿa were marginalised by Sunni-
dominated governments. The Shiʿi youth in these regions were also embold-
ened by the success of the Iranian revolution and were eager to come to Qom. 
Non-Iranian students were offered a different programme, which emphasised 
the Islamic ideology.42
Politics was not the only factor that attracted non-Iranian Shiʿa. The flood of 
Pakistani and Afghan youths, whose opportunities for higher education in their 
communities were limited due to political instability and economic difficulties, 
demonstrated that seminary education was seen as an alternative form of higher 
education. In my interviews with Pakistani and Afghan Shiʿi youths in Quetta 
in the late 1990s, I found that going to Qom was the most realistic way of getting 
into higher education, even though it had become rather competitive by the 
1990s. Since Qom’s seminaries experienced an over-representation of Pakistani 
and Afghani youth in the 1980s, ICIS gradually had to tighten the criteria for 
acceptance for both countries in order to diversify nationalities.43 MIU adopted 
the ICIS policy by emphasising the admission of students from countries from 
where MIU did not have students.44
A new chapter in the history of ICIS began when Ayatollah Khameneiʾi 
took over the post of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic upon the death of 
Khomeini. Khameneiʾi was one of Khomeini’s disciples and served as president 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 1981 to 1989. He was elected as the new 
Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts on 4 June 1989. His appointment 
was controversial because, at that time, his theological qualifications fell short 
of mujtahid or ayatollah.45 This lack of theological qualifications hampered his 
claim to be a legitimate successor because the constitution required the Supreme 
Leader to be a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d. To solve this problem, the constitutional require-
ment of being a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d was replaced by “being an expert on Islamic 
jurisprudence”, and being in possession of “appropriate political and manage-
rial skills” was added as a new qualification for being Supreme Leader. This 
constitutional amendment made it possible for Khameneiʾi to be Khomeini’s 
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successor, although his legitimacy continued to be questioned by many leading 
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d of the time. The appointment of a Supreme Leader who did not 
hold the highest rank in the religious hierarchy ended the theocratic regime in 
which the Supreme Leader embodied both religious and political authority. To 
compensate for this weakness, two major steps were taken: the reinforcement 
of the Supreme Leader’s political power via constitutional amendment; and the 
introduction of Ayatollah Araki46 (1894–1994) as a marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d, so that lay-
people could follow Khameneiʾi on political issues and Araki on religious issues. 
After the death of Araki, several clerics, including Khameneiʾi, were nomi-
nated for marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d by the clerical supporters of the regime.47 Meanwhile, 
Khameneiʾi, suffering from his lack of religious credentials, hastened to expand 
his influence outside Iran.48 This led to the office of the Supreme Leader gaining 
direct control of ICIS, so enabling Khameneiʾi to apply centralised manage-
ment49 to non-Iranian student affairs.50
Another of Khameneiʾi’s projects was the modernisation of seminary educa-
tion. The ICIS constitution stressed that its mission was to train non-Iranian 
preachers, trainers, teachers, researchers, interpreters, mujtahids and adminis-
trators, who are refined, aware of the important issues of the day, able to run 
scientific and cultural magazines, and learned in Islamic sciences, humanities 
and Ahul al-Bait studies.51
This statement implies an extension of the scope of education beyond beliefs, 
rituals and personal affairs to the realm of public affairs; that is, to teach Islamic 
sciences and humanities to prepare students for various roles in the public 
sphere. The implications of this mission become more apparent when we con-
sider the student admission criteria. The applicants must be Muslim, and have 
to pledge allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. They have to have at least 
a secondary school certificate, be aged between 18 and 22, and be single. They 
are also required to pass entrance examinations and attend interviews. It was 
important for ICIS to seek capable students from all over the world in order to 
diversify the student body in terms of nationality.52
To locate students who satisfied the above-mentioned criteria, ICIS adopted 
three methods of recruitment. First, it sent out recruitment missions in coordi-
nation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; these missions were empowered to 
administer both written and oral examinations, as well as interviews. Secondly, 
candidates living in a country where ICIS does not send out recruitment mis-
sions could be accepted through direct correspondence, by way of emails or 
upon the request of a foreign representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in 
case they could meet the standards set by ICIS. Thirdly, candidates living in 
Iran could make contact with ICIS directly.53 ICIS was distinct from traditional 
seminaries in that it set clear admission criteria and administered examinations. 
Those accepted were entitled to receive various services, including an education 
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subsidy allowance, a housing subsidy allowance, medical services and travel 
expenses.54 Although ICIS retained its basic identity as a seminary, its certif-
icates were confirmed by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, 
which benefited the graduates when they returned home. Khameneiʾi’s efforts 
to apply central management to the seminary also extended to the seminaries 
for Iranian students, both male and female.55
ICIS as a Predecessor of MIU: 
Its Educational Courses and Affiliated Colleges
ICIS was a forerunner of MIU, and the concepts and structures underpinning 
the latter institution took shape as a result of the experiences of the former. ICIS 
adopted the academic system of the modern university, based on credits and 
semesters, and provided five levels of courses equivalent to university degrees: 
Level 1 (Associate of Arts); Level 2 (Bachelor of Arts); Level 3 (Master of Arts); 
Level 4 (PhD); and Level 5 (ijtihād). Currently, non-Iranian students have to 
undertake a preparation course before starting Level 1, in which they receive 
intensive Persian and Arabic lessons along with the basic Islamic sciences. Level 
2 is composed of two majors: Islamic Sciences and Humanities. Level 3 is also 
divided into two, Islamic Sciences and Humanities, along with the obligatory 
presentation of a thesis. Those who wish to continue their studies can sit the 
examination for Level 4. Level 4 is a five-year course in which students study 
Islamic jurisprudence and the principles of jurisprudence along with their own 
major for three years, with the last two years being devoted to writing a thesis. 
The final course is for the training of mujtahid.56
ICIS is the central organisation for controlling non-Iranian students’ affairs, 
and education takes place in institutions and learning centres under its umbrella. 
Among them, the most important institution for males is the Imam Khomeini 
School for Higher Education (Madrasa-yi ʿAli-yi Imam Khomeini), founded 
in 1992 by order of Khameneiʾi. It offers courses from Levels 1 to 4. Hujjatiyya 
Seminary was renamed the Islamic Law and Knowledge School (Madrasa-yi 
ʿAli-yi Fiqh va Maʿarif-i Islami) in 2002 and offers courses from Levels 1 to 
4. The Specialty School of Islamic Law and Islamic Jurisprudence (Madrasa-yi 
Takhassusi-yi Fiqh va Usul) started its activities within the structure of Marʿashi 
Seminary in 2004 as an institution specialising in Islamic jurisprudence with 
four educational courses: Islamic law and jurisprudence; Islamic judicial law; 
law; and Islamic economic law.57 Rasul al-Akram College is a higher education 
institute for the adherents of four schools of law, namely, Hanafi, Shafiʿi, Maliki 
and Hanbali. It was established in 1996–7 in the city of Gorgan in Golistan 
province, facing the Caspian Sea. In the beginning it accepted students from 
Central Asia and Russia for a five-year course, but in 2005–6 it opened its doors 
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to students from all over the world, with a new education programme recognised 
by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology.
Bint al-Huda School for Higher Education (Madrasa-yi ʿ Ali-yi Bint al-Huda) 
is a seminary exclusively for non-Iranian female students established by a group 
of clerics under the leadership of Ayatollah Muhammad Mahdi Asifi in 1982. 
Originally it offered Arabic-medium courses, mainly for students from Iraq 
and the Gulf region. In 2000, it was placed under the supervision of ICIS 
and introduced courses in the Persian language to facilitate the acceptance 
of students from all over the world; by 2008, 550 students from twenty-five 
countries were engaged in study there.58 The Centre for Language and Islamic 
Education (Markaz-i Amuzish-i Zaban va Maʿarif-i Islami) has been engaged in 
Persian-language education for non-Iranian students since its establishment in 
1982–3. The Persian language course lasts six months and teaches non-native 
students without intermediate languages or translation. Those who finish this 
course can proceed to the 6–8-month basic Islamic study course. The Institute 
for Humanities (Muʿassasa-yi ʿUlum-i Insani) started its activities in 2005–6 
in order to teach the humanities to seminary students. In addition to these 
institutions, for the promotion of distance learning for overseas residents, the 
Imam Khomeini International Islamic Virtual University (Danishstan-i Imam-i 
Khomeini) began activity in 2001. The Centre for Short-Term Education 
and  Research Opportunities (Muʿassasa-yi Amuzish-ha-yi Kutah Muddat va 
Fursat-ha-yi Mutalaʿati) provides short-term education for clerics in order to 
enhance their knowledge, and provides research opportunities for scholars on 
sabbatical.59
ICIS has offices in Mashhad and Isfahan which directly supervise a number 
of seminaries. The Mashhad Office supervises non-Iranian students, both male 
and female, studying at seminaries in Mashhad – such as the Madrasa-yi ʿAli-yi 
Baradaran (Higher Institute for Brothers), the Markaz-i Amuzish-i Khaharan 
(Education Centre for Sisters), Madrasa-i ʿIlmiyya-yi Baqiya al-Allah (Baqiya 
al-Allah Seminary), Madrasa-yi ʿIlmiyya-yi Ahl al-Bait (Ahl al-Bait Seminary) 
and the Maktab-i Narjis (Narjes Seminary for Women). The Isfahan office was 
opened in order to raise the educational level of non-Iranian students who had 
been instructed in traditional methods at seminaries in Isfahan.60
Beside educational institutions, ICIS comprises a research centre; ICIS Press; 
the Centre for Family Affairs and Housing Complex, which provides education 
and religious services for the spouses and children of non-Iranian students; and 
the Centre for Student Counselling and Guidance, which gives students guid-
ance on both personal and educational issues.61
The basic objective of ICIS is to bring under its control the seminaries 
that already accept non-Iranian students, while also adding new institutions to 
create a vast, modern education complex exclusively for non-Iranians.62 One of 
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the striking features of ICIS is that it educates non-Iranian students separately 
from Iranian students under a curriculum designed especially for them. One 
male former student commented that the provision of separate classes is a pro-
tective measure for non-Iranian students, stemming primarily out of considera-
tion for the handicaps that non-Iranian students face at their time of entrance: 
studying in Persian is a challenge for non-Persian-speaking students, and if they 
are also weak in Arabic this will be an additional burden. In addition, Iranian 
students – particularly humanities majors – already have considerable knowl-
edge of religious sciences before coming to the seminaries, due to the Iranian 
high school curricula, whereas the majority of non-Iranian students come to 
Iran with minimal knowledge of religious sciences.63
To what extent are non-Iranians separated from Iranians? According to the 
testimony of the same student, non-Iranian male students are encouraged to join 
in with the discussions among students and scholars taking place in the holy 
shrine of Fatima Maʿsuma. In addition, many of the instructors teaching intro-
ductory classes are in fact senior Iranian students with whom non-Iranian stu-
dents have friendly relations, and it is not accurate to say that non-Iranians are 
forced to remain isolated.64 Indonesian scholars who have studied in Qom pro-
vide testimony that the non-Iranian students who were enrolled at Hujjatiyya 
Seminary in the 1980s and in the early 1990s enjoyed freedom due to the fact 
that the Hujjatiyya Seminary had not yet converted to the credit system. They 
were encouraged to participate in classes and seminars held outside Hujjatiyya, 
and were able to study with Iranian students. However, transformation to the 
credit system in the mid-1990s made it difficult for non-Iranian students to take 
classes outside the seminary, which limited their opportunity to mingle with 
Iranian students.65 In the case of the female non-Iranian students with whom I 
had conversations, they indicated that they are not as free as male students and 
that their association with Iranian students is much more limited.66
The Establishment of MIU
Al-Mustafa International University was established in 2008 to strengthen the 
overseas propagation of Iranian-style Shiʿism by integrating ICIS and OOSS. 
The domestic activities of MIU were adapted from ICIS by placing ICIS’s nine 
schools and centres under its direct supervision, with some restructuring and 
renaming.67 Like ICIS, MIU is categorised as a private university, drawing its 
budget mainly from the profits from factories that it owns, as well as from invest-
ments, religious endowments68 and government funding.69
The change of name from ICIS to MIU was strategic. First, “al-Mustafa” is an 
epithet of the Prophet Muhammad, which means “the Chosen One” in Arabic, 
the lingua franca of all Muslims. The use of Arabic and the non-sectarian 
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name increases the appeal of MIU in the Muslim world. A similar tactic can be 
observed at work in the university’s official prospectus, which states that one of 
the five main policies of MIU is “to respect Islamic sects on the basis of Islamic 
unity policies”.70
Secondly, the change from “centre” to “university” signifies al-Mustafa’s 
determination to create a new model of Islamic teaching in which humanities 
subjects are taught from an Islamic perspective, along with Islamic sciences. It 
also aims to improve the social status and work opportunities of graduates by 
providing them with a university degree.
MIU is a “mission-oriented”71 institution that aims to train preachers who can 
take on the task of “disseminating Islamic viewpoints and divine teachings and 
expanding Islamic culture as well as moral and spiritual traits”.72 The prioritisa-
tion of training for Islamic propagation distinguishes MIU from the traditional 
Shiʿi seminaries, whose ultimate goal is to train mujtahids who are entitled to 
issue legal opinions – although advancement to the status of mujtahid is open 
to MIU students. According to the president of MIU, Alireza Aʿrafi (1959– ),73 
ten to twenty students are currently studying to be mujtahid at Level 5.74
President Aʿrafi has identified three core characteristics of an MIU edu-
cation: (1) rational, philosophical and analytical observation (nigāh-i ʿaqlānı̄ 
va falsafı̄ va tah∙ lı̄lı̄); (2) comparative studies (mut∙āliʿāt-i tat∙bı̄qı̄) and dialogue 
between religions (ādyān) and branches of Islam (madhhab); and (3) interest 
in humanities and social sciences (tavajju-yi ʿulūm-i insānı̄ va ijtimāʾı̄). It is 
these, he claims, that distinguish MIU from al-Medina and Umm al-Qura in 
Saudi Arabia, al-Azhar in Egypt and the International Islamic University in 
Pakistan.75
The MIU’s emphasis on philosophy can be traced back to ʿ Allama Tabatabaʾi 
(1903–81), who began teaching Islamic philosophy in Qom in 1946. He was an 
Islamic philosopher in the tradition of Ibn Sina (known as Avicenna, 980–
1037) and Mulla Sadra (1572–1640), and came to Qom to fight against Western 
materialism, which was popular among intellectuals at that time.76 Though his 
teaching of philosophy was contested by jurists including Burujirdi, the sole mar-
jaʿ-i taqlı̄d at that time, he developed a large following, many of whom – such 
as Ayatollah Mutahhari (1919–79) – would later become the leading figures of 
the Islamic revolution.77 Khomeini’s attachment to philosophy and mysticism 
helped to integrate their study into the curriculum of the Qom seminaries, in 
which Tabatabaʾi’s works are used as textbooks. It is remarkable that Tabatabaʾi 
and his students consider metaphysics to be the foundation for the study of the 
totality of knowledge.78 It is also worthy of note that in the 1960s Tabatabaʾi 
expounded the Platonic idea of government by philosopher-kings, a decade 
before Ayatollah Khomeini made public his theory of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, said to 
have been inspired in part by Plato’s Republic.79 This linkage of philosophy and 
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vilāyat-i faqı̄h is essential to Qom’s model of seminary education, which MIU 
has embodied. Additionally, Tabatabaʾi’s Islamic ontology provided the philo-
sophical basis of post-revolutionary Iran’s endeavour to overcome the sense of 
self-alienation engendered by the shah’s Westernisation policy and the estab-
lishment of the Islamic Republic based on the slogan of “Neither West nor 
East”.80
The emphasis on comparative study and the dialogue between religions and 
sects can also be traced back to Tabatabaʾi, who studied various doctrines of 
Western philosophy in order to refute them – especially Marxism, which had 
become popular among Muslim youth.81 Although Marxism is no longer the 
main concern of Iranian seminarians, the protection of Islam from Western 
cultural influence (especially secularism and materialism) through the teaching 
of Islamic philosophy, and the provision of answers for all manner of questions, 
is still of vital importance for the Qom seminaries.82 MIU’s emphasis on a com-
parative perspective can thus be seen as a continuation of this effort.
This is not to imply that MIU totally rejects Western culture and scholarship, 
however. MIU asserts that shedding light on the “congruity between the Islamic 
sciences and the humanities”83 is one of its missions. President Aʿrafi has stated 
that MIU never prohibits its students from learning about Western culture and 
sciences, but that it does encourage them to examine them critically. In other 
words, his position towards the humanities is neither total rejection nor uncrit-
ical acceptance. What is important for students is to know that their “religion 
has to have its view in every realm”.84
The other characteristic of MIU’s curriculum is its introduction of new fields 
of Islamic jurisprudence, such as Islamic jurisprudence in medicine, environ-
mental science, international affairs, management, education and economics, 
especially at MA level.85 As one of the frontrunners in the new field of Islamic 
jurisprudence, President Aʿrafi asserts that the provision of legal answers to 
emerging problems is a duty of the Islamic jurist, and in order to provide the 
relevant answers the Islamic jurist must have sufficient knowledge of contempo-
rary issues.86 MIU inherited its basic curriculum from ICIS, and currently offers 
a BA programme with two majors: Islamic Studies, with ten programmes, and 
Humanities, with thirteen programmes.87 Subjects taught in each programme 
are divided into “seminary”, “general”, “common with other programmes/core” 
and “specialised”. Seminary studies (durūs-i h∙awzavı̄) includes Arabic morphol-
ogy and syntax, logic, Islamic philosophy, commentary, Qurʾanic studies, Nahj 
al-Balagha (Peak of Eloquence),88 reading comprehensions and Islamic law, 
though a number of units differ from course to course.89 General Studies must 
be taught in every programme, and includes Islamic thought, the analytical 
history of early Islam, Khomeini’s socio-political viewpoints, Persian literature, 
physical education, Islamic ethics, thematic commentary on the Qurʾan, family 
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management and foreign languages. MIU has introduced a number of more 
practical classes, such as foreign languages or IT, which enable non-Iranian stu-
dents to engage effectively in propagation activities in their home communities 
after graduation, especially “in the fields of the media, academic dialogues, and 
the artistic arena”.90
Teaching a wide range of humanities alongside seminary education is of 
vital importance for MIU to meet the criteria for being a “university”, despite 
the fact that MIU claims to be the inheritor of a 1,000-year history of seminary 
education.91 The design of MIU’s curriculum enables its students to compete 
with other university graduates and prevents them from being out of touch with 
international academia.92 Iran’s fusion of religious studies, humanities and the 
social sciences is at the heart of the project known as “Seminary and University” 
(h∙awza va dānishgāh), in which the Islamisation of the social sciences and 
humanities is pursued alongside the updating of religious science to meet con-
temporary needs. The adaptation of the university system and its curricula in 
seminaries is also part of this project.93 These changes in the system and curric-
ula enable ICIS and MIU graduates to expand the scope of their activities from 
traditional face-to-face teaching and preaching in their home communities to 
indirect methods including “virtual propagation” through television, video and 
enriched web pages. Furthermore, the diversification of educational content and 
the provision of university degrees have allowed the graduates to branch out 
into various fields, and this facilitates their active involvement at the forefront 
of their communities.
Although MIU’s hybrid form of education is attractive to the majority of 
students who come to Qom, it remains disadvantageous for those students who 
wish to advance to the highest level in order to attain the status of mujtahid. In 
Shiʿism, no matter how much one studies, if one does not attain the position of 
mujtahid one must remain a muquallid, one who follows (taqlı̄d) the guidance of 
a mujtahid. Over the last three decades there has been a tremendous increase 
in the number of non-Iranian students studying at Qom; but they have seldom 
attained the status of mujtahid. This allows Iranian mujtahid to maintain their 
dominance within the Shiʿi clerical hierarchy both within and outside Iran.
Another important aspect of education in MIU – as it was in ICIS – is that 
the majority of professors and instructors are Iranians, and Persian is the lan-
guage of instruction. Non-Iranian students are first required to undergo intensive 
Persian-language training, because important texts are in Persian, including the 
writings of Khomeini and other Islamic revolutionary ideologues – ICIS defined 
Persian as “the language of the revolution”, while Arabic is “the  language of the 
Qurʾan”.94
Teaching in Persian has inevitably enhanced the position of that language in 
the Qom seminaries (and elsewhere) and has promoted the “Persianisation” of 
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Shiʿi language.95 Thus, students’ success in their studies greatly depends on their 
level of proficiency in Persian. Conversely, MIU’s ability to transmit the Iranian 
version of Shiʿism and the revolutionary message depends on how well it can 
teach Persian to non-Iranian students.
Overseas Outreach
The other important project for MIU is the integration of the overseas activ-
ities of OOSS, which was established to promote overseas propagation and 
proselytisation by opening educational institutions locally for non-Iranians. It 
is estimated that the organisation supervised more than 150 schools in sixty 
countries in its first decade, hosting about 10,000 students.96 Due to a lack of 
available documentation, however, I was not able to determine the details of 
its activity. One of the reasons for the difficulty in ascertaining the overall 
scope of OOSS seems to be the ambiguity of its understanding of “supervision”. 
Based on my observations, it seems that the religious schools opened by Qom 
returnees did have contact with OOSS, but this did not mean that these schools 
were fully supervised by OOSS. For example, in 1997 I was visiting a religious 
school for girls in Quetta whose principal was a female Qom returnee; and it 
transpired that an Iranian woman who claimed to have a religious education was 
also visiting the town at that time, along with her husband who was a religious 
expert. The principal asked me to come to the school in the afternoon so as to 
avoid meeting the Iranian visitors, explaining that it might put her in a diffi-
cult situation. When we eventually visited the school, the principal explained 
that OOSS sometimes sent a mission on their own initiative to “supervise” 
them, even though OOSS had no official connection with the school. Based 
on my visit to schools in Lahore in 2006, it seems that the relationship between 
OOSS and the Shiʿi schools opened by Qom returnees varied from school to 
school. Some claimed to have contact with OOSS, whereas others claimed to 
be  relatively independent.
The president of MIU states that “Organising international branches is one of 
our priorities that we should pay attention to.”97 MIU’s website lists twenty-four 
schools and colleges as affiliated institutions,98 although it seems there are even 
more institutions that have direct or indirect connections to MIU. For instance, 
the 2009 pamphlet states that MIU “has representation in over 50 countries”, 
and has branches in “Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, India, Thailand, 
Tanzania, Sri Lanka and other countries”. The same pamphlet also introduces 
schools in Bangladesh and Russia with images of their buildings.99 An introduc-
tory booklet published in October 2010 refers to the “Islamic University Ghana, 
Islamic College London, Teacher Training Centre Burkina Faso, Islamic College 
Indonesia”, as well as to “branches in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, 
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India, Thailand, Tanzania and Sri Lanka”.100 Compiling the information about 
branches or affiliated institutions mentioned in MIU’s official documents and on 
its website, the number of branches in Africa is conspicuous: there are three in 
Ghana and one each in Burkina Faso, Benin, Congo, Cameroon, Madagascar, 
Malawi and Tanzania. By contrast, there are only two branches in the Middle 
East, in Lebanon and Syria. Both countries have close diplomatic relations 
with the Iranian government. In Eastern Europe, there are two in Albania 
and one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Western Europe, branches can be found in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden. There are two in South 
America, in Argentina and Brazil. Others are located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Philippines.101 These 
branches vary in size, academic level and in the subjects they teach. Some 
schools, such as those in Benin and Bosnia, are boarding schools. The courses 
and the type of education offered also vary in the schools, ranging from high 
school to graduate degree courses. Some focus mostly on religious training, 
whereas others also provide secular courses. Some institutions provide only part-
time non-degree schooling. It seems that many of them have Iranian directors, 
but in many cases the relationship between MIU and the institution is not clear.
One of the most active institutions in Western Europe is the Islamic College 
for Advanced Studies in London. Founded in 1998 by an Iranian doctoral 
scholar who had studied at a seminary in Qom as well as at a university in the 
United Kingdom,102 it promotes Islamic studies in the West by providing an 
“insider’s perspective” on Islam, and trains Muslim scholars for the West. In 
2002, the college established a partnership with Middlesex University to offer 
an accredited BA (Hons)103 in three courses: Islamic Studies, Muslim Cultures 
and Civilizations, and Hawza Studies. The Hawza Studies course aims “to train 
students as ministers of religion, religious teachers, or academics by providing its 
students with classical Islamic education and spiritual training”. In 2007, MA 
courses in Islamic Studies, Islam and the West, and Islamic Law were launched, 
and in 2008 the college was renamed the Islamic College.104
The London branch is one of the most important of MIU’s branches105 
outside Iran, because London is where rival marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d to Khomeini and 
Khameneiʾi have their offices. Khuʾi, for instance, established the al-Khoei 
Benevolent Foundation in 1989 and opened a London branch, as well as the 
al-Sadiq and al-Zahra Schools in London.106 Ayatollah Sistani (1930– ), the 
great disciple of Khuʾi and currently the most popular marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d in Najaf, 
also has his office in London, the Imam Ali Foundation.107 Given the rivalry 
between marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d, having a branch in London is important for elevating 
the prestige of MIU.
MIU has also found its way to Southeast Asia. The population of Indonesia 
is predominantly Sunni, but it does have some Shiʿa, mostly of Arab descent. In 
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the 1970s, some of them went to Qom to study at Dar al-Tabligh. A few years 
after the Islamic revolution, Iran’s clerical representatives arrived in Indonesia 
where they met Husein al-Habsyi (1921–94), one of the prominent Shiʿi clerics 
from Bangil, East Java. Since their meeting, Indonesian students have been sent 
to Qom through him, and many have become leaders of the Indonesian Shiʿa. 
After his death, ICIS representatives came to Indonesia to conduct an exami-
nation to select students for study in Iran; this increased the number of students 
who went to Qom, and so further diversified the composition of the student 
body there.108 These developments only emerged, however, after the collapse of 
the Suharto regime in 1998.
In conjunction with the increase in the number of Indonesians studying at 
Qom, the Iranian presence in Indonesia has also increased. In 2003, the Islamic 
College for Advanced Studies in London opened a branch in Jakarta, which was 
renamed the Islamic College Jakarta in 2009. Similar to the Islamic College, 
London, the Jakarta branch is headed by an Iranian doctoral scholar. The col-
lege aims to promote religious values through Islamic philosophy and mysticism, 
offering MA programmes in Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism.109
In 2003, an institution called the Islamic Cultural Centre, Jakarta, was estab-
lished by five Iranians. The centre conducts Persian-language courses and has 
been facilitating Indonesian students who wish to study in Iran. Both institu-
tions have worked closely with, and have been run predominantly by, Iranians 
or Indonesians of Arab descent who studied at Qom.110
Unlike their Indonesian counterparts, Malaysians who have studied in Qom 
might be compelled to practise taqı̄yya (dissimulation), due to the Malaysian 
government’s anti-Shiʿi policy.111 Another important centre for propagation 
in southern Asia can be found in Thailand, where there are a small number of 
Shiʿa,112 mostly descendants from Persians who migrated to the region during 
the Ayutthaya dynasty (1350–1767).113 They had been isolated from the rest 
of the Shiʿi world until they were “discovered” by a Shiʿi cleric visiting the 
Thonburi district of Bangkok after the Iranian revolution. In Thonburi there 
is a small Shiʿi community descended from Qom and Lucknow, and there the 
cleric established a centre where classes in religion, including the teachings 
of Khomeini as well as in the Persian language, were given to both children 
and adults. Some of those who studied there have gone on to Qom for further 
study.114 Though neither ICIS nor MIU has opened a branch in Thonburi, a 
considerable number of Thai youth were sent to Qom.115
MIU’s presence in Eastern Europe, specifically in Albania and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, is a relatively new phenomenon. Iran started its cultural activities 
in Bosnia in 1995, as soon as the Bosnian War ended.116 The Cultural Centre 
attached to the embassy offers free Persian-language courses. The Mulla Sadra 
Foundation promotes Islamic teaching and Shiʿi publications translated into the 
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local language.117 The Ibn Sina Institute, established in 1996, has four sections: 
the Centre for Philosophy and Gnosis, the Centre for Culture and Civilization, 
the Centre for Persian Language and Literature, and the Centre for Balkan 
Studies.118 Kewser is a Shiʿi-inclined women’s organisation in Bosnia that issues 
its own magazine and runs its own TV and radio stations.119 These institutions 
have direct or indirect relations with the Iranian regime and encourage the 
creation of a Shiʿi- and Iran-friendly environment in Bosnia. This strategy by 
the Iranian regime was reinforced by the establishment of the Persian-Bosnian 
College in 1999 in Ljesevo near Sarajevo as one of the branches of MIU. The 
college is a secondary school with boarding facilities, and its curriculum is 
equivalent to that of other schools in Sarajevo except that it offers Persian-
language studies and Shiʿi-oriented extracurricular activities, such as a com-
memoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and a field trip to Iran.120 Iran’s 
active involvement in cultural and educational activities in Bosnia indicates 
that Bosnia is one of its important centres for propagation.
Albania has also been identified as a target for propagation in the region. 
Organisations such as the Saadi Shirazi Cultural Foundation, a female high 
school named Saadi College, and the Kuran Foundation are active in Albania.121 
In 2007, the Rumi Foundation was established as an MIU branch for the promo-
tion of education, research and comparative religion. The first Persian–Albanian 
dictionary was published in 2010, and more than ten books have been published 
in Albanian, including the works of Sayyed Hossein Nasr, William Chittick and 
ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi.122
South Asian non-Muslim countries seem to be the new frontier for MIU. 
The MIU Indian Branch has recently opened in New Delhi, aiming to promote 
higher education with an emphasis on seminary education.123 In October 2012, 
a new branch of MIU was opened in Colombo,124 and MIU is planning to open 
another branch in Hyderabad offering courses in Humanities, Islamic Studies 
and Persian language.125 East Asia and the Pacific region are another frontier for 
MIU: a Tokyo office was opened in May 2013, and I was informed that MIU is 
planning to open offices in Canada, the United States and Australia.126
The African continent seems to be the top priority for MIU’s propagation 
work.127 The Islamic University College, Ghana,128 started activity in 1988 
under the name of Ahul al-Bait Islamic School, as a training institute for Islamic 
theology. It was accredited in 2002 by the University of Ghana. Other MIU 
branches on the African continent vary in size and in the level of education 
they provide. The oldest seems to be the Imam Sadiq School in Madagascar,129 
established in 1986. It offers post-high school education in Islamic teachings 
in Arabic. A school in Malawi was established in 1994, offering post-high 
school education in Islamic teachings, also in Arabic, while Dar al-Mahdi in 
Tanzania was established in 2006, offering post-high school education in Islamic 
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teaching in Swahili. The date of the establishment of the schools in Cameroon 
and Benin are, respectively, 2001–2 and 2002–3. Most of the schools have an 
Iranian director. The African countries where MIU has opened its branches are 
mostly Muslim-minority countries with a significant shortage of education. In 
addition, most of the Muslims in these countries have few links with Shiʿism, 
except for certain countries where Shiʿi immigrants from India and Lebanon 
can be found. Dr Hakim Elahi, the vice president of MIU, served in Africa for 
twelve years, establishing the Islamic University College in Ghana and serving 
as director of the Centre for Islamic Studies in Mali. In an interview, he empha-
sised that the number of Africans attracted by Shiʿism has grown and that 
anti-Shiʿi propaganda by Wahhabis has been unsuccessful.130 The distribution 
of MIU branches in non-Muslim African countries as well as in Eastern Europe 
indicates that MIU is trying to counter the growing influence of anti-Shiʿi 
Wahhabism in these countries by creating a sympathetic atmosphere through 
cultural and educational activities. MIU’s investment in education activities is 
closely related to the Iranian government’s endeavours to strengthen diplomatic 
and economic ties with these countries, though MIU claims to be independent 
from government. The benefits derived from an education at an MIU branch 
vary from student to student, but the most important thing for them is having 
the  opportunity to get a post-secondary education.
MIU does not have branches in Sunni-dominated countries such as Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, where, historically, local 
Shiʿa have had strong ties with the Najaf seminaries. In these countries, the 
returnees from Najaf have a strong influence on Islamic education and many of 
them run religious schools and classes to disseminate Shiʿism under their own 
initiative. Even though the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran has changed 
the destination of choice for many advanced students from Najaf to Qom, and 
although the younger generation has been more exposed to Iranian influence, 
Najaf scholarship still remains an attractive option. The possible reasons for the 
absence of MIU branches in these areas are, first, the presence in these countries 
of a sufficient number of Qom returnees who are already influencing their com-
munity, and, secondly, MIU’s decision to avoid aggravating political tensions 
between Iran and countries that may tend to see MIU branches as political 
rather than as educational entities. However, it is worth noting that while MIU 
may not have branches in these countries, it does maintain representatives.
Returnees from MIU: Their Perspectives
ICIS and MIU have had a complex impact on home communities via returnees 
from the Qom seminaries. The role of the returnees in their communities must 
be understood in the context of their location. My visits to the Shiʿi madrasas 
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in Karachi, Quetta, Islamabad and Lahore131 verified that studying at Qom has 
been beneficial for Shiʿi youth in terms of improving their education and future 
career prospects, but does not necessarily entail their subordination to Qom. 
The majority of students studying at local madrasas are from less privileged 
backgrounds, including Afghans, mostly Hazaras, who settled in Pakistan after 
the Soviet invasion. The madrasas are essentially free and allow students to 
continue their studies with no financial burden. Students who are able to con-
tinue on to advanced study at Qom have more promising futures, because Qom 
returnees are highly respected in Shiʿi communities.
The opportunity to study in Qom is particularly precious for women, whose 
education and career options are much more limited than for men. Many of the 
female returnees said that they would never have been allowed to study, were it 
not for the seminaries in Qom.
The existence of a strong belief that secular education makes women less reli-
gious and that a seminary education is religiously rewarded has encouraged fam-
ilies to send their daughters to Qom. After returning home, many of the female 
returnees engage in teaching at a girls’ madrasa or preaching at women’s reli-
gious gatherings, and through these activities they gain social respect and finan-
cial independence, which helps them to develop a good reputation and higher 
status in their family. Many women I have interviewed said that, as a result 
of their experiences in Qom, they learned how women can be active in soci-
ety without challenging the existing male-dominated social order, for females 
there are active in teaching, preaching and even administering religious schools, 
organisations and circles for women. Though still few in number, some female 
returnees, especially the daughters or wives of clergymen, can serve as principals 
in girls’ madrasas. It is worthy of note that the support of a man is indispensable 
to running a madrasa, because the public religious sphere in Pakistan is domi-
nated by men, and women have limited scope to collect religious endowments 
from lay followers and so secure financial support for a madrasa.132
Unlike female returnees, whose activities are mostly confined to a gen-
der-segregated space, male returnees are more likely to be involved in politics. 
Since the late 1970s, Pakistani Shiʿa have faced increasing pressure from the 
Sunni Islamisation initiated under the government of Zia ul Haq. The success 
of the Islamic revolution led by Khomeini emboldened Pakistani Shiʿi to nego-
tiate with the Zia government over a new law on the compulsory deduction 
of zakat. In rivalry with the Shiʿi movements, Sunni groups, especially those 
influenced by Wahhabism, initiated an anti-Shiʿi campaign that aggravated 
sectarian conflict.133 In such circumstances, being a returnee from Qom can be 
a double-edged sword. Returnees are respected for having acquired advanced 
knowledge about religious science and for having absorbed the revolutionary 
spirit, but they might also be seen as advocates of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, and even as 
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agents of Iran who follow Khomeini or Khameneiʾi not as a religious leader, but 
as a representative of the Iranian government.
Returnees might support the idea of vilāyat-i faqı̄h as an ideal, but most 
of the interviewees I spoke with said that such an ideal was inapplicable in a 
Pakistani context, where Shiʿa are the minority.134 A Pakistani clergyman who 
had studied for twelve years in Qom and now runs a female madrasa in which 
his wife teaches, said that he had received permission from Sistani and other 
marājiʿ-i taqlı̄d to use zakat and khums to run the madrasa so as to provide free 
education. He also said that he had studied under Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi 
and Ayatollah Lankarani in Qom, and that he looks to Khameneiʾi in Qom on 
political matters, but follows Sistani in Najaf with regard to religion. Despite 
his profession of compartmentalised allegiances, portraits of both Khomeini 
and Khameneiʾi were on display in his office, showing his special attachment 
to Qom. Not all clergy who have studied at Qom reveal their direct attachment 
to that place, let alone display portraits of Khomeini and Khameneiʾi. Another 
Pakistani cleric with seven years’ study experience in Iran cautiously avoided 
mentioning the name of any marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d, stressing in fluent Persian that his 
mission was to facilitate dialogue among different religious groups, including 
different branches of Islam. This shows how sensitive Pakistani returnees are 
about relations with Qom.
It is worth noting that the older generations of Pakistani scholars were 
mostly educated in Najaf and that, historically, Pakistanis have followed 
Ayatollah Khuʾi in Najaf and, after his death, Sistani in Najaf. Because of this 
tradition, many of those who followed Khomeini after the 1979 revolution 
returned to Khuʾi after the death of Khomeini. In addition, we may note that 
the idea of “following marjaʿ-i taqlı̄d” is itself somewhat equivocal, with many 
interviewees saying that the idea that khums should be paid to the marjaʿ-i 
taqlı̄d had been popularised by Qom returnees and was relatively new to lay 
Shiʿa in Pakistan.
The other factor that has enhanced the value of studying at Qom is the 
 aggravation of sectarian violence against Shiʿa. More and more Shiʿa feel that 
it is necessary to arm themselves with theoretical arguments to defend their 
denomination in the face of growing attacks from Wahhabi-influenced Sunni 
groups.
In the case of Thailand, where Shiʿa are few in number, returnees face 
different challenges. Unlike Pakistan’s Shiʿa, whose population is somewhere 
between 17 and 34 million, Shiʿa in Thailand are estimated to number fewer 
than 50,000,135 and seem to be in economically moderate circumstances. The 
absence of a larger Shiʿi community seems to be the main obstacle to returnees in 
establishing a career as a religious teacher or preacher. In such an environment, 
the Cultural Centre attached to the Iranian embassy, where Persian-language 
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skills are required, has become an important provider of work for returnees and 
also runs support seminars and publication activities.136 Golam Ali Abazar, who 
has established his career as a leader of the Thai Shiʿa, is no exception and has 
maintained ties with Iran.137 Abazar is a nephew of the imam of Masjid al-Huda, 
located in Taling Chan in the southern part of Bangkok. He left Thailand in the 
mid-1970s to undertake religious study in Pakistan. After spending a few years 
there, he moved first to Kuwait and then to Hujjatiyya Seminary in Qom for 
advanced studies. He returned to Thailand at the age of twenty-five with ijāzas – 
in particular from Sistani – authorising him to collect khums as one of Sistani’s 
representatives. He also holds an ijāza issued by the Friday prayer steering com-
mittee and signed by Khameneiʾi, stating that he had been appointed a leader 
of the Friday congregational prayer, based on a request from the Shiʿi people in 
Thailand and the recommendation of the clergy. It also requires him to promote 
understanding of the Islamic revolution and unity among Muslims.138 Thanks to 
the support of the Qom returnees, the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran139 in Bangkok functions as an active centre for Islamic propagation in 
Southeast Asia. The examples of Pakistan and Thailand show that the relation-
ship between returnees and MIU and Iranian representatives depends on the 
circumstances of Shiʿa in their particular locality.
Conclusion: Globalising “Iranised” Shiʿism?
The Shiʿi seminaries known as h∙awza-i ʿilmiyya have long been a meeting 
place for students and scholars of various origins. A perfect example of this was 
nineteenth-century Najaf, which attracted Persians, Turks, Arabs and Indians 
– although ethnic division did exist in housing, classes and among scholars.140 
Twentieth-century Qom is distinguished from nineteenth-century Najaf by the 
emergence of “national consciousness”, which engenders a clear distinction 
between Iranians and non-Iranians. ICIS’s, and MIU’s provision of separate 
educational spaces and curricula for non-Iranians is intended for the benefit of 
the majority of the non-Iranian students; however, as discussed, this measure 
discourages non-Iranians from studying to the level of mujtahid, and this per-
petuates Iranians’ monopoly over that elevated position, while non-Iranians 
remain muqallid in the Shiʿi religious hierarchy.
MIU has ensured Qom’s incontestable dominance over Najaf,141 especially 
in terms of financial stability and human resources, and this has convinced 
some Iranians that Qom has become the “Vatican”142 of the Shiʿi hierarchy. In 
spite of its achievements, though, the Shiʿi world is in fact far from monopo-
lised by the seminaries of Qom; and at the same time there are signs of the res-
toration of Najaf seminaries in today’s Iraq as an alternative centre for learning, 
especially for Arab Shiʿa who are uncomfortable with the “over-politicised” 
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and “Iranised” forms of teaching.143 Questions about Qom’s strong inclination 
towards philosophy and rationalism have also been voiced by scholars, espe-
cially in Najaf and Mashhad, who belong to maktab-i tahkı̄k,144 although it is this 
very inclination that has attracted the younger generation of Shiʿa in Lebanon 
and elsewhere.145
Even those who see vilāyat-i faqı̄h as an ideal are well aware that the Iranian 
model of Shiʿism developed within a country where the overwhelming majority 
of Muslims are Shiʿi – a fact that is neither applicable nor relevant to the rest of 
the world. The graduates of MIU are struggling to reshape and reinterpret what 
they have been taught in the light of their local needs and realities.
In addition, the language of instruction is also a matter of great concern, 
especially for Arabs, and this has created a new opportunity for seminaries out-
side Iran. For instance, a new Shiʿi seminary has emerged in Damascus, where 
the Zainab Shrine is located, a popular site of Shiʿi pilgrimage. Since the mid-
1970s, students expelled from seminaries in Najaf by the Iraqi authorities have 
been finding refuge at the shrine and numbers have grown rapidly. Zainabiyya 
Seminary was established in order to accommodate these students, and has now 
expanded to house 250–300 students from some twenty to twenty-five nation-
alities, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and 
countries in Africa. This seminary has differentiated itself by making Arabic the 
sole language of instruction.146
President Aʿrafi is aware of the criticism of MIU’s educational strategies, 
and has emphasised that “Shiʿism is a matter which transcends nationality”. At 
the same time, however, he also averred that there is an important proximity 
between Iranian culture and Shiʿism as concerns their rational, philosophical 
and mystical proclivities. It is precisely this tendency to identify Iranian cul-
ture with Shiʿism that is troubling for Shiʿa outside Iran, and is at the root 
of non-Iranians’ hesitation to see Qom as the sole reference point in religious 
sciences.147
Additionally, unlike those extremists who believe that Islam and nationalism 
are incompatible, President Aʿrafi maintains that people can maintain their 
national identity while still regarding themselves as belonging under the broad 
umbrella of Islam. Again, the problem here is whether people from different 
nationalities can have a shared image of what that umbrella really is, if Iranians 
equate aspects of Islam with Iranian culture.
MIU provides us with an example of an attempt to globalise a denomi-
national form of education blended with a national agenda, and reveals its 
complex effects on various localities. The expansion of MIU has spurred com-
petition and contestation among Shiʿa and between Shiʿa and Sunnis; and it 
seems likely to continue to spur such rivalry in the future, rather than bringing 
them closer.
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Chapter 3




It was in the tenth century that the Ismaili Shiʿi Fatimid dynasty laid the 
foundation of the al-Azhar Mosque; its endowment, shortly afterwards, with a 
number of teaching positions1 marked the birth of the centre of Islamic learn-
ing that was to become al-Azhar University. Few people, and certainly not its 
founding dynasty, would have envisioned that this institution would one day 
become the leading authority in the world of Sunni Islam.2 This mixed origin, 
along with a range of other factors – such as Egypt’s strong tradition of cultural 
pluralism; the geopolitical developments that led to Cairo becoming the geo-
graphical centre for convergence of Muslim scholars between the ninth and the 
eleventh centuries; and the controversial, but decisive, twentieth-century state-
led reforms of al-Azhar – have all played important roles in the rise of al-Azhar’s 
“al-Wasatiyya” Islam. This “middle-way” Islam is central to al-Azhar’s posi-
tioning within the spectrum of Muslim institutions speaking on behalf of Islam 
today. The university’s current leadership3 is very conscious of its international 
stature as a “tolerant voice of Islam”,4 providing Sunni Muslims across the globe, 
and increasingly even within Egypt, with an alternative to the exclusionary 
tendencies and the rigidity associated with Wahhabi-inspired Salafism, as well 
as the orthodoxy and armed militancy at times associated with movements 
 representing political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.5
Every year, al-Azhar attracts over 30,000 students6 from around one hun-
dred countries, many sponsored by their national governments. The university’s 
fatwas draw the attention of Muslim scholars and ordinary believers alike from 
all over the world;7 it is approached by Western heads of states to galvanise 
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support for their policies vis-à-vis Muslim communities at home; and its curric-
ulum has been adopted by Islamic institutions – and in the case of Malaysia by 
the state (see Chapter 8) – in many countries. This chapter documents how the 
pursuit of al-Wasatiyya Islam has been important in shaping al-Azhar’s global 
following, and tries to explain what has enabled al-Azhar to stay steadfast in 
this pursuit. First, the chapter defines what al-Wasatiyya Islam means to schol-
ars inside al-Azhar, as well as to its wider following. Such analysis will help us 
to understand the basis of al-Azhar’s global influence, while also showing that 
it is al-Azhar’s organic process of evolution over the centuries that has enabled 
it to maintain a more complex relationship with the state and society at home 
and abroad than is possible for either al-Medina and al-Mustafa (discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2, respectively).
Al-Azhar’s Domestic and International Stature
Although it retained its autonomy as a waqf-supported centre of Islamic learning 
for over nine centuries,8 al-Azhar University today is a national university reg-
ulated by the Egyptian state, and the Shaykh al-Azhar, the most senior position 
in the university, holds office as a minister. A series of reformist measures intro-
duced by successive governments starting from the mid-nineteenth century9 
culminated in the nationalisation of al-Azhar in 1961. Under the reign of King 
Faud I, an ordinance issued in 1930 divided al-Azhar’s teaching role into three 
distinct departments: Arabic Language, Shariʿa and Theology. Meanwhile, the 
ideas of reformist scholars such as Muhammad ʿAbduh10 also began to influ-
ence the curriculum, notably through the influence of two of his students – 
al-Maraghi and al-Zawahiri11 – who held senior positions at al-Azhar from 1928. 
The most dramatic transformation, however, followed the Egyptian Revolution 
of 1952, when Nasser introduced the 1961 Ordinance, nationalising al-Azhar, 
thus giving it the formal status of a national university, while also bringing it 
under the direct control of the state.12
Under this ordinance, the religious education faculties became subject to state 
regulation, and at the same time al-Azhar had to expand its teaching faculties to 
incorporate modern subjects, opening colleges of medicine, engineering, econom-
ics, etc. This move towards the provision of modern education did not, however, 
change al-Azhar’s primary identity as the seat of Islamic learning. For the Egyptian 
government, al-Azhar remained the most important institution that it could use to 
secure religious legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Similarly, with regard to pop-
ular perceptions, it is the three faculties of Islamic Studies that continue to attract 
the best students in the field,13 and the fact that the international students at 
al-Azhar are also concentrated in those faculties demonstrates the global demand 
for its teaching in this area. At any given time al-Azhar hosts close to 30,000 
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international students. These students come for four-year undergraduate degree 
courses, and many also pursue the two-year master’s degree. Few, however, stay on 
to take the PhD, since the requirements for continuing at that level are viewed as 
quite demanding. A few international students also join al-Azhar’s primary and 
secondary institutes, thereby gaining entry into the system at a very young age.
While the total number of international students shows the level of global 
demand for Azhari education, a breakdown of student data by country helps 
to better understand the reach of al-Azhar across the globe. In the 2012–13 
academic cycle, international students came from 103 countries. Although the 
majority of students at al-Azhar come from Muslim majority countries, cer-
tain regions and countries show a much higher concentration of students. The 
2012–13 international student data gives the following breakdown of the 29,263 
students enrolled in that academic year: 5,189 from Arab states, 4,154 from 
Africa, 13,321 from Asia, 2,902 from Europe, 2,773 from Russia and neighbour-
ing states, and 924 from the Americas. Southeast Asia is particularly noticeable 
in terms of student numbers: in 2012–13, 5,624 students came from Malaysia, 
2,830 from Indonesia and another 2,260 from Thailand. The chapters in Part 
Three of this volume show how a complex set of factors made Azhari Islam so 
influential in this region. In Africa, Nigeria stands out as one of the most promi-
nent student-sending countries, with 2,169 students enrolled at al-Azhar during 
the 2012–13 academic cycle. Senegal, Ghana and Kenya are some of the other 
African countries which are well represented within the Azhari student body, 
with student numbers ranging between 100 and 300. Equally importantly, the 
data shows that an increasing number of students are coming from Europe and 
the United States. During the 2012–13 academic cycle, there were 410 students 
from France, 234 from Holland, 400 from the United Kingdom, 443 from the 
United States, and 390 from Canada. This growth in the number of students 
from the West shows al-Azhar’s popularity among second- and third-generation 
Muslims there, as well as among converts. With 873 students, Turkey was also 
well represented during this academic cycle; and there were also 1,093 students 
specifically from Russia.
Gender-disaggregated international student data shows that al-Azhar is an 
equally popular destination for female students. As noted in recent studies, there 
is rapid growth in the demand for textual learning among Muslim women, some 
of whom pursue formal Islamic education and become prominent preachers in 
their own right.14 This demand for Islamic education among Muslim females is 
also reflected in the size of the female population within al-Azhar’s international 
student body. In the 2012–13 academic cycle, between 30 and 35 per cent of the 
international students were female, and this ratio remains fairly constant across 
the different levels of education imparted at al-Azhar.
Although important, the presence of international students is not the 
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sole barometer of al-Azhar’s global influence. One other important vector of 
al-Azhar’s influence overseas takes the form of the appointment of al-Azhar 
faculty members to teaching positions in universities in other countries. These 
overseas appointments, which are awarded for a few years at a time, are rela-
tively competitive. The Shaykh al-Azhar personally takes an active role in the 
selection of candidates for these overseas appointments, which are made in con-
sultation with the Egyptian embassies in those countries. The selection process 
for these appointments is stringent, because those so appointed also come to act 
as ambassadors not only for al-Azhar, but for the Egyptian state and society more 
generally. The International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan, is one of 
the institutions that has benefited from the expertise of Azhari scholars through 
such appointments.
As with any Islamic institution, the most stringent test of al-Azhar’s religious 
authority rests in the demand for its fatwas. It is in this domain that al-Azhar’s 
influence is most clear. Individuals from around the globe seek al-Azhar’s fatwas 
on a diverse set of questions, as do the Egyptian government and the gov-
ernments of other Muslim-majority and Western countries. In recent years, 
al-Azhar has introduced a telephone hotline in a number of European lan-
guages to provide fatwas for a diverse range of followers based in different 
parts of the world. This service manifests the increasing demand for al-Azhar’s 
fatwas among second- and third-generation Muslims in European countries, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.
In addition, al-Azhar’s ideas are also widely disseminated through its two 
major publications: Al-Azhar Magazine, which is produced monthly, is now 
eighty-four years old; while Saut al-Azhar (Voice of al-Azhar) is a weekly publica-
tion that covers important news events from al-Azhar’s perspective. Efforts are 
currently afoot to make past issues of the monthly magazine available online for 
at least the last ten years and to make it more accessible to Muslims worldwide. 
The World Association of al-Azhar Graduates is similarly a widely diffused but 
effective network for the spread of Azhari Islam.
Meanwhile, Azhari shaykhs have a growing presence on the ever-increasing 
independent Islamic TV and radio channels. Though the shaykhs appear on 
these channels in a personal capacity rather than as spokesmen for al-Azhar, 
the plurality of positions they adopt and the extent of textual knowledge of 
Islam they demonstrate also helps to boost the image of al-Azhar as the most 
prestigious place for higher learning in Sunni Islam. Many of these channels are 
now available on regional or international cable TV networks and the Internet. 
Thus, the very platforms which some have argued are fracturing Islamic author-
ity15 by allowing a new class of independent scholars to develop large followings, 
are also providing opportunities for scholars from the historically influential 
institutions to advance their message further.
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If the above considerations were not enough to establish the global reach of 
al-Azhar, the great emphasis placed by al-Azhar’s current leadership on its role 
as the promoter of moderate Islam on the international stage should remove 
any remaining doubts. When asked if al-Azhar’s audience is primarily domestic 
or international, its senior scholars are very clear: “Just like the Kaʿba is the 
Qibla for the prayers, al-Azhar is the Qibla for Muslims for the study of Islamic 
Sciences.”16 Such reference to al-Azhar as the “Qibla” for the study of higher 
Islamic sciences arose frequently in all the interviews conducted at al-Azhar for 
this chapter. This overwhelming confidence as expressed by the Azhari shaykhs 
in their ability to lead the Muslims across the globe arises from the reverence the 
institution has enjoyed for centuries from Muslims worldwide.
Last but not least, one of the most important signs of al-Azhar’s global follow-
ing among Muslims, both at home and abroad, rests in the Egyptian state’s deci-
sion to nationalise it, and in Western governments’ attempts in recent decades 
to gain legitimacy for policies that are proving to be controversial with their 
Muslim constituencies at home. Zeghal presents an insightful analysis of the 
way President Nicolas Sarkozy tried to enlist al-Azhar’s support for the banning 
of Islamic headscarves in public places in France by seeking a fatwa on the issue 
from the Shaykh al-Azhar.17 Most recently, General Abdul al-Sisi’s decision 
to have the Shaykh al-Azhar, along with senior Christian leaders, by his side18 
when announcing the decision to remove President Morsi’s government, shows 
how al-Azhar is seen as commanding enough religious legitimacy within Egypt 
to continue to be a useful tool for the Egyptian state.
Basis of Demand: Engineered or Organic?
In nationalising al-Azhar, Nasser revealed a preference for reforming the struc-
ture of Islamic authority in Egypt rather than eroding it – the latter being the fate 
meted out to the two other influential seats of Islamic learning in North Africa, 
al-Zaytuna in Tunisia and al-Qarawiyyin in Morocco.19 As noted by other schol-
ars,20 Nasser’s decision was motivated by a number of domestic and regional 
considerations. At home, al-Azhar was seen as an effective counterweight to 
the growing appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood. Within the Arab world and 
among Muslims in general, hosting al-Azhar was seen as boosting Egypt’s image 
as the leader of the pan-Arab movement and so earned the Egyptian leadership 
respect from Muslims across the globe. Similar considerations have shaped the 
Egyptian state’s engagement with al-Azhar to date, whereby al-Azhar is used 
for securing legitimacy for controversial decisions at home, while achieving a 
prominent position within the international Muslim discourse. This outlook 
has led the Egyptian state to invest in increasing the international outreach of 
al-Azhar by offering scholarships for international students and assisting with 
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the posting of al-Azhar scholars overseas. It also funds international conferences. 
However, when compared with the extensive state investments in al-Medina and 
al-Mustafa (see Chapters 1 and 2), where the majority of international students 
receive quite a generous scholarship, Egypt’s investment in this area seems rather 
limited: al-Azhar offers a total of only 1,200 scholarships per annum, whereas its 
cohort of international students numbers around 30,000. This means that only 
4 per cent of its international students are on al-Azhar scholarships, with the 
remaining 96 per cent either funded by their home governments or mobilising 
personal or family resources. This financial investment by foreign governments 
or by individuals and their families in securing an Islamic education at al-Azhar 
again shows the demand for its brand of Islam. It also demonstrates that despite 
the compromises it has had to strike since 1961 – its close association with the 
Egyptian state, and the requirement that it lend its authority to certain contro-
versial state decisions – al-Azhar has managed to retain a reasonable level of 
legitimacy in the eyes of many Muslims worldwide.
The relatively limited investment by the Egyptian state in enhancing the 
international outreach of al-Azhar, as compared with the two other universities 
discussed in this volume, can be understood in terms of the limited religious 
agenda of the Egyptian state, which claims a modernist outlook in contrast to 
theocracies such as Saudi Arabia or Iran. The political legitimacy of a theocratic 
state is directly dependent on its control over the religious sphere. Given the rel-
atively secular outlook of the Egyptian state, successive regimes have attempted 
to use al-Azhar’s authority to legitimise their policies, but have not adopted the 
more extensive ambition of promoting a particular brand of Islam via the Azhari 
platform. Rather, the Egyptian state has used al-Azhar to defend its modernist 
ambitions and to help to present itself globally as the guardian of “moderate” 
and “tolerant” Islam. Thus, for the Egyptian state the global agenda has not been 
to promote an Islam of a particular kind, but rather to make selected use of the 
religious legitimacy enjoyed by al-Azhar to protect the state against critique by 
Islamists at home and to claim a prominent standing among Muslim countries. 
This has placed limits on the kind of control the state has exerted on al-Azhar, 
especially during the Mubarak era, since successive Egyptian governments have 
realised that some appearance of autonomy within al-Azhar is important if 
it is to retain its legitimacy as an authentic platform for Islamic learning. As 
a result, the investment made by the Egyptian state in promoting al-Azhar’s 
 international outreach has been strategic, but relatively limited.
The basis of demand for Azhari education thus remains very organic: the 
prestigious status acquired by al-Azhar over the centuries naturally draws stu-
dents to it from across the globe. However, it must also be acknowledged that 
the shaykhs within al-Azhar play an active role in promoting Azhari teaching 
globally. They see their role as being to provide guidance to Muslims across the 
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globe, and they take this role seriously. It is widely believed within Islamic circles 
that Islam assigns ʿulama a high status because they are the guardians of Islam, 
and thus are taking forward the tradition of the Prophet. In turn, the ʿulama 
hold themselves responsible for spreading Islamic learning. This understanding 
of the importance and responsibility of the role of ʿulama in promoting Islamic 
learning is prevalent across the different schools of thought and throughout 
the world’s Islamic intellectual strongholds, and the scholars at al-Azhar are no 
exception. The ʿulama of al-Azhar are conscious that they reside in a seat of 
global Islamic learning and feel it their responsibility to ensure that the wider 
Muslim community, and not just Egyptians, benefit from it. As noted by one of 
the senior scholars at the al-Azhar Islamic Research Academy:
There is no question within al-Azhar, we think of it as a global and not an 
Egyptian institution. As scholars of Islamic sciences it is our responsibility 
to make efforts to ensure that the learning we have benefits the Muslim 
community as a whole. We therefore patronise a long chain of interna-
tional engagements. For example, our former students recommend their stu-
dents to us. There are linkages and alumni associations of al-Azhar graduates 
 internationally who try to link more students to al-Azhar.
Thus, while the Egyptian state might make some investment in amplifying the 
international clout of al-Azhar through providing scholarships to international 
students, making provision for international conferences at al-Azhar, and fund-
ing appointments of faculty members to universities overseas, the real basis of 
demand for Azhari education emerges from a fluid and organic network of stu-
dent associations and informal religious networks, with a history that extends 
back through the centuries. The question that then naturally arises is: what is 
so distinctive about the experience of learning at al-Azhar that makes it such a 
popular destination for international students?
Defining “al-Wasatiyya” Islam
Although they may describe al-Azhar’s “centrist approach” in different words, 
the ʿulama as well as the students interviewed for this volume identified 
al-Azhar’s “al-Wasatiyya” Islam as its defining feature and saw it as the basis 
of its global following. This image of al-Azhar was defended by the Sorbonne-
trained former spokesperson for the Shaykh al-Azhar in simple but forceful 
terms: “Centrism, this you can say is the first label of al-Azhar.” This assertion 
was repeated in the interviews with all the senior Azhari ʿulama conducted for 
this chapter, as well as those with faculty members in the social sciences. Equally 
importantly, discussions with students also raised this as the primary basis of 
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al-Azhar’s appeal. During interviews, the students mentioned how they had 
first learned about al-Azhar via different routes. Some had heard of it because 
the institution at which they originally studied had links with al-Azhar, others 
through religious scholars in their communities or via the publications of Azhari 
scholars. However, what was common across the responses was a heavy empha-
sis on the appeal of its centrism. As one Indonesian student noted: “I had read 
work of some of the senior scholars of al-Azhar in Aceh; I wanted to come and 
study with those scholars. And I love it here, it is a moderate place.” Similarly, 
a female student from Singapore commented: “I love it here. There are so many 
reminders of Islam in everyday life when you are studying at al-Azhar. At the 
same time it is a very free place allowing the students to pursue Islam without 
enforcing rigidity of behaviour.” A Pakistani student similarly emphasised the 
importance of moderation and pluralism as being central to his decision to come 
to al-Azhar, averring that “the only person who can go to Medina is a Salafi, and 
one who has the signature of support from those who are known in the Salafi 
circles. However, al-Azhar is not like that. It admits students from diverse back-
grounds.” He remarked that there are many Salafi-oriented students at al-Azhar:
They come mainly to get the stamp of al-Azhar and do not attend the classes 
seriously as they are not open to the pluralistic approach promoted here. 
However, al-Azhar does not close its door on them. We have many Salafi-
oriented scholars within al-Azhar too, but they teach alongside scholars who 
belong to different positions as well as those who have a Sufi orientation. It 
is this ability to harness multiple discourses and positions within al-Azhar 
that to me makes it a most important international institution for Islamic 
learning.
Moving beyond the scholars and students within al-Azhar, and turning instead 
to specific cases in which foreign governments have actively drawn on Azhari 
Islam, also helps to demonstrate how those seeking a more pluralistic interpreta-
tion of Islam tend to gather around this institution. The Malaysian case, which 
is examined in detail in Chapter 8, illustrates how the modernising Malay state 
found within the al-Azhar curriculum an ideal balance between retaining an 
Islamic identity while developing the ability to embrace change and move with 
modern times. Similarly, as noted above, President Sarkozy’s decision to reach 
out to al-Azhar to seek support for the controversial policy of banning Islamic 
headscarves in France shows that al-Azhar is seen by Muslim states as well as 
Western governments as one of the most influential platforms for generating a 
pluralistic discourse within Islam.
But what does this “al-Wasatiyya” Islam – whether referred to as “centrism”, 
“moderation” or “pluralism” – really consist in? An appeal to terms such as 
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“moderate”, “liberal” or “orthodox” is always contentious. One standard way to 
locate an Islamic institution along the liberal–orthodox continuum is to classify 
it on the basis of the emphasis it places on critical hermeneutic interpretations, 
as opposed to adopting more literal interpretations of Islamic texts.21 Another 
proposal is that al-Wasatiyya be seen as:
an approach that assumes that divine instructions were given to human 
beings in their own interest; the correct interpretations of Islamic teachings 
and texts will therefore be beneficial to believers. This is an approach that 
might be contrasted with the extreme textualism of many Salafi figures . . . it 
is effectively a modernist approach that stresses being reasonable, moderate, 
friendly to the public interest.22
An equally important route to understanding the appeal of al-Wasatiyya 
Islam would be to shift the focus away from the particular position or interpreta-
tion that al-Azhar takes on a given issue, and concentrate instead on the more 
fundamental matter of the actual process through which al-Azhar sustains this 
plurality of discourses within a single space. The defining feature of al-Azhar’s 
al-Wasatiyya Islam is the equal representation of the four Sunni schools of Islam 
within its curriculum. As we have seen in the two preceding chapters, even uni-
versities based around very rigid doctrinal beliefs do allow some level of flexibil-
ity and engage with positions from opposing schools of thought in order to retain 
some appeal for students from different backgrounds. In the case of al-Azhar, 
its emphasis on covering the four key Sunni madhāhib23 makes it appealing to 
moderate Muslims who are against the rigidity and exclusionary tendencies of 
strictly Wahhabi interpretations. The biggest appeal of al-Azhar thus rests in its 
ability to capture the plurality and richness of debates within different Islamic 
positions instead of the taqlı̄d (strict adherence) to one school of thought; it is 
this that forms the basis of its “al-Wasatiyya” Islam.
Crucial to al-Azhar’s centrism is thus the issue of tolerance and the impor-
tance of debate. It starts from having the space to study the major four Sunni 
madhāhib, but it does not end there. It also requires having the tolerance to 
engage with Shiʿi scholars, even though Shiʿi teachings are not covered in 
al-Azhar’s curriculum; and it further requires allowing space to explore Sufism, 
while at the same time giving space to Salafi scholars and those with affinities 
to the Muslim Brotherhood. Equally importantly, it requires embracing religious 
differences and retaining the willingness to coexist with other religious commu-
nities such as Egypt’s Coptic Christians. As one Azhari scholar noted:
First of all the most important issue is that al-Azhar has avoided extrem-
ism [tashaddud] of thought, unlike in other countries. It has harboured the 
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 82 —
four Sunni madhāhib, as well as the Sufi tradition. Al-Azhar also at times 
approaches Shiʿi scholars for consultation on an issue of Islamic fiqh. At times 
governments from other countries who send their students overseas to study 
Islam find that they have become very rigid after that education, they then 
send those very students to al-Azhar to gain a more moderate education.
Similarly, a senior official in the office of Shaykh al-Azhar Ahmed al-Tayeb 
noted:
Al-Azhar has always kept a neutral approach. Scholars of al-Azhar never 
became extreme. It is always good to have different points of view on a given 
issue. Al-Azhar fights extremism. Many people want al-Azhar to play this 
role. The Coptic Christians in Egypt seek al-Azhar’s help in protecting them 
against extremists, as do the Islamic institutions around the world which are 
threatened by extremist tendencies, while governments of Muslim countries 
and those in the West also want al-Azhar to provide and to lead the discourse 
on moderate Islam. The governments of these countries are behind al-Azhar.
A typical Azhari graduate would normally thus learn to appreciate this plurality 
of thought when engaging with Islamic texts, as is demonstrated by the fol-
lowing comment from a former student who is now a faculty member in one of 
al-Azhar’s social science departments:
I studied at one of the secondary-level institutes run by al-Azhar and then 
moved on to the university level. To me, al-Azhar presents the perfect model 
of Islam. It defends tolerance and dialogue among Muslims as well as with 
members of other religious communities. It defends the teaching of the major 
Sunni madhāhib. It stands for moderate Islam but it also has space for Salafi 
scholars. We need to learn to develop a distinction between scientific Salafis 
and those who start to focus on the outer expressions of Salafism. Al-Azhar is 
not opposed to engaging with Salafi discourse as it is one of the expressions of 
Islam. But, at the same time it also nurtures Sufism.
Elaborating on the presence of Salafi scholars within al-Azhar, he continued:
Mohammad Hassan, Syed Ali Raza and Safari Hajazi are some of the very 
prominent Salafi scholars who teach at al-Azhar. Most Egyptians love 
Mohammad Hassan. There are degrees of Salafism. We are all Salafi, we all 
go back to the Qurʾan and the Sunna but there are variations in how it is 
applied. These Salafis from al-Azhar speak on many TV channels, such as 
al-Rahman and al-Hafiz. Similarly, many shaykhs at al-Azhar have an affinity 
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with the Muslim Brotherhood even though al-Azhar stays away from the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s politics.
As Zeghal has noted in her influential work on al-Azhar, by harbouring these 
multiple discourses within it, al-Azhar is able to provide a buffer zone between 
radical and political Islam, on the one hand, and state-defined Islam, on the 
other.24
Another interesting route through which to study al-Azhar’s centrism is to 
reflect on the al-Azhar Document,25 wherein Shaykh al-Tayeb outlined a set 
of principles for post-Arab Spring reforms in Egypt. The document outlined 
a framework wherein Islam remained the main reference point for setting the 
overall goals, but the day-to-day decisions were left to the will of the people to 
be harnessed through a democratic process. Presenting the document to the 
Egyptian public on national television, Shaykh al-Tayeb expressed his support 
for a “democratic and constitutional” state. The al-Azhar Document contained 
eleven main articles, and was meant to serve as a foundation for a new social 
arrangement in post-Mubarak Egypt. Shaykh al-Tayeb laid out his support for a 
democratic and constitutional state. The document emphasised that:
Freedom of opinion is the mother of all freedoms, and it is most manifest in 
the free expression of opinion by all different means, including writing, ora-
tory, artistic production and digital communication. Indeed, it is the mani-
festation of social freedoms, which goes beyond individuals to include, among 
other things, the formation of parties and civil society institutions, the free-
dom of the press and the media, whether in audio, visual or digital form, and 
the freedom to access the information needed for expression of opinion. This 
freedom should be guaranteed by constitutional provision so as to transcend 
ordinary laws, which are subject to change.
Freedom of religion was also emphasised, as were the rights of women and chil-
dren. Shaykh al-Tayeb further argued for greater autonomy of al-Azhar from 
the state; it was proposed that the Supreme Clerical Committee of al-Azhar 
should be given the right to appoint the Shaykh al-Azhar, as was the practice 
before its nationalisation. The document also argued strongly against religious 
intolerance:
Also, based on the respect for the freedom of belief is the rejection of trends 
that exclude others, condemn their beliefs and label them as disbelievers 
amid attempts to examine the inner thoughts of those who hold those beliefs. 
. . . the freedom of opinion and expression is the true manifestation of democ-
racy, and they call for educating the new generations about the culture 
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of freedom, the right to difference, and to show respect for others. . . . To 
achieve this, we have to recall the classical civilizations and traditions of 
Islamic thought, whose great imams would say, “I hold that my opinion is 
right, yet may be wrong, and that the opinion of others is wrong, yet may be 
right.”
Having attempted to define what is unique about al-Azhar’s al-Wasatiyya Islam, 
it is worthwhile exploring how al-Azhar came to adopt this pluralistic outlook 
to the teaching of Islam, which sets it in contrast to most other Islamic dis-
courses which manifest more exclusionary tendencies. Just as the emergence 
of Wahhabism and Iranian Shiʿism can be connected to certain contexts and 
linked to certain personalities, so the emergence of al-Azhar’s centrism can be 
traced to a combination of specific factors and individuals. What, then, led to 
the emergence of al-Azhar’s notion of al-Wasatiyya Islam? The answer, which 
will not surprise many social scientists, has a great deal to do with the context in 
which Islam developed in Egypt.
The Ability to Stay in the Centre: 
Domestic and International Factors
A combination of historical factors, strategic interventions and external overar-
ching factors such as geography have contributed to the emergence of the cen-
trism that has come to define al-Azhar. Two factors often identified by Azhari 
scholars as crucial for the rise of al-Wasatiyya Islam are the location, and the 
culture, of Egypt. Location was critical to the early emergence of al-Azhar and 
its attaining prominence over rival institutions. As one of the senior historians 
at al-Azhar has argued, it is the location and culture of Cairo that have helped 
to maintain centrist Islam at the university:
People stopped here on the way to Mecca and many scholars ended up stay-
ing in Cairo for some period of time. This had a great influence in generating 
a vibrant intellectual tradition at al-Azhar. Further, the culture of Egyptian 
society is also more tolerant and that culture has kept Azhari shaykhs rooted 
to a more centrist Islam which is more acceptable within the community.
The tenth–twelfth centuries are thought to represent the Golden Age of 
al-Azhar: it was during these centuries that Cairo became the centre of Islamic 
learning, and this was chiefly due to its location. The political instability in 
Baghdad and Andalusia led to an exodus of Muslim scholars from both the 
Mashriq and the Maghrib, and Cairo was their natural point of convergence. 
The increasing number of prominent scholars at al-Azhar brought yet more 
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scholars there, and this critical mass in turn started to attract students from 
throughout the Muslim territories.
Al-Azhar’s organisational structure, which allows for a number of prominent 
positions within the institution and thus engenders a degree of division of author-
ity, has also helped to retain the plurality in discourse. No one has ever been fully 
successful in enforcing change within al-Azhar from the top down. Muhammad 
ʿAbduh, the reformist thinker, met with serious resistance to his proposed 
reforms, even when he held the senior position of the Mufti of al-Azhar. Even 
the current Shaykh al-Azhar has to carry along other scholars with him, such as 
the mudı̄r (editor) of the al-Azhar publications, the senior ʿulama who lead the 
al-Azhar Islamic Research Academy, and individually influential ʿulama who 
have a public profile due to their publications or media presence. The existence 
of these multiple platforms has been critical to retaining the centrist tendencies 
within al-Azhar since its nationalisation in 1961. Al-Azhar’s ability to resist the 
state’s edicts thus reveals the dynamism of the Azhari shaykhs; yet it also shows 
recognition on the part of the Egyptian state that a certain level of autonomy 
must be allowed if al-Azhar is to retain its religious authority, and thus on occa-
sion be useful to the state in advancing its political ends.
Here it has to be acknowledged that the relationship with the modern state 
since nationalisation, while compromising al-Azhar’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
many, has also helped to consolidate its hold through increasing the level of 
resources available to it, and, more importantly, by cementing al-Azhar’s posi-
tion as the main religious institution in the country. Al-Azhar’s primary and sec-
ondary network has expanded rapidly since its nationalisation, and at the same 
time al-Azhar has been very effective in retaining active links with the informal 
religious networks, including independent mosques and Sufi halaqat which has 
further helped to consolidate its authority.26
It is this ability to maintain a delicate balance between being dependent on 
the state while keeping a certain level of autonomy that has enabled al-Azhar 
to retain its global following. In addition, as seen in the widely different level 
of respect enjoyed by Shaykh al-Tayeb as compared with his predecessor, the 
personality and knowledge of the individual appointed as the Shaykh al-Azhar 
also plays an important role in shaping public perceptions of the legitimacy of 
al-Azhar.
The Future: Al-Azhar and the Arab Spring
Al-Azhar was cautious during the events of 25 January that forced Mubarak to 
resign, but it stepped forward to claim a prominent place within the ensuing 
discourses on the future of Egypt. Since the revolution challenged the authority 
of existing state institutions in a context where no alternative institution was 
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in a position to assert its authority, al-Azhar found itself an important player in 
shaping public discourse. Al-Azhar credits itself with having played an impor-
tant role in bridging differences among rival groups in the post-revolutionary 
context. Its desire to influence the future is evident in the production of the 
al-Azhar Document, discussed above. As noted by a senior shaykh in an inter-
view conducted in March 2013:
al-Azhar is becoming stronger and stronger, beginning with the revolution of 
25 January up to now. It has played a very important role in gathering people 
across the divide on a single platform and reducing conflict between different 
groups. This has been a very important role. The Shaykh al-Azhar is not a 
political position but al-Azhar plays this role for the sake of the people.
The irony, however, is that, as in the past,27 it is precisely the presence 
of other competing Islamic groups, namely, the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafist parties such as al-Nour, that made al-Azhar such an important player in 
this period. The presence of these other Islamic platforms induced the secular-
ists, closely followed by the Christians, to throw their weight behind al-Azhar, 
which was seen as the moderate voice of Islam. Al-Azhar’s leadership clearly 
took this opportunity seriously and, at the time of the fieldwork conducted for 
this volume, was clear about its responsibility to respond to public expectations 
that it play a dominant role in advancing the “middle-way Islam” both at home 
and abroad. Al-Azhar’s leadership was also confident in its ability to continue 
to bring opposing groups together and to play a reconciliatory role in the post- 
revolutionary context.
What gave al-Azhar’s leadership particular confidence at the time of the 
interviews was the recent legislative decision to give al-Azhar the ultimate 
status to interpret Islamic doctrine, along with a clause that restored to al-Azhar 
the old practice of the ʿulama selecting the Shaykh al-Azhar, rather than him 
being appointed by the state.28 However, it was also argued that the Muslim 
Brotherhood had not granted this prominence to al-Azhar by choice; rather 
it had been forced to concede on these reforms by the five Azhari scholars 
represented on the national constitution committee, who had the backing of 
the secularist members. “We were not given this independence, we asked for 
it”, asserted a senior official from the office of the Shaykh al-Azhar. Al-Azhar’s 
positioning as a counter force to other streams of Islam, which were viewed as 
more rigid, was also repeatedly expressed by respondents outside al-Azhar. As 
one journalist at al-Ahram newspaper said:
It is in times like this that when one is seeing the failure of Muslim 
Brotherhood and the rise of Salafis that one says thank God for al-Azhar. 
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Al-Azhar is gaining increased importance and increased respect in the public 
eye in the post-Arab Spring context, as it is being seen as a neutral force to 
keep the extremist interpretations within the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Salafis at bay.
The relationship between the Shaykh al-Azhar and President Morsi remained 
difficult, with the shaykh making many public expressions of his dissatisfaction 
with the Morsi government. In March 2012, al-Azhar and its Islamic Research 
Academy announced the withdrawal of their representative, the former Grand 
Mufti of Egypt Shaykh Nasr Farid Wassel, from the constituent assembly, thus 
joining a growing list of parties and figures resigning from the newly elected con-
stituent assembly, claiming it had been marginalised. This followed the rejec-
tion of al-Azhar’s proposed eleven-article statement of general constitutional 
principles. The most explicit expression of al-Azhar’s disenchantment with 
the Muslim Brotherhood, however, came when the Shaykh al-Azhar demon-
strated its support for the removal of President Morsi’s government by standing 
 alongside General al-Sisi.
President Morsi’s relationship with al-Azhar, however, seemed to be shaped 
more by his difficulty in dealing with Shaykh al-Tayeb as a person than with 
al-Azhar as an institution. The Muslim Brotherhood has never been against 
granting al-Azhar an authoritative voice, but critics worried that, once in power, 
the Brotherhood would want al-Azhar to promote its own brand of Islam. This 
made many scholars doubt that al-Azhar would retain any influence on the 
Morsi government: “It is not essential that they will have an ear for us”, a senior 
shaykh at al-Azhar had noted. But if al-Azhar was worried about encroachment 
from the Muslim Brotherhood, it was equally wary of the rise of Salafis after 
the election. In the view of many Azhari scholars, the growth of the Salafis 
happened through the unregulated mosques; some being of the view that in the 
post-Mubarak period there is going to be even less surveillance of these mosques. 
It is thus ironic that at one level it seems that it was more difficult for al-Azhar 
to accept an Islamic government than to work with a secular state, since it was 
expected that the Brotherhood would come up with its own interpretation of 
Islam and desire to impose it on other religious spheres.
However, the recent developments in Egypt, where power has again reverted 
to the armed forces after the toppling of the Morsi government, have for now 
put an end to al-Azhar’s ambitions to play a prominent role in future social and 
political reform. Given the constitutional protections afforded to al-Azhar under 
the Morsi government, and despite the tension between the university and the 
Brotherhood, Morsi’s rule had made Islam important to the national discourse 
and thus enabled al-Azhar to claim a bigger role for itself as the arbiter of what 
is considered moderate Islam. This was a natural outcome of a period of extreme 
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political change, within which all social and political institutions had scope to 
try to reconfigure their positions within society. With the reversal of this demo-
cratic process, and concentration of power back in military hands, al-Azhar, like 
other civil institutions, will have limited space to do things differently. Thus, 
the optimism about al-Azhar’s ability to gain independence from the Egyptian 
state, which seemed plausible in the post-revolutionary context, now seems ill-
founded. Given the use of brutal force by General al-Sisi to crush the protests 
staged by the Muslim Brotherhood, Shaykh al-Tayeb will have to show great 
skill in balancing his support for this new military regime and retaining the 
respect of Islamists, at home and abroad, who are likely to question his support 
for the toppling of the Morsi government. However, as in the past, al-Azhar’s 
domestic or international following will not be shaped by the individual actions 
of the Shaykh al-Azhar, but by the diverse set of responses that generally emerge 
from within al-Azhar at such moments of crisis. It is this plurality of thought 
within al-Azhar that has always been, and will remain, its biggest strength.
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A Preaching Network from Kano to 
Medina and Back
Alex Thurston1
How and when do Nigerian graduates of the Islamic University of Medina 
(IUM) refer to their studies in Saudi Arabia? In what contexts do these gradu-
ates invoke the authority of prominent contemporary Saudi and Middle Eastern 
religious thinkers? This chapter discusses a network of Salafi leaders in Kano, 
northern Nigeria, many of whom graduated from IUM. They are not the only 
graduates of IUM in Kano, and not all Nigerian graduates of IUM are Salafis. 
But this network is notable for its wide youth following, strong media presence, 
and its ability to provoke religious and political controversy. The members 
of this network refer to themselves as “Ahl al-Sunna wa-al-Jamaʿa” (Arabic: 
The People of the Prophetic Model and the Muslim Community, hereafter 
“Ahlussunnah”).2 Non-Salafi Sunni Muslims, including Sufis with whom Salafis 
have sometimes debated, also use this phrase to describe their religious affil-
iations. For many Salafis in Kano, however, the label “Ahlussunnah” carries 
a specific connotation. It stresses what they see as the universal applicability 
and necessity, across time and space, of the Salafi view of what it means to be 
Muslim.
The word “Salafism” derives from the Arabic salaf, or “pious ancestors”: 
the companions of the Prophet Muhammad and the next two generations of 
Muslims. Following Thomas Hegghammer, I treat Salafism as a “theological, not 
a political category”.3 Salafi theology, as elucidated by Bernard Haykel, includes 
a conviction that the Qurʾan and sunna (the model of conduct established by 
the Prophet, as articulated through hadith reports) provide a universal model 
of orthopraxis and an emphasis on the notion of tawh∙ ı̄d, or the unicity of God.
4 
Salafis oppose Shiʿism and denounce certain esoteric beliefs and ritual practices, 
including some associated with Sufi orders.
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As Hegghammer points out, there is an identifiable “Salafi intellectual pos-
ture” and “a set of Salafi intellectual traditions”.5 The Salafi intellectual posture 
includes a set of methodologies for distinguishing strong versus weak hadiths 
and for elevating strong hadiths above other sources of legal thought, even the 
established rulings of traditional Sunni legal schools. The intellectual tradition 
that constitutes Salafism includes figures from different eras: hadith collectors 
and critics from the formative period of Islamic law (such as Imam Ahmad 
bin Hanbal, 780–855); the late classical polymath Shaykh ibn Taymiyya 
(1263–1328) and his students; the early modern Arabian reformer Shaykh 
Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (1703–92); twentieth-century scholars such 
as the Albanian hadith master Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914–99); and 
senior clerics within the official Saudi religious establishment, such as Shaykh 
ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Baz (1910–99) and Shaykh Muhammad ibn ʿUthaymin 
(1926–2001). Treating Salafism as a tradition, rather than as a decontextualised 
literalist movement, calls attention to the particularities of Salafi expression 
in discourse, dress, preaching and other domains. Examining Salafis’ sense of 
belonging to a tradition helps to clarify why Kano’s Salafis have stressed the 
symbolic connection between their own position as a minority within Kano’s 
Muslim community and their perceived predecessors’ positions as minorities 
within their communities.
Across different contexts in which they speak, Ahlussunnah leaders in Kano 
consistently stress the Salafi themes noted above. As Ahlussunnah leaders 
convey these core messages in different formats and to different audiences, how-
ever, they highlight different aspects of the Salafi intellectual canon. In messages 
aimed at popular audiences, they draw frequently on scripture and on what I refer 
to here as the “classical Salafi canon”, that is, the set of thinkers that spans the 
period from Imam Hanbal to Shaykh ibn ʿ Abd al-Wahhab. Ahlussunnah leaders 
invoke Shaykh ibn Taymiyya with particular consistency. Ahlussunnah leaders 
have criticised certain Nigerian politicians and lamented extra-local conflicts 
involving Muslims, such as the 2003–10 war in Iraq. Yet within the contempo-
rary Salafi canon, which includes thinkers with diverse attitudes towards polit-
ical activism, Ahlussunnah leaders’ intellectual allegiances have been to Saudi 
and Middle Eastern scholars often described in secondary literature as politically 
quietist, rather than to the Sahwa (Arabic: Awakening) movement identified 
with Saudi Salafi scholars influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Dr 
Safar al-Hawali (b. 1950) and Dr Salman al-ʿAwda (b. 1955/6).6
In contrast to their efforts to acquaint the public and their students with 
classical Salafi thinkers, Ahlussunnah leaders most frequently invoke what I 
refer to as the “contemporary Salafi canon” – which includes al-Albani, Bin Baz 
and ʿUthaymin – in technical discussions concerning the contours of Islamic 
orthopraxis and the validity of specific legal rulings. These technical discussions 
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include a broader version of the classical Salafi canon, and also make reference 
to nineteenth-century thinkers such as the Yemeni scholar Shaykh Muhammad 
bin ʿAli al-Shawkani (d. 1834). Technical discussions have occurred in sev-
eral contexts, notably in Ahlussunnah leaders’ debates with rival Salafis. In 
those debates, Ahlussunnah leaders have evoked their learning at IUM, and 
the authority of Salafi thinkers from the last two centuries, to undermine rival 
Salafis’ religious claims and credentials.
Ahlussunnah’s preaching and literary production present a valuable case 
through which to examine how graduates of institutions such as IUM use and 
reconfigure their overseas learning after they return home. This chapter focuses 
on the lives, statements and teachings of three Ahlussunnah leaders: Shaykh 
Jaʿfar Mahmud Adam (1961/2–2007, hereafter “Shaykh Jaʿfar”), his associate 
and biographer Dr Muhammad Sani Umar Rijiyar Lemo (b. 1970, hereafter 
“Dr Sani”), and his companion Shaykh Abdulwahhab Abdullah (b. 1953, here-
after “Shaykh Abdulwahhab”). I do not claim that IUM exercises hegemonic 
influence over its graduates. In terms of their educational formation, Kano’s 
Ahlussunnah leaders are products of multiple institutions, including tradi-
tional educational settings in northern Nigeria. Graduates of IUM in Kano’s 
Ahlussunnah do not, furthermore, represent a deculturised Salafism. Rather, 
they mediate between local particularities and phenomena that they portray as 
universal. They use Salafi traditions, historical narratives and Islamic scriptures 
to read Nigeria’s experiences into the history of Salafism and a global geography 
of perceived assaults against Islam. Saudi Arabia is a powerful reference point in 
Ahlussunnah discourses, but it remains only one of several.
After tracing the educational trajectories of several Ahlussunnah leaders, 
this chapter examines debates between Ahlussunnah leaders and other Salafis. 
These rivals include members of the mass-based organisation Jamaʿa Izala 
al-Bidʿa wa-Iqama al-Sunna (Arabic: The Society for the Removal of Heresy 
and the Instatement of the Prophetic Model, hereafter Izala). Another rival 
was Muhammad Yusuf (1970–2009), founder of the violent sect known as Boko 
Haram (Hausa: Western Education/Culture is Forbidden; in Arabic: Jamaʿat 
Ahl al-Sunna li-al-Daʿwa wa al-Jihad, The Society of Salafis for Preaching and 
Jihad). Relations between Kano’s Ahlussunnah and these other Salafi move-
ments have been complex, including both cooperation and conflict. Shaykh 
Jaʿfar and Dr Sani belonged to Izala in the 1980s and 1990s, and contin-
ued to partner with Izala leaders – including graduates of IUM – during the 
2000s. Yet Ahlussunnah leaders rejected doctrinal positions that certain Izala 
preachers took, and distanced themselves from the organisation while empha-
sising a broader Salafi identity. Yusuf, meanwhile, was a student of Shaykh 
Jaʿfar until the mid-2000s, at which point the shaykh publicly denounced his 
teachings, particularly his assertions that Muslims should not seek government 
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employment or “Western-style” education. Ahlussunnah leaders, in debates 
with former associates and theological colleagues, emphasised their intellec-
tual connections to Saudi Arabia and their mastery of Salafi traditions and 
methodologies. This move helped them to claim that they represented sober, 
well- credentialed scholarly authority in contrast to opponents they cast as rhe-
torically irresponsible and poorly trained. The chapter closes with an examina-
tion of how Ahlussunnah leaders shift  intellectual registers as they write and 
speak to different audiences.
Ahlussunnah Leaders’ Paths to Medina and Back7
Since its founding in 1961, IUM has been a Salafi intellectual centre and a site 
for training missionaries meant to carry Salafism back to their home commu-
nities (see Chapter 2 on IUM in this volume). Though not all Nigerians who 
attend IUM are Salafis, many Nigerians have been influenced by Salafi thought 
before, during and after their stay. For example, Dr Sani writes of Shaykh Jaʿfar’s 
devotion to the works of Shaykh al-Albani, who taught at IUM briefly during 
the 1960s, and whose student and follower Dr Rabiʿ al-Madkhali (b. 1931) 
exercised substantial influence at the university when he taught there during the 
1980s and 1990s. “Hardly would a new book by Shaykh Nasir al-Din al- Albani 
come out than [Shaykh Jaʿfar] would rush to look for it, purchase it, and study 
it.”8 Yet Ahlussunnah preachers, once they returned to Kano, were not mere 
conduits for Saudi Arabian interests or ideologies. They participated in local 
culture and politics, both as agents seeking to translate religious ideals into 
social realities and as participants, sometimes unwillingly, in political struggles.
Of the eleven men who were the most prominent Salafi preachers in Kano 
as of 2012,9 at least six graduated from IUM.10 This section focuses on five grad-
uates of IUM: Shaykh Jaʿfar, Dr Sani, Shaykh Abdulwahhab, Dr Bashir Aliyu 
Umar (b. 1961) and Dr Abdullahi Salih Pakistan. As discussed below, by the 
2000s the first four men no longer identified themselves primarily as members of 
Izala, while Dr Pakistan remained a senior Izala leader. Since his assassination 
on 13 April 2007 by unknown gunmen, Shaykh Jaʿfar’s fame and influence have 
continued to grow. He was the most prominent public face (often literally, on 
CD and DVD covers) of Salafism in Kano as of 2011–12.
Graduates of IUM have come from different social backgrounds. For exam-
ple, Dr Bashir’s grandfather and other male ancestors held the Imamate of 
Kano, while Shaykh Jaʿfar came from more humble origins. Some, like Dr Sani 
and Dr Bashir, are Kano men. Others, like Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Pakistan (of 
Daura in Katsina State) and Shaykh Abdulwahhab (of the Republic of Togo) 
immigrated to Kano. The Salafi community is politically diverse. Salafi leaders 
took different stances towards Kano’s governor Ibrahim Shekarau, who held 
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office for the period 2003–11. Shaykh Abdulwahhab served as a member of the 
Zakat Committee, the Shariʿa Commission, and the Shura Committee under 
Shekarau, while Shaykh Jaʿfar openly opposed Shekarau by 2007. Finally, the 
preachers’ educational backgrounds differ, though all of them had experience 
of different educational tracks, both formal and informal, and blended them in 
their teachings. Some, like Shaykh Abdulwahhab and Shaykh Jaʿfar, studied 
extensively inside the traditional system. Others initially had greater exposure 
to Western-style schools and universities. Dr Bashir says that his “first contact 
with deep Islamic education” came only in his twenties.
The paths these men took to Saudi Arabia varied, although the tightly net-
worked nature of the group means that some went at the suggestion of their 
friends. The first to go were Dr Pakistan and Shaykh Abdulwahhab, who in 
1981 went, respectively, to Medina and Mecca. Saudi Arabia began its Dawra 
(Arabic: “tour”, i.e., educational programmes aimed at recruiting students) in 
northern Nigeria in that year. Shaykh Pakistan, who held a secondary certifi-
cate from the Arabic Teachers’ College in Gwale, completed a BA in Qurʾanic 
Studies at IUM in 1985. From 1986 to 1991, he lived in Pakistan. He completed 
an MA at the Islamic University in Islamabad in 1989 and, from 1989 to 1991, 
supervised schools run by the Muslim World League. Shaykh Abdulwahhab 
attended primary and secondary school in Mecca before proceeding to IUM, 
where he obtained his BA in 1991.
Dr Bashir enrolled in Electrical Engineering at Ahmadu Bello University in 
Zaria in 1978. He joined Nigeria’s Muslim Students’ Society, many of whose 
members became politically inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979. After 
helping his peers destroy the alcohol at the faculty club, Dr Bashir was expelled. 
Back in Kano, he worked as a water engineer, but continued to study Islamic 
subjects and give religious lectures. He participated in the dawra in 1981, but 
declined a scholarship to Saudi Arabia, partly out of fear that abandoning his 
career might produce family conflict. After a period of soul-searching, he gave 
up his post to pursue the path of Islamic learning. When he made hajj in 1986, 
Shaykh Abdulwahhab convinced him to apply to IUM; he joined the Faculty of 
Hadith in 1988. He obtained his BA, MA and PhD from IUM, completing the 
latter in 2004.
Shaykh Jaʿfar took a different route to Medina. While a youth, he memorised 
the Qurʾan as an itinerant student. He then studied with traditional scholars in 
Kano, learning Maliki legal manuals like the Mukhtas∙ar of Khalil, but also read-
ing works like Shayh Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s Kitab al-Tawhid (Book 
of the Unicity of God). The early 1980s was a pivotal time for Shaykh Jaʿfar. He 
studied at an evening literacy programme. At the Egyptian Cultural Centre, an 
instructor taught him the recitation of the Qurʾan (tajwı̄d). Undoubtedly this 
training played a role in Shaykh Jaʿfar’s victory in a 1987 Qurʾan competition, 
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another turning point in his life. After winning the Nigerian competition, 
Shaykh Jaʿfar was placed fifth in the international competition in Saudi Arabia. 
This accomplishment solidified his status as a rising reformist preacher and 
paved the way for his scholarship to IUM. In 1987, Shaykh Jaʿfar obtained a 
secondary diploma at the Arabic Teachers’ College of Gwale;11 in 1989, he 
obtained a scholarship to IUM, where he joined the Qurʾan College. Dr Sani, 
who attended primary and secondary schools in Kano, completed a higher sec-
ondary certificate at the Arabic Teachers’ College in 1989 and joined Shaykh 
Jaʿfar at IUM the following year. Despite the diverse paths these men took to 
Medina, significant commonalities emerge, including exposure to traditional 
northern Nigerian Islamic educational curricula and, in almost all cases, some 
attendance at Nigerian secondary schools and/or universities.
The Nigerian students found IUM academically challenging and intellec-
tually enriching. In addition to their classroom learning, the Nigerians studied 
extensively with scholars in mosques. Dr Bashir said the atmosphere was lively 
in Medina during his undergraduate days: “Everything was new to me.” He had 
classes from morning until the asr (mid-afternoon) prayer, then he would read at 
home. At maghrib (evening prayer), he came to the mosque for lessons. During 
his first two years at IUM, a former vice chancellor of the university and an asso-
ciate of Shaykh bin Baz, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Abbad (b. 1934), taught 
Sahih al-Bukhari, the most famous hadith collection in the Muslim world.12 This 
kind of study enhanced the young preachers’ command of scripture and their 
ability to cite textual evidence in lectures and debates back home in Nigeria.
Life in Medina and the Nigerians’ relations with Arabs were not free of prob-
lems and racial discrimination. Dr Bashir mentioned several incidents of racism 
to me, including harassment by Saudi Arabian traffic police. Once, he related, 
he was with his son in the library of the Prophet’s Mosque. His son sneezed. 
An attendant brought a tissue, but another attendant said he should not bring 
children to the mosque, citing a hadith. When Dr Bashir told him this hadith 
was weak, the attendant asked who he was, an African, to challenge him on 
a hadith. Some Saudis, Dr Bashir said, think Africans have “no background 
knowledge of Islam”.
In interviews, Ahlussunnah leaders characterised the religious landscape in 
the kingdom both positively and negatively. Shaykh Muhammad Nazifi Inuwa 
(b. 1970) mentioned that Saudi Arabian society was more closed to new ideas 
than either Sudan (where he also studied) or Nigeria, but he said that this 
atmosphere did not make his time there unpleasant.13 Dr Pakistan said that 
Saudi Arabia funds charity and social welfare much more lavishly than Nigeria 
does, but he added that Nigerian society is more pious. Another difference Dr 
Pakistan mentioned is that in Saudi Arabia, the government pays and supervises 
preachers and imams. “Therefore”, he said approvingly, “unrest seldom occurs 
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there.” In Nigeria, Dr Pakistan continued, people say whatever they want. They 
live by what they can get from their supporters, which leads to kadhib (lying) and 
dajl (trickery) – a reference to Salafis’ feeling that many Sufi shaykhs are charla-
tans who exploit their followers.14 Order in the kingdom did not, however, stifle 
debate among the students themselves.
Salafi leaders maintained ties to Nigeria throughout their time in Medina, 
visiting Nigeria periodically and remaining abreast of developments there 
through correspondence. They returned permanently to Nigeria at different 
times: Shaykh Abdulwahhab in 1991; Shaykh Jaʿfar in 1993; and Drs Bashir and 
Sani, who obtained PhDs in Medina, in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Following his return from Medina, Shaykh Jaʿfar returned to the teaching 
and lecturing circuits to which he had belonged before leaving for the uni-
versity. He also created new institutions. He became director of the Uthman 
bin Affan group, a mosque and school complex established in the Gadon 
Kaya neighbourhood of Kano’s old city by one of his local patrons. Shaykh 
Abdulwahhab worked closely with him there.15 The mosque in Gadon Kaya 
has remained a central institution for the movement. As of 2012, Dr Sani and 
Shaykh Abdulwahhab still offered lessons there. Dr Bashir began his preaching 
there after his return from Saudi Arabia, before the al-Furqan Mosque, where he 
became imam, opened in 2007.16 Graduates of IUM have maintained connec-
tions to Saudi Arabia through pilgrimages and visits; in 2011, for example, Dr 
Bashir was a royal guest on the hajj.
In a further demonstration of educational hybridity, IUM was often not 
the endpoint of the Kano Salafis’ educational trajectories. Shaykh Jaʿfar, after 
completing his BA in Medina, later entered (and subsequently left) an MA pro-
gramme in Islamic Studies at Bayero University, Kano. He completed an MA 
at the Africa International University in Khartoum and enrolled (before his 
death) in a PhD programme at Usman Danfodiyo University in Sokoto (where 
Dr Pakistan obtained his PhD in 2006). The paths that led to Medina often led 
back to Nigeria or to other destinations in Africa and/or the Arab world.
Advanced educational credentials placed these graduates in a tiny minority 
of Nigerians and helped them to reach diverse audiences. Despite their own 
relative youth within a scholarly gerontocracy, Shaykh Jaʿfar and other preach-
ers earned a strong following among Kano youth who have seen them not only 
as credible scholars, but also as down-to-earth speakers who address issues like 
marriage, sex, family, politics, community conflicts and creed without euphe-
mism or obfuscation. While audiences at study circles have often been primarily 
male, Ahlussunnah preachers have reached women through radio, recordings 
and co-educational lectures in mosques. Their advanced educational credentials 
have earned Ahlussunnah some following among politicians, civil servants and 
professionals. The relationships between graduates of IUM and these different 
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groups show how Ahlussunnah preachers have partially targeted their lectures 
to local audiences’ concerns.
Shaykh Jaʿfar’s popularity and influence began to soar by the end of the 
1990s. In 2000, as the Kano State government was moving to re-implement 
shariʿa, he served on a ten-man review committee for the draft shariʿa code, 
indicating his position as a representative of a major religious constituency.17 By 
1999, Shaykh Jaʿfar’s followers had begun to systematically record his lectures, 
dozens of which still circulated in Kano as of 2012. By the mid-2000s, after Dr 
Sani and Dr Bashir returned home, the Ahlussunnah network had represent-
atives in some of the city’s most prominent institutions, including BUK (Dr 
Bashir) and the Shekarau administration (Shaykh Abdulwahhab, Dr Bashir). 
Over three decades, this network of young activists became a major force in the 
religious and political life of one of Nigeria’s largest cities.
The Invocation of IUM and the Salafi Canon in 
Debates between Ahlussunnah and Izala
Ahlussunnah leaders have sometimes broken with other Nigerian Salafis over 
Islamic legal issues. In the 1990s, Ahlussunnah leaders partly distanced them-
selves from the mass reformist movement Izala, to which many of them had 
belonged in their youth, due to disagreements with Izala hardliners over ritual 
issues connected to Salafis’ interactions with Sufis. In the mid-2000s Shaykh 
Jaʿfar denounced his former student Muhammad Yusuf, who founded the group 
Boko Haram, over disagreements concerning the permissibility of Muslims seek-
ing Western-style education and working for secular governments (see next sec-
tion). Some of the most prominent examples of Ahlussunnah leaders invoking 
their learning at Medina, their mastery of Salafi canons and methodologies, and 
their respect for thinkers in the global Salafi arena have occurred during debates 
with other Salafis.
The course of the relationship between Shaykh Jaʿfar, Dr Sani, and other 
young preachers, on the one hand, and Izala, on the other, illustrates processes of 
de-localisation and re-localisation, processes discussed at greater length below. 
In terms of de-localisation, Ahlussunnah has at times downplayed its connec-
tions to Izala in favour of asserting an allegedly universal identity as Salafis. Yet 
Ahlussunnah has then re-inscribed this universal identity in the local environ-
ment by means of connecting local struggles to broader histories and geographies. 
An ability to shift between addressing local concerns and claiming transcendent 
identities has lain at the heart of Ahlussunnah’s rhetorical power.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, new Islamic tendencies flourished in northern 
Nigeria. These tendencies offered alternatives to the Sufi orders that had pre-
viously dominated much religious activity in the region. One new movement 
A Preaching Network from Kano to Medina and Back
— 101 —
was Izala, which Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani joined in the 1980s. Izala was 
founded in 1978 in Jos under the leadership of Shaykh Ismail Idris (1936–2000), 
with Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (1924–92), former Grand Qadi (judge) of the 
defunct regional government of Northern Nigeria, as the movement’s spiritual 
mentor. Izala established branches in other northern cities, including Kano. 
Izala’s preachers encountered opposition from Sufis inside Kano’s old city, but 
had greater success preaching in areas like Fagge, where Shaykh Jaʿfar partly 
grew up.18 Izala’s young preachers, like Shaykh Jaʿfar, taught children and adults 
how to read, recite and interpret the Qurʾan, and offered lessons in hadith and 
fiqh (jurisprudence).19
In Kano, Izala spread Salafism by assembling a coalition of young preachers 
and older businessmen who fought micro-political battles to create alternative 
religious spaces to the Sufi-dominated mosques. Kano’s Emirate Council con-
trolled the establishment of mosques, especially Friday mosques, of which there 
were only five in Kano by the early 1980s. Izala’s activists established worship 
spaces in private homes and broadcast their sermons through loudspeakers. 
These tactics brought conflict with Sufis and with the emir, who ultimately 
allowed Izala some freedom.20 Izala’s re-inscription of urban space was paral-
leled by an inversion of older relationships between clerics and businessmen, a 
process that has occurred within other Salafi movements elsewhere in Africa.21 
Rather than wealthy Sufi clerics “overshadowing” businessmen, businessmen 
began recruiting and supporting Izala’s young preachers. In this pattern, “unlike 
the Sufi Shaykh, the cleric is not supposed to have any extraordinary powers. 
So, spiritually, he is assumed to be the equal of the businessman.”22 Studies 
of Izala have sometimes asserted that funding from Saudi Arabia and Shaykh 
Gumi’s personal connections to the kingdom played decisive roles in the spread 
of the movement. But during the 1980s, many of the movement’s preachers 
were trained within northern Nigeria, and much of its funding came from local 
business people. It is especially noteworthy that Shaykh Jaʿfar, one of the most 
famous Izala preachers to have studied in the Arab world after Shaykh Gumi 
himself (who attended Bakht er Ruda Teachers’ College in Sudan in 1954–5), 
would eventually reassess his relationship with Izala.
Shortly after its founding, politics and theological disputes began dividing 
Izala. In Kano, Ousmane Kane writes, “One patron tried to turn the preachers 
into an institutional channel for the negotiation of relations with the state”, 
side-lining and alienating some activists.23 The society became divided over 
the question of whether Sufis should be regarded as Muslims.24 By the mid-
1980s, the preachers who would later make up the Ahlussunnah network began 
to distance themselves from some elements of Izala. Dr Sani writes: “I had 
some heated situations with some of the extremists [mutat∙arrifı̄n] in [Izala], for 
I leaned more toward reviving correct knowledge and spreading it than toward 
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establishing preaching assemblies.”25 These disagreements grew into Shaykh 
Jaʿfar’s and Dr Sani’s decision to break with Izala during their time in Medina.
At IUM, the Nigerian students formed tight bonds with each other and 
with other African students. Dr Sani relates that he, Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr 
Ibrahim Jallo of Taraba State formed an extracurricular study circle dedicated 
to reading works by Shaykh ibn Taymiyya. “One doctrinal affiliation brought us 
together, and that was affiliation to [Izala], as duʿāt [preachers] in it. We were 
comrades before the university, and we became more connected at the univer-
sity.”26 At the same time that membership in Izala linked them, however, the 
Nigerian students found new opportunities for reflection and debate. At IUM, 
the young preachers cultivated the spirit of intra-Muslim pluralism that they 
felt Izala lacked. Shaykh Jaʿfar later said: “We would gather books and read, or 
we would open a chapter in a book. [Dr Sani] would read or I would read and we 
would comment on it to each other. Sometimes we would agree, sometimes we 
would differ, and so forth.”27
During their time at IUM, the circle around Shaykh Jaʿfar came to feel that 
they had textual evidence to support their stances against the Izala hardliners – a 
significant asset in a tradition that prizes textual evidence as the decisive crite-
rion for settling disputes. Dr Sani writes that study and debate in Medina took 
on a wider scope than discussions inside Izala circles at home. “When we met 
together at the campus of the Islamic University, we would re-examine many 
of the preaching issues (al-qad∙āya al-daʿwiyya) that [Izala] had adopted”, such as 
“the issue of prayer behind the heretic (mubtadiʿ), or the one whose status [as a 
believer or unbeliever] is unknown (al-mastūr), and the issue of eating something 
sacrificed by Sufis.”28 On the latter issue, Dr Sani mentions that he read works 
by Shaykh Muhammad Siddiq Hasan al Qinnawji (d. 1890), a thinker from 
the Indian subcontinent who belonged to the Ahl-e Hadith movement, which 
influenced later Salafi thinkers. Dr Sani also read texts by Shaykh Muhammad 
bin ʿAli al-Shawkani (d. 1834), a scholar from Yemen widely cited by Salafis. 
Both these authors “increased my conviction [qanāʿati] in my stance”.29
Dr Sani’s invocation of these figures has at least two salient contexts. First, 
he mentions them while recalling a legal debate with Izala hardliners in the 
1990s; canonical Salafis become intellectual authorities supporting his stances. 
Secondly, he mentions these figures in a book attempting to define Shaykh 
Jaʿfar’s legacy – and the identity of his successors in the Ahlussunnah network 
– after the shaykh’s death. By invoking canonical Salafis, Dr Sani suggests that 
time in Medina expanded his and Shaykh Jaʿfar’s command of the canon to a 
degree that the Izala hardliners could not match. It is worth reiterating that Dr 
Sani’s biography of Shaykh Jaʿfar was written in Arabic, not Hausa. Given the 
large number of Nigerian figures and places Dr Sani mentions in the book, often 
without providing much contextual information, the general Arabic-reading 
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global public might find the book difficult to follow at times, suggesting Dr Sani 
may have intended Nigerian Arabophone scholars as his primary audience. It 
is also worth noting that in his oral, Hausa-language intellectual autobiography 
“Tarihin Rayuwata a Ilmi” (“The History of My Intellectual Life”), Shaykh Jaʿfar 
mentions IUM only briefly, and includes little discussion of the Salafi intellec-
tual canon. In “Tarihin Rayuwata” and another lecture, “Gwagwarmaya tsaka-
nin Gaskiya da Karya” (Hausa: “The Struggle between Truth and Falsehood”), 
Shaykh Jaʿfar glossed over his circle’s split with Izala, referring to his period of 
Izala membership in the 1980s without rancour and, simultaneously, identify-
ing Izala – even in the 1980s – as part of Ahlussunnah.30 In different contexts, 
Ahlussunnah leaders have presented different framings of their relationship 
with Izala, as well as of the significance of their time in Medina with regard to 
that relationship.
In 1991, while Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani were at IUM, Izala split into two 
camps, based, respectively, in Jos and Kaduna. The sympathies of Shaykh Jaʿfar 
and Dr Sani lay with the latter, which they perceived as more moderate and less 
authoritarian. The Jos camp, Dr Sani writes, went too far in “excommunicat-
ing without any thinking” (“takfı̄r bilā ʿadna tafkı̄r”).31 Significantly, in Kano, 
where Izala also split, the leader of those aligned with Kaduna was Dr Pakistan, 
an alumnus of IUM. Despite their sympathies for Kaduna, the students around 
Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani at IUM remained neutral. Dr Sani writes: “When this 
split occurred, we decided to meet with all the students in the university belong-
ing to [Izala], and take one stance characterised by neutrality (al-h∙ iyādı̄ya) and 
justice (al-ʿadāla), and not support a side against the other side.” They authored 
a “letter of advice” (risāla nas∙ı̄h∙a) to the two sides and delegated Shaykh Jaʿfar to 
deliver it.32 Dr Sani describes this episode as a formative experience in Shaykh 
Jaʿfar’s career as a preacher:
There is no doubt that this stance that the students took then is what 
formed for the brother [Shaykh Jaʿfar], may Allah have mercy on him, an 
intellectual basis for launching his preaching after his return to Nigeria. It 
created for the Salafi daʿwa a special air, and gave it a distinguished dimen-
sion in Nigerian society. After some of the students had been fettered by 
the decisions [Izala] issued, they became free in their daʿwa and free in their 
approach, not compelled to follow a certain person who would impose his 
views on them.33
In the 1990s, as Shaykh Jaʿfar and his circle began to present Ahlussunnah as 
a category that transcended the boundaries of Izala as an organisation, their 
preaching became accessible to new constituencies, especially professionals and 
civil servants. Dr Sani writes:
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There had been among them some who evaded sunna because of the harsh-
ness [ghilz∙a] in social interaction, cruelty in expression, and excess in takfı̄r 
and driving people out [tanfı̄r] which characterised some individuals of the 
Society. Then when they saw a form of daʿwa unaligned with a sect, not 
fanatic toward a group, and at the same time one whose leaders were endowed 
with the spirit of good treatment toward the one who is different, they appre-
ciated sunna. [Shaykh Jaʿfar], may Allah have mercy on him, was a pioneer 
and a leader in this direction.34
The graduates of IUM placed a premium on the ability to demonstrate tex-
tual knowledge. In recruiting teachers for lessons at the mosque, Shaykh Jaʿfar 
emphasised scholarly credentials, for he “saw the majority of those who under-
took daʿwa and instruction as weak in knowledge and poor in understanding”.35 
Graduates of IUM were attempting to enforce a new standard for intellectual 
accomplishment among reformist preachers, and to shift the tone and focus of 
their preaching.
For Shaykh Jaʿfar and his circle, shifting the emphasis from identifying 
themselves as members of Izala to describing themselves as representatives of 
Ahlussunnah was a way of universalising their identity. As one Nigerian Salafi 
graduate of IUM, Shaykh Abdullahi Garangamawa, explained, Izala is, from the 
perspective of Ahlussunnah, “only an organisation”, one with a specific history 
and context. Ahlussunnah, on the other hand, is “an approach, dating from the 
time of the Messenger of God”, distinguished by adherence to the Qurʾan and 
the sunna. “Everyone you see inside [Izala] is Ahlussunnah, but it is not neces-
sary for everyone who is Ahlussunnah to be inside [Izala].” Some Ahlussunnah 
members preferred not to label themselves as Izala, Shaykh Garangamawa 
added, “Because in the past, there was foolishness . . . and excommunications 
and some things that had no basis.”36
At IUM, Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani underwent at least two intellectual shifts. 
First, deepening their disagreements with Izala hardliners, they adopted some-
what greater tolerance for certain interactions with Sufis. Secondly, they began 
preaching outside the context of a formalised, hierarchical organisation. IUM 
has remained a potent reference point in Dr Sani’s presentation of his circle’s 
break with Izala.
Not all Nigerian Salafis had the same experience at IUM. Some members of 
Izala found confirmation for their theological stances and remained within the 
Izala fold. Still others promoted reform within Izala. Dr Pakistan, who rose to 
leadership within Kano Izala after 1991, told me that he moved the society’s 
emphasis from takfı̄r (excommunication) to taʿlı̄m (education).37 It is important 
also not to exaggerate the extent of the split between Shaykh Jaʿfar’s circle 
and Izala. Ahlussunnah continued to work with the movement, especially with 
A Preaching Network from Kano to Medina and Back
— 105 —
reformers like Dr Pakistan. Ahlussunnah and Izala leaders are interconnected 
through friendship, marriage and kinship. In conflicts with hereditary Muslim 
rulers and other adversaries, Izala and Ahlussunnah have often presented a 
united front. As illustrated in earlier chapters, the different initial dispositions 
of various Nigerian students (as for other nationalities, see Chapter 2) at IUM 
have been an important variable in shaping the specific intellectual influences 
they absorb while at IUM. Platforms such as IUM can transmit specific Salafi 
ideas and traditions globally, but such transmission is not hegemonic and has 
inherent limits.
The Invocation of IUM and the Salafi Canon in Debates between 
Ahlussunnah and Boko Haram
The emergence of Boko Haram around 2002 in northeastern Nigeria extended 
the ongoing fragmentation of Salafism in Nigeria. This sect was originally cen-
tred on its founder Muhammad Yusuf, who built a following through personal 
charisma, strident rhetoric and, possibly, connections to wealthy and politically 
powerful patrons. The sect clashed with authorities in 2003–4 and again in 
a massive uprising in 2009, during which Yusuf died in police custody. Since 
2010, under the formal leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram has con-
ducted assassinations, bombings and raids directed at Nigerian security forces, 
Christians, businesses accused of collaborating with the state, and other targets.
Boko Haram presents itself as a Salafi group. The group’s formal name, Ahl 
al-Sunna li-al-Daʿwa wa-al-Jihad, translates as “The People of the Prophetic 
Model Who Conduct Preaching and Jihad”. The label “Ahl al-Sunna”, as with 
the circle around Shaykh Jaʿfar, evokes Salafi self-presentations as the custo-
dians of the Prophet’s legacy. In further Salafi symbolism, Muhammad Yusuf’s 
mosque in Maiduguri was named after Shaykh ibn Taymiyya.
Yusuf was at one time a prominent student of Shaykh Jaʿfar. The latter had 
a presence in Maiduguri, where he often conducted tafsı̄r (exegesis) sessions 
during Ramadan. Boko Haram’s political stances, however, placed it outside the 
scope of mainstream Salafism in northern Nigeria. After Yusuf came to reject 
the permissibility of Muslims working for secular governments and the validity 
of Western education, Shaykh Jaʿfar broke with him. Boko Haram’s use of the 
“Ahlussunnah” label may represent an effort to lay claim to the Salafi daʿwa in 
northern Nigeria, in rivalry with Shaykh Jaʿfar’s successors.
The extended public debate between Shaykh Jaʿfar and Muhammad Yusuf 
has been analysed in depth by the anonymous author of an article on Boko 
Haram. As the author writes, Yusuf, who “was largely self-educated, without 
the benefit of formal schooling”, took a “shortcut to prominence by articulating 
a new discourse that stridently emphasised Salafi doctrines on a host of issues 
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. . . His followers were attracted by his ultra-Salafi doctrines, his heavy reliance 
on Ibn Taymiyya . . . and his incredible ability to solidly marshal Salafi argu-
ments in support of his seemingly preposterous positions.”38 Yusuf made several 
pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia,39 and took refuge in the kingdom after clashes 
between his followers and the authorities in 2003–4,40 but no publicly available 
source has asserted that Yusuf attended any Saudi university.
As the anonymous analyst points out, Shaykh Jaʿfar not only disagreed with 
Yusuf on technical grounds, he attacked Yusuf’s scholarly credentials and moral 
character. It is here that Shaykh Jaʿfar seemed to brandish his education in 
Medina and his mastery of the Salafi canon. After quoting a passage in which 
Shaykh Jaʿfar castigated Yusuf for his ignorance of the history of Muslims’ 
 struggles across time and space, the anonymous author writes:
By questioning Yusuf’s knowledge, [Shaykh Jaʿfar Mahmud] Adam highlights 
the resentment of his cadre, who seem to think they are the only ones enti-
tled to speak for Islam due to their advanced degrees from prestigious Islamic 
universities. By questioning the length of time Yusuf has spent preaching, 
Adam alludes to the important issue of generating followers by carefully 
building a reputation of vast learning and piety over many years of toil in 
teaching, preaching, and organizing . . . By quickly generating a mass fol-
lowing with what Adam considers half-baked knowledge of Islam, Yusuf is 
in effect an interloper who does not deserve the perquisites that come from 
mass followers.41
In this context, Shaykh Jaʿfar invoked the authority of the contemporary Salafi 
canon. In one lecture, Shaykh Jafʿar denigrated Yusuf by comparing him both 
with scholars in Maiduguri, where the shaykh said many people surpassed Yusuf 
in “knowledge”, “piety” and “humility”, and with intellectual authorities on the 
global Salafi stage:
He thinks that major scholars in whom the scholarly world trusts, such as 
Shaykh bin Baz, Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Shaykh Salih ibn ʿUthay-
min, and other major scholars, either in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or other 
places, he thinks that all of them are ignorant. What they have studied is not 
learning. His own is learning.
Shaykh Jaʿfar, referring to the works of Shaykh al-Albani, attacked the valid-
ity of the hadith reports that Yusuf had used in fatwas against government 
employment and Western education.42 Through assaults on Yusuf’s knowledge 
and character, one of the most prominent exponents of Salafism in northern 
Nigeria worked to exclude him from the mainstream Salafi fold. Key to this 
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effort was Shaykh Jaʿfar’s ability to invoke intellectual giants of the contem-
porary Salafi canon to support his own position, and to apply Salafi method-
ologies of hadith criticism to undermine the textual support Yusuf claimed for 
his arguments.
Shifting Registers: 
Popular Messages, Salafi Texts and Technical Manuals
That Ahlussunnah referred explicitly to IUM and Saudi Arabia in their debates 
with Izala hardliners and with Yusuf underscores the relative lack of such refer-
ences in other contexts. If invoking IUM is sometimes a powerful tool for assert-
ing intellectual superiority, at other times Ahlussunnah leaders have left their 
credentials and connections to Saudi Arabia in the background. One reason for 
Ahlussunnah’s success in growing their followership in Kano from the 1990s to 
the present, then, has been their ability to present core ideas through different 
media and in different registers.
Ahlussunnah leaders have created various intellectual products, includ-
ing simple manuals of advice, courses structured around classical Salafi works, 
manuals on technical worship requirements, translations of Arabic texts, and 
advanced original compositions (in Arabic and Hausa) engaging with a particu-
lar thinker or issue. Shifting between registers has allowed Ahlussunnah leaders 
to offer the general public specifically Salafi solutions to everyday problems 
in Kano. Operating in a popular register has helped to localise Ahlussunnah’s 
message, but it has also universalised local issues, connecting them to Salafi 
conceptions of history and daʿwa.
One example of the popular works that Ahlussunnah leaders have produced 
in Kano is their lectures on marital problems. Widespread concern exists in 
Kano, among Salafis as well as other Muslims, over what is perceived to be a 
high incidence of divorce, as well as increasing difficulty in making successful 
matches and avoiding marital conflict. This sense of crisis helps to explain why 
one of Shaykh Jaʿfar’s only lectures to be transcribed and published as a book 
– and one that remained widely available, in audio and text forms, as of 2012 
– is entitled Matakan Mallakar Miji (Hausa: Steps for Controlling a Husband). 
Delivered as a lecture at Uthman bin Affan Mosque in 1999 and published 
in 2000, the text uses Qurʾanic verses and hadiths to explain how women 
can achieve marital harmony. Shaykh Jaʿfar presented these suggestions as 
an Islamic (and Salafi) alternative to local practices, which included women’s 
visits to people whom Shaykh Jaʿfar called “boka” (Hausa: “spiritual healer”) or 
“malamin tsibbo” (Hausa: “charm maker”). In his introduction, Shaykh Jaʿfar 
wrote that the Islamic alternative he offered had generated substantial popular 
interest:
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Then we said, if Islam forbids going to [spiritual healers and charm makers] 
. . . there are prayers that one can do, that do not clash with shariʿa . . . This 
cassette spread, and I got no rest due to the amount of calls from different 
programmes in the north of this country [asking] about these prayers for 
 controlling a husband, and where could one find them?43
This work delegitimised certain local practices while offering an accessible ver-
sion of Salafi practice as a viable alternative. But it did not attempt to offer a 
comprehensive account of Salafi views on marriage or of Salafi scriptural meth-
odologies. Aside from occasional references to the thought of canonical figures 
like the hadith collector Imam Bukhari and Imam ibn Taymiyya, Matakan 
Mallakar Miji presented Salafi thought almost entirely through scripture.
Other writings and lectures by Ahlussunnah leaders have referred more exten-
sively to Salafi thinkers and methodologies. Yet even in more advanced discus-
sions, Ahlussunnah leaders have frequently concentrated on improving students’ 
knowledge of major classical Salafi texts and figures rather than on introducing 
them to the contemporary, global Salafi intellectual landscape. For example, 
Ahlussunnah leaders have taught individual texts to their students, translat-
ing and explaining texts in mosques and recording these commentaries for fur-
ther distribution. Some of these courses featured core hadith collections from 
the classical period. Shaykh Jaʿfar, for example, taught al-Arbaʿun Hadith (The 
Forty Hadiths) and Riyad al Salihin (Garden of the Righteous) by Shaykh Yahya 
al-Nawawi (1234–78), Bulugh al-Marum min Adilla al-Ahkam (Attainment of the 
Objective According to Evidences of the Rules) by Shaykh ibn Hajar al-Asqalani 
(1372–1448), and other collections. Ahlussunnah leaders have also taught well-
known works by classical Salafi thinkers. Shaykh Jaʿfar taught Shaykh ibn ʿAbd 
al-Wahhab’s Kashf al-Shubuhat (The Clearing of Doubts) and Kitab al-Tawhid.44
When introducing courses on such works, Shaykh Jaʿfar and Dr Sani often 
assumed little contextual knowledge on the part of their audiences. In 2008, Dr 
Sani taught Imam ibn Taymiyya’s al Tuhfa al ʿ Iraqiyya fi al Aʿmal al Qalbiyya (The 
Iraqi Masterpiece on Actions of the Heart) in Katsina. His first lecture introduced 
Shaykh ibn Taymiyya’s life and works. This was necessary, Dr Sani explained, 
because “there is no doubt, few know who Ibn Taymiyya is” (“Babu shakka, 
kadan ne suka san wanene Ibn Taymiyya”). If Ahlussunnah leaders could not 
assume that their own students were deeply familiar with major classical Salafis, 
then it is little surprise that contemporary Salafi thinkers are not major subjects 
in courses and popular works.
Ahlussunnah leaders’ references to contemporary, extra-local Salafi thinkers 
like Shaykh al-Albani or Shaykh bin Baz have primarily occurred within tech-
nical discussions on specific legal rulings. Examples of this pattern come from 
Shaykh Abdulwahhab’s books Ramadan a kan Koyarwar Alkurʾani da Sunnah bisa 
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Fahimtar Magabata na Kwarai (Hausa: Ramadan According to the Teaching of the 
Qurʾan and the Sunna According to the Understanding of the Pious Forefathers) and 
Fatawoyin Aikin Hajji da Umrah da Ziyara a kan Koyarwar Alkurʾani da Sunnah 
da Fahimtar Magabata na Kwarai (Rulings on Hajj, Umra [the lesser pilgrimage], 
and Ziyara [visiting] According to the Teaching of the Qurʾan, the Sunna, and the 
Understanding of the Pious Forefathers).45 In these books, Shaykh Abdulwahhab 
not only cited scripture to support his positions, he provided precise references 
within canonical hadith collections, such as those of Imams Bukhari, Muslim, 
Abu Dawud and others. He discussed the status of each hadith according to 
Salafi methodologies of hadith criticism. In this context, approving mentions of 
Shaykh al-Albani as an arbiter of a hadith’s strength or weakness became ubiq-
uitous. Debates with rival Salafis, then, are a particularly contested subset of the 
technical legal discussions in which Ahlussunnah leaders have mostly strongly 
invoked the authority of contemporary Salafi intellectuals.
Local Daʿwa in the Context of Universal History
The tendency of Ahlussunnah leaders to shift registers and move between local 
concerns and allegedly universal identities has implications for an understanding 
of the relationship between Salafism as a global trend and a set of locally con-
textualised communities. Identifiably Salafi postures and traditions are shared 
across different localities; yet Terje Østebø and Laurent Bonnefoy have argued 
persuasively that the rhetorical and organisational strategies and behaviours 
of Salafi movements in, respectively, Ethiopia and Yemen, are shaped by their 
interactions with local contexts, even as Salafis attempt to undermine local 
competitors. In Bale, Ethiopia, Østebø writes, Salafis’ efforts to de-localise Sufi 
practices did not represent a move from the local to an “abstract” global sphere. 
Rather, one locality influenced another: “A particular variant of Islam, stem-
ming from Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and evolving in the socio-political and cultural 
environment of the Arabian Peninsula, was introduced to and expanded in 
Bale.”46 Haykel suggests that the appeal of Salafism in diverse contexts origi-
nates not in its allegedly “de-territorialised” quality, but in its willingness to dis-
count traditional authorities in the name of scriptural authority.47 This appeal 
grows in contexts where Salafis effectively connect the Salafi tradition with 
local struggles over practice and authority.
The localisation of Salafism can occur through education and media. In Kano, 
where many adult men of diverse theological orientations attend evening prayer 
and study sessions called majalisai (Hausa, sing. majalisa, from the Arabic majlis, 
“council”), Salafis have organised their own sessions for studying hadith col-
lections, Qurʾanic recitation and other Islamic sciences. Media interventions 
and translation constitute other avenues for localisation. The Salafi Shaykh 
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Muhammad Nazifi Inuwa, a graduate of IUM, conducted what some informants 
called the most popular radio programme in Kano as of early 2012. In weekly 
appearances, he translated the Khut∙ba (Friday sermon) in Mecca from Arabic into 
Hausa, and then commented on it in Hausa. Giving lectures on topics of wide-
spread local concern, such as marital conflict and divorce, has allowed Salafis to 
relate their theological and legal worldviews to the daily lives of local audiences.
Localisation also occurs through the financial and political infrastruc-
tures that Salafis construct. The financial patronage of local businessmen has 
allowed Salafi preachers to build mosques and schools. While Shaykh Jaʿfar’s 
circle received some support from international Muslim charities like al-Mun-
tada al-Islami, local financial support strongly aided their rise to prominence. 
Ahlussunnah leaders have also participated in Kano politics in diverse ways. 
They have held bureaucratic positions relating to the administration of Islamic 
law, publicly criticised elected officials and hereditary Muslim rulers, and con-
tested control of mosques and media.
At the same time that education, media, funding and other processes have 
localised Salafism in Kano, Ahlussunnah leaders have urged their followers to 
view themselves as part of a broader community of adherents to the allegedly 
correct understanding of monotheism. Ahlussunnah leaders narrate local events 
in ways that attempt to transcend local chronologies and geographies. The 
community to which Ahlussunnah leaders link their local community’s expe-
riences includes the Qurʾanic prophets before Muhammad, but its historical 
centre is the Prophet and his companions. The community extends forward in 
time from the Prophet to any Muslim, in any place, considered to follow his 
sunna. Ahlussunnah leaders have presented their struggles in Kano as part of an 
ongoing struggle wherein true Muslims, surrounded by hostile communities and/
or faithless Muslims, are a permanent vanguard and a vulnerable minority. For 
Ahlussunnah, a sense of triumphalism – that the true Muslims will overcome 
persecution and spread their message – has coexisted with a sense that the 
Muslim community is doomed to decline.
Ahlussunnah leaders’ use of hadiths that foretell the future – such as “Islam 
began as a stranger and it will return a stranger as it began” – has reinforced a 
core theme: that the trajectory of Islam in Nigeria parallels the trajectory of 
Islam elsewhere and fits within a larger, foreordained historical arc. In a 2003 
lecture titled “Siyasa a Nigeria” (“Politics in Nigeria”), Shaykh Jaʿfar cited a 
hadith that predicts a time when, despite the large size of the Muslim commu-
nity, no nation would fear Muslims because they would have succumbed to “love 
of the world and fear of death”. He commented:
Any observant person will notice how the Muslim umma is growing in the 
world. We are not shrinking. Here at home in Nigeria before you find one 
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person who has apostasised you will find a hundred people who have pro-
nounced the shahāda and entered Islam . . . But at the exact same time, 
[Islam’s] problems are increasing, and weakness and humiliation are increas-
ing in the umma.48
As history drives towards its eschatological conclusion – and a sense that 
that conclusion may be near at hand permeated some of Shaykh Jaʿfar’s 
lectures – textually based creedal purity remains of paramount importance. 
Through historical analogy and assertions that prophecies are being fulfilled, 
Ahlussunnah preachers have merged past and present, accenting the idea 
that true Muslims are under attack. Enemies of the sunna, despite appearing 
in different garbs, promote similar messages of heresy and disunity in different 
times and places.
For Ahlussunnah, history is not only a template in which they are embedded, 
but a process that they can study and use. Dr Sani, comparing the Mongol inva-
sion of Shaykh ibn Taymiyya’s time to the Iraq War, elucidated Ahlussunnah’s 
view of history in one lecture:
As Allah says, “Such days we cause to follow by turns among men” [Q 3:140]. 
History is only a cycle of periods, a cycle of time. As they say, history is 
“ah∙dāth” [Arabic: events] and “asbāb” [Arabic: causes] that combine. Things 
that are done and the reasons for their occurrence combine to produce his-
tory. Therefore what happened yesterday – if the reason for its occurrence 
yesterday reoccurs – will happen again. That is history . . . We study history 
so that we may draw some lessons [from it].49
History, for Ahlussunnah, provides a framework for making sense of the present 
in religious terms, and a template for religious action: the creation of a ritually 
and theologically pure Muslim community that will rebuke heretics and point 
Muslims towards the sole path to salvation.
Religious action, for Ahlussunnah, centres on daʿwa, a category that is 
intended to be at once an embodiment of an allegedly universal Islamic mission 
and a locally situated practice. The Arabic word daʿwa can be translated as the 
“call” or “appeal” to Islam. Those who practise daʿwa are duʿāt (sing. dāʿiya). Dr 
Sani’s memoir of Shaykh Jaʿfar bears the Arabic subtitle Daʿiya al-Jil wa Mufassir 
al-Tanzil (The Daʿwist of the Generation and the Exegete of the Revelation). These 
epithets stress two core aspects of Ahlussunnah identity: an activist stance 
towards Islamic reform and a mastery of scripture. Ahlussunnah leaders enjoined 
followers in Kano to be activists too. In one 2006 lecture, Shaykh Jaʿfar told 
the crowd: “Understanding sunna does not mean ‘registering’ with some ‘regis-
tration card’ such that if you enter your name, that’s it, you become a member 
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 112 —
. . . The creed of Ahlussunnah wa-al-Jamaʿa does not mean . . . daʿwa with the 
mouth alone without any work that makes it real on a daily basis.”50
Daʿwa, in Salafi discourses worldwide, is not limited to converting non- 
Muslims to Islam; it includes calling other Muslims to become better Muslims. 
The dāʿiya is, for Salafi thinkers in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, a universal 
category. An article published in the journal of the Saudi Arabia-based Muslim 
World League in 1990, by which time Shaykh Jaʿfar was at IUM, outlined how 
the dāʿiya needed to possess certain timeless qualities to succeed, including 
“imitation of the traces of the Messenger”. The article presents the dāʿiya’s 
struggle as basically unchanging:
For if our pious ancestors [salafuna al s∙ālih∙ ] were fought by ignorant classes 
(t∙abaqāt jāhila), failed leaderships (riʾāsāt fāshila), obscure tribes, and bellig-
erent, combative peoples, we today are fought by classes who claim they are 
cultured. Indeed we are fought by unbelieving governments who have jointly 
decided and jointly stated that they will fight Islam and unite together to 
block its daʿwa and to judge its men.51
Ahlussunnah leaders’ conception of daʿwa is similar to this view. Just as 
Ahlussunnah leaders have viewed their historical circumstances as fundamen-
tally similar to those of other Salafis, so too have they viewed their core mission 
as identical to that of other Salafi figures, past and present.
Daʿwa, however, occurs in a context. African graduates of Saudi Arabian 
universities have noted that local contexts shape the challenges each dāʿiya 
faces. In 2001, at a conference the Saudi Arabian government held in Kano for 
African graduates of Saudi Islamic universities, a Malian scholar outlined five 
challenges for the African dāʿiya: converting non-Muslims; purifying Islamic 
practices; fighting “Christianisation” (al-tans∙ı̄r) and Westernisation; opposing 
Sufism; and confronting “waves of Shiʿism”. In West Africa, the scholar con-
tinued, fighting polytheistic beliefs and opposing Sufism were the most salient 
challenges, due to the historical linkages between Sufism and Islamisation in 
the region.52 Anti-Sufism has frequently been a defining trait of West African 
Salafism, including in works such as the 1972 polemical text al-ʿAqida al-Sahiha 
bi Muwafaqa al-Shariʿa (Arabic: The Correct Creed in Accordance with the Shariʿa) 
by Shaykh Abubakar Gumi, the spiritual patron of Izala.
Localisation also occurs within Africa. The priorities of African Salafis vary 
from context to context, or even over the course of individuals’ lifetimes, in 
response to external impetuses and strategic concerns. Robert Launay, for exam-
ple, describes how one prominent Salafi (Launay uses the term “Wahhabi”) 
in Côte d’Ivoire transitioned from outspoken anti-Sufism to accommodation 
with Sufism as he became a local elder and took on a range of social roles “that 
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flagrantly contradicted his Wahhabi ideas”.53 The appearance or escalation of 
new perceived threats to Salafi creed may also affect Salafis’ priorities; for exam-
ple, the outspokenness of some Shiʿi leaders in northern Nigeria, and Sunni–
Shiʿa conflict in Iraq after 2003, have contributed to Ahlussunnah leaders’ 
strongly anti-Shiʿi views. The imperative of adapting daʿwa to local concerns 
and circumstances helps to explain why and how Ahlussunnah leaders have 
shifted intellectual registers in their messages to audiences.
Conclusion
Graduates of the Islamic University of Medina within the “Ahlussunnah” net-
work in Kano have made use of their learning at IUM, and of different aspects 
of the classical and contemporary Salafi canons, in varied and complex ways. 
Ahlussunnah leaders have built a wide audience, including youth, but also mar-
ried women and certain social and political elites, partly through their ability to 
shift intellectual registers. While Ahlussunnah’s popular messages often empha-
sised scripture in an accessible way, in other intellectual settings Ahlussunnah 
leaders demonstrated their mastery of Salafi methodologies of hadith criticism 
and engaged a variety of Salafi thinkers. Mastery of Salafi methodologies and 
canons proved to be particularly useful to Ahlussunnah leaders in technical 
debates with rival Nigerian Salafis, such as “hardliners” from the Izala movement 
and the radical preacher Muhammad Yusuf. Ahlussunnah leaders invoked their 
learning at IUM and the authority of contemporary Saudi Salafi thinkers in such 
debates in order to discredit rivals and present them as intellectually deficient. 
These intellectual attacks on their rivals reinforced the self- presentations of 
Ahlussunnah leaders as highly credentialed, sober representatives of Islamic 
daʿwa.
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Chapter 5
Qom Alumni in Indonesia:  
Their Role in the Shiʿi Community
Zulkifli
Introduction
This chapter explains the role of Qom alumni in the development of the Shiʿi 
community in Indonesia. The phrase “Qom alumni” refers to those who have 
completed courses in Islamic education in the Hawza ʿIlmiyya (College of 
Learning) of Qom, which is at present the most important centre of Shiʿi 
Islamic education in the world. Today there are more than 200 Qom alumni 
in Indonesia, even excluding those who travelled to Qom to attend short-term 
courses. The growth in the number of Qom graduates has made a marked contri-
bution to the formation and development of the Shiʿi community in Indonesia; 
indeed, the majority of renowned Shiʿi ustadz (religious teachers, from the 
Arabic ustadh, teacher) are graduates of the Hawza ʿIlmiyya. As a consequence, 
Shiʿi ustadz are frequently identified with the Qom alumni, even though a 
number of ustadz were in fact educated in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. For example, 
Umar Shahab and his younger brother Husein Shahab, two Shiʿi ustadz who 
are connected with prominent Shiʿi foundations in Indonesia where important 
pengajian (religious gatherings) are held, are among the most popular Shiʿi 
figures engaged in educational and daʿwa activities in Jakarta. Another prom-
inent Qom returnee is Abdurrahman Bima, former director of the Madinatul 
Ilmi College for Islamic Studies, a tertiary educational institution located in 
Depok, Southern Jakarta, and currently a member of parliament for the lead-
ing Democratic Party, led by current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
In Pekalongan, Central Java, Ahmad Baragbah leads a famous Shiʿi pesantren 
(traditional Islamic educational institution) called al-Hadi.
Frequently, Shiʿi ustadz who are graduates from Islamic schools in other 
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Middle Eastern countries, as well as intellectuals from secular universities, also 
come to Qom to take short-term training programmes in order to gain Islamic 
knowledge and establish connections with Shiʿi leaders and the ʿulama of 
Qom. Hasan Dalil, for example, having finished his undergraduate programme 
in Riyadh, took a three-month training programme in Qom. Even the renowned 
Indonesian Shiʿi intellectual Jalaluddin Rakhmat and his family stayed in Qom 
for a year, during which time he attended learning circles and lectures carried 
out by ayatollahs. This illustrates the great importance attached to Islamic edu-
cation in Qom by the Shiʿia of Indonesia.
The first section of this chapter describes the history and development of 
the practice of Indonesian students pursuing their education in Qom; it then 
explains the educational system and schooling structure which is prevalent 
there. The next section explains the workings of the Qom alumni association. 
Finally, the chapter attempts to account for the significant role played by Qom 
alumni in the field of Islamic daʿwa and education in Indonesia.
The Proliferation of Indonesian Students in Qom
It is unclear exactly when Indonesian students began to pursue Islamic edu-
cation in Qom. Efforts had indeed been made to send students to Qom by 
Indonesian Shiʿi leaders such as Muhammad Asad Shahab, who met and 
established contact with prominent Iranian Shiʿi ʿulama in the 1950s; how-
ever, reliable reports suggest that students began travelling to Qom for Islamic 
learning only a few years before the Iranian revolution, which began in 1978. 
These students were the descendants of Arabs, and lived in various locations on 
the Indonesian archipelago. Ali Ridho al-Habsyi, son of Muhammad al-Habsyi 
and grandson of Habib Ali Kwitang of Jakarta, studied in Qom in 1974. Six 
graduates of the Pesantren al-Khairat of Palu, Central Sulawesi, followed over 
the next two years, and in September 1976, Umar Shahab, an Arab descendant 
from Palembang, South Sumatra, and today a famous Shiʿi ustadz, came to 
Qom to study alongside seven other Indonesian students. In fieldwork con-
ducted in 1975, Fischer also noted the presence of Indonesian students in Qom; 
among the foreign students, including cohorts from Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
India, Lebanon, Tanzania, Turkey, Nigeria and Kashmir, Indonesians were the 
least numerous.1
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, interaction 
intensified between its government and Indonesian Shiʿi ʿulama. The victory 
of the ayatollahs inspired Indonesian intellectuals and ʿulama to study the ide-
ological foundation of the Iranian revolution, namely, Shiʿism; and at the same 
time, there was an Iranian policy of “exporting” the revolution, with Iranian 
politico-religious leaders aiming to spread Shiʿism in Indonesia and to attract 
Qom Alumni in Indonesia: Their Role in the Shiʿi Community
— 119 —
Indonesian students to study in Iran. In 1982, the Iranian government sent 
its representatives Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi and Hujjat 
al-Islam Mahmudi to Indonesia. Among their activities was a visit to Yayasan 
Pesantren Islam (YAPI; the Foundation of Islamic Pesantren) in Bangil, East 
Java, where they met with its leader, Husein al-Habsyi; the latter would become 
the most important confidant of Iranian leaders and ʿ ulama in Indonesia. At the 
time, Husein al-Habsyi was probably one of the most prominent Shiʿi ʿulama in 
Indonesia and he played a major role in the development of Islamic daʿwa and 
education. As a result of the meeting, Qom’s Hawza ʿIlmiyya agreed to accept 
ten Indonesian students selected by Husein al-Habsyi. From then until his death 
in 1994, Husein al-Habsyi was responsible for selecting candidates for study at 
Hawza ʿIlmiyya in Qom and in other cities in Iran.
As a result, graduates of YAPI numbered among the Indonesian students who 
came to Qom in 1982, alongside the alumni of other educational institutions. 
They have become renowned Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia: of the ten students 
referred to in the agreement, nearly all of whom are Arab descendants, six are 
alumni of YAPI. The YAPI alumni include Muhsin Labib (Husein al-Habsyi’s 
stepson) and Rusdi al-Aydrus, who have become Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia, 
and Husein al-Habsyi’s son, Ibrahim al-Habsyi, who has pursued his studies 
in Qom up until the present day. From outside YAPI, Ahmad Baragbah and 
Hasan Abu Ammar have also become Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia. In the years 
that followed, graduates of YAPI and/or those recommended by Husein al-Hab-
syi were still predominant among the Indonesian students who went to Qom. 
Between 1985 and 1989, al-Habsyi sent ten students to Qom, and today most 
of them have established or are affiliated with notable Shiʿi foundations in 
Indonesia and have been recognised as important Shiʿi ustadz. These include 
Musyayya Baʿabud, Zahir Yahya (the leader of al-Kautsar Foundation, Malang, 
East Java, and formerly the head of YAPI), Miqdad (the head of Pesantren 
Darut Taqrib, Jepara, Central Java), Fathoni Hadi (the founder of al-Hujjah 
Foundation, Jember, East Java, and currently on the administrative staff of the 
Islamic College Jakarta), Muhammad Amin Sufyan (the head of Samudera 
Foundation, Surabaya), Abdurrahman Bima (former director of Madinatul Ilmi 
College for Islamic Studies, STAIMI, Depok, Southern Jakarta), Husein al-Kaff 
(an adviser at al-Jawad Foundation, Bandung), Herman al-Munthahar (the head 
of Amirul Mukminin Foundation, Pontianak, West Kalimantan), Muhammad 
al-Jufri, and Abdul Aziz al-Hinduan.
In the 1990s, in addition to the alumni of YAPI, graduates of other Islamic 
educational institutions, such as the Mutahhari Foundation and al-Hadi, were 
selected to continue their education in Qom. This development corresponds 
with the growing influence of the Shiʿi intellectuals Jalaluddin Rakhmat and 
Haidar Bagir, whose recommendations were taken note of in Iran. Over time, 
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the educational background of the Indonesian students studying in Qom has 
become more varied. From the outset, most of the students who went there had 
completed their secondary education; but more recently a number of graduates 
of tertiary schools have also gone there to pursue higher levels of study – among 
them are a few alumni of Madinatul Ilmi College for Islamic Studies (STAIMI), 
Depok, and we can also find graduates of “secular” universities, such as the 
University of Indonesia, Jakarta, and the University of Padjadjaran, Bandung, 
studying religious knowledge in Qom. Their educational backgrounds are varied 
and include the humanities, social sciences, and even science and technology. 
Mujtahid Hashem, for instance, is a graduate of the technical faculty at the 
University of Indonesia. Instead of expanding his knowledge in technology, 
Mujtahid Hashem came to Qom in 2001 to engage in religious study. While 
there, he was selected as the general secretary of the Association of Indonesian 
Students (Himpunan Pelajar Indonesia), which was founded in Iran in August 
2000.2
In addition to the growing interest on the part of Indonesian students with 
regard to studying in Iran, the Iranian government, through the International 
Centre for Islamic Studies (ICIS; Markaz-i Jahani-yi ʿUlum-i Islami), has 
stepped up efforts to attract international students. Until 1993, the manage-
ment of the centre was traditional in that h∙awza was unstructured; but since 
1994, ICIS has been under the supervision of the office of the Leader of the 
Islamic Revolution headed by Grand Ayatollah ʿAli Khameneʾi, who also has 
the authority to appoint its director. Thus, Ali Khameneʾi succeeded in trans-
forming “the previously amorphous and unstructured seminary into a manage-
able center”.3 With regard to its effort to attract Indonesian students, an ICIS 
representative conducts an annual selection process at Islamic institutions, 
such as the Islamic Cultural Centre of Jakarta and the Mutahhari Foundation, 
Bandung. In addition to academic achievement, Arabic is a prerequisite in the 
selection process, since this is an international language for Islamic learning 
and also the sole language of instruction at certain madrasas in Qom. Upon 
arrival in Iran, students are also required to follow a six-month training pro-
gramme in Persian, which is the language of instruction at most of Qom’s 
Islamic educational institutions.
The number of Indonesian students studying in Qom has increased signifi-
cantly. By 1990, fifty Indonesian students had reportedly completed their studies 
or were still studying in Qom; ten years later, the number of Qom graduates in 
Indonesia was reportedly over a hundred. In 2001, fifty Indonesian students were 
chosen to continue their studies in Qom,4 and in 2004, ninety additional stu-
dents were selected. Currently, there are about 250 Indonesian students in Iran, 
most of them pursuing Islamic studies in Qom.
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The Education System in Qom
Generally speaking there are two education systems operative at the Hawza 
ʿIlmiyya in Qom: the traditional system, which is the most famous and influen-
tial; and the modern system. The traditional system’s curriculum includes both 
transmitted and intellectual religious sciences: fiqh (jurisprudence), usūl al-fiqh 
(principles of jurisprudence), ʿulūm al-Qurʾan (sciences of the Qurʾan), ʿulūm 
al-hadith (sciences of hadith), nah∙w (Arabic syntax), s∙arf (Arabic morphology), 
balāgha (rhetoric), mantiq (logic), h∙ ikma (philosophy), kalām (theology), tas∙aw-
wuf (Sufism) and ʿirfān (gnosis, mystic knowledge). Each subject has its own 
standard texts,5 which are studied in halaqat (study circles) under an instructor’s 
supervision.
At the muqaddamāt (preliminary) level, which lasts from three to five years, 
the emphasis is on providing students with various skills in Arabic that are at 
the core of its educational programme. The main subjects taught at the prelimi-
nary level include naḥw, s∙arf, balāgha and mantiq. In addition, there are certain 
optional subjects, including literature, mathematics, astronomy, and introduc-
tory fiqh, taken from one of the risāla ʿamālı̄yya (tracts on practice) of a contem-
porary marja -ʿi ta ̄qlıd̄ (pl. mara ̄ji -ʿi ta ̄qlıd̄; an authoritative source on matters of 
Islamic law). The learning process at this level involves groups of students gath-
ering together around a teacher who goes through the texts with them. Students 
are free to choose the teacher who will become their instructor. Usually, teach-
ers at this level are senior students or assistants of marājiʿ-i tāqlıd̄.6
At the sut∙ūḥ level, which usually lasts from three to six years, students are 
introduced to the substance of deductive fiqh and usūl al-fiqh, on which their 
progress to the next and ultimate level depends. The optional subjects provided 
at this level are tafsı̄r (Qurʾanic exegesis), hadith (traditions), kalām, philoso-
phy, ʿirfān, history and ethics. Generally, courses are organised according to the 
instructional technique employed and based on the main texts of the two main 
subjects, and students are free to select which lectures to attend. The students 
may also attend lectures in the optional subjects. Teachers at this level are 
usually mujtahid who have just achieved the status of ijtihād and are establishing 
their reputations.7
Although the subjects at the ultimate level (dar-i khārij) are also fiqh and 
usūl al-fiqh, the method of learning employed is different from that of the two 
prior levels. The teaching is done by prominent mujtahid, who deliver lectures 
of varying length. Usually they post their own schedules and locations for their 
lectures, and students are free to choose whose they will attend. The lectures 
delivered by the most prominent mujtahids may well be attended by hundreds of 
people, including other mujtahids. A dialectical method is generally employed 
in these classes: students are free to discuss and are encouraged to argue points 
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with the teacher. At this stage, most students are accomplished in the skill of 
abstract discursive argumentation and are trained to have self-confidence. The 
culmination of the learning process is the attainment of an ijāza (licence, certi-
fication) from one or many recognised mujtahid. It is common for the student at 
this level to write a treatise on fiqh or usūl al-fiqh, and present it to a mujtahid 
who then considers the student and their work. Based on their evaluation, the 
mujtahid may issue the ijāza, which authorises the student to exercise ijtihād.8 
Thus, students build up their careers based on their relationships with certain 
mujtahid-teachers.
When a student receives the ijāza, making him a mujtahid, the honorific 
title ayatollah (“ayat Allah”, “sign of God”) is normally bestowed upon him. 
An ayatollah recognised as a marjaʿ-i tāqlıd̄ usually receives the title ayatollah 
al-ʿuzma (“grand ayatollah”). The common title of an aspiring mujtahid is hujjat 
al-Islam (proof of Islam). The structure of the Shiʿi ʿulama is pyramidal: those at 
the highest level, the marājiʿ-i tāqlıd̄, are the fewest in number. The traditional 
system of education is extremely important in Shiʿi society, given the major role 
of marjaʿ-i tāqlıd̄ throughout history.
The modern madrasa system is a transformation of the classical system, 
adopting the modern regime of education conceived in terms of gradation, 
curriculum, classroom learning and rules. Non-traditional madrasas “are set up 
to serve needs not supplied by the traditional system”.9 The curriculum consists 
of religious and secular sciences presented through a slightly simplified version 
of traditional study courses. Unlike the traditional system, this modern madrasa 
system is not intended to train students to become mujtahids, but rather to 
become Islamic scholars and missionaries. This innovative type of education 
has provided an alternative for students who, for whatever reason, cannot follow 
the traditional system of the Hawza ʿIlmiyya. International students, including 
Indonesians, are generally enrolled in this modern type of programme.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has made educational innovations in Qom’s 
Hawza ʿIlmiyya through ICIS, which coordinates programmes for foreign stu-
dents, assigns students to madrasas, and monitors their needs within the wider 
framework for the global dissemination of Islamic knowledge and teachings. 
ICIS has organised new programmes for international students based on the 
modern madrasa system. The Imam Khomeini College for Higher Education, 
for example, offers programmes based on grade systems that include under-
graduate and graduate levels equivalent to the tertiary education level of the 
modern educational system: this innovation brings Hawza ʿIlmiyya a step closer 
to becoming a leading international centre of Islamic learning. Its importance as 
a centre of Islamic learning is not only based on the traditional madrasa, but also 
on the emancipation of ḥawza in the form of new institutions and universities.10
Both education systems have been attended by Indonesian students. The first 
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Indonesian students to come to Iran were enrolled at Dar al-Tabligh al-Islami, 
a modern Shiʿi institution founded in 1965 by Ayatollah Muhammad Kazim 
Shariʿatmadari (1904–86). As an institution of Islamic learning, Dar al-Tabligh 
was known for its large numbers of foreign students and for the efforts it was 
willing to make in arranging their visas and residence permits. It operated a 
five-year programme with a credit system, and its curriculum included both 
religious knowledge and secular sciences such as psychology, philosophy, soci-
ology, mathematics and English. The language of instruction was Arabic. The 
educational system of Dar al-Tabligh was therefore modern: although it was 
strongly entrenched in the traditional ḥawza system, it did not follow the tradi-
tional system of learning. Accordingly, the first group of Indonesian students in 
Qom followed the formal modern system of education, although they could also 
attend classes or lectures as provided through the traditional Hawza ʿIlmiyya 
system.
After the dissolution of Dar al-Tabligh in 1981 – owing to its leader’s oppo-
sition to the concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h (mandate of the jurist) implemented by 
Khomeini – Madrasa Hujjatiyya began to provide the same programme for 
foreign students. Since 1982, nearly all Indonesian students who came to Iran 
have attended Madrasa Hujjatiyya, including the prominent Shiʿi ustadz Husein 
Shahab, who was transferred to this madrasa after studying at Dar al-Tabligh for 
two years. This madrasa was founded in 1946 by Ayatollah Muhammad Hujjat 
Kuhkamari (1892–1963), a student of ʿAbd al-Karim Haʾiri (d. 1936), the 
reformer of Hawza ʿIlmiyya.11 Unlike Dar al-Tabligh, Hujjatiyya School follows 
the traditional system of education generally employed in Hawza ʿIlmiyya. The 
majority of Indonesian students who become Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia have 
completed only the preliminary level and lack a formal diploma.
Although most Indonesian students were registered at Madrasa Hujjatiyya, 
a few pursued their learning at Madrasa Muʿminiyya, which also provided a 
programme for foreign students. This madrasa was founded in 1701 during the 
reign of Sultan Husayn of the Safavid dynasty, and was rebuilt by the Grand 
Ayatollah Shihab al-Din Marʿashi-Najafi (d. 1991), known for his role in the 
establishment in Qom of a large library, filled with a magnificent collection of 
published books and manuscripts. This madrasa formulated its own education 
system and curriculum, and provided its own learning materials rather than 
utilising recognised textbooks. The Muʿminiyya School also differed from the 
Hujjatiyya School in that the former prohibited its students from attending 
 religious lectures and study circles in the traditional ḥawza system.12
As educational reform has progressed in Qom, a large number of Indonesian 
students have registered at the Imam Khomeini College for Higher Education. 
Since 1996, this madrasa has been striving to position itself as the principal 
education centre for international students. The madrasa, which was established 
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after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, uses the modern system of education in 
terms of programmes and curricula, in spite of its entrenchment in the tradi-
tional ḥawza system. It runs both undergraduate and graduate programmes in 
various fields of specialisation within the realm of religious sciences.13
Changes in the education system for foreign students have been designed, in 
part, to expand the primacy of Qom as a world centre for Islamic learning. One 
such change is the adoption of the credit system and a modern taxonomy of 
study programmes – namely, bachelors, master’s and doctorates, as implemented 
by Western universities – along with diplomas and formal systems of accredi-
tation. This is meant to provide for the demands of students from all over the 
world, and it is also in accord with Qom’s goal to produce Islamic scholars and 
preachers with a global appeal. In 2008, the Iranian government transformed 
the International Centre for Islamic Studies into al-Mustafa International 
University to provide education for all foreign students, including Indonesians. 
It now supervises a number of universities such as Imam Khomeini College for 
Higher Education and Madrasa Bint al-Huda School for Higher Education. 
Indonesian students have thus experienced a variety of changes in the educa-
tion system: unlike their predecessors, they study in undergraduate or graduate 
programmes in particular fields of specialisation with recognised diplomas and 
titles; while some do BA degrees, others take master’s programmes, and a few 
others seek doctorates. While most male students study at Imam Khomeini 
College for Higher Education, female students attend either Bint al-Huda or 
Jamiʿat al-Zahra, another institute for religious learning in Qom that offers 
bachelors or master’s degrees.
Qom’s transformation of Islamic education into a modern system includes 
the use of information technologies in the dissemination of knowledge. In this 
regard, Rasiah suggests:
In Qum, the ḥawza has not been immune to these developments, and the 
new technology of the so-called “digital revolution” has brought innovations 
to the way traditional Islamic knowledge is transmitted . . . Today, digital 
means of communication and storage, the form of internet web pages, video 
and audio podcasts, email, compact disks, DVDs, CD-ROM software and the 
like, are transforming the possibilities of disseminating Islamic knowledge. 
With regard to the ḥawza the digitization of knowledge has included three 
major interrelated developments: the digital library, the online correspond-
ence course, and the translation of original texts.14
Indonesian students benefit from the transformation of Islamic education in 
Qom through their use of the various forms of information technology, and 
this has rendered them more progressive than their predecessors. Certainly, 
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connections between both generations are more easily made by means of infor-
mation technology, and this in turn is contributing to the development of 
Islamic education in Indonesia.
The Qom Alumni Association
Along with the growing number of Hawza ʿIlmiyya alumni in Indonesia and 
the concomitant demand for ways to establish close relationships between them 
and so intensify their missionary efforts upon returning home, the Indonesian 
alumni of Hawza ʿIlmiyya and of al-Mustafa International University (MIU) 
established an association called Ikatan Alumni Jamiah al-Mustafa (IKMAL; 
Association of al-Mustafa University Alumni). The association, which was 
launched on 7 February 2009, brings together all those who have studied in 
Hawza ʿ Ilmiyya. It is currently (2011–13) chaired by Miqdad Turkan (the chair-
man of Pesantren Darut Taqrib, Jepara, Central Java), assisted by Husein al-Kaff 
(al-Jawad Foundation, Bandung) as vice-chairman and Kholid al-Walid as sec-
retary. The structure of the association incorporates such divisions as education 
and daʿwa, welfare and advocacy, media and public relations, and women, each 
headed by renowned Qom alumni of the older generation.
According to its statute, the goals of IKMAL are to develop and advance 
Islamic propagation as both an individual and a collective obligation; to protect 
its members; to increase the quality, competence and prosperity of its members; 
to increase the religious knowledge of the Islamic community, particularly the 
Indonesian ahl al-bayt community; and to establish harmonious and productive 
relationships with alumni of related institutions. To achieve these goals, the 
association intends to carry out activities by: (i) improving the performance 
of its members through education, research and applications; (ii) promoting 
and developing the existence of the Association of al-Mustafa Alumni; (iii) 
promoting and preserving the interests and positions of members; (iv) improv-
ing communication and cooperation among members; (v) establishing commu-
nication and cooperation with institutions, agencies and other organisations, 
both within and outside the country; (vi) improving coaching, mentoring and 
supervision of members in carrying out missionary and scientific activities; (vii) 
carrying out efforts for the welfare of members by coordinating the activities 
of the alumni and allocating social assistance; (viii) performing community 
service; and (xi) providing information and helping to solve religious problems 
faced by communities.
Since its foundation, the association has carried out a range of activities, 
including training, workshops, seminars, publications and community service. 
One notable activity was the workshop on daʿwa methods and ahl al-bayt syllabi 
in Indonesia, which took place in March 2012 with around a hundred participants, 
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both members of IKMAL and other Shiʿi activists and propagators. Among the 
facilitators were Sayyid Ahmad Fazeli (director of the Islamic College Jakarta, a 
branch of al-Mustafa International University), Sayyid Morteza Musawi (direc-
tor of the Islamic Cultural Centre), and Haidar Bagir (Mizan Publishing House). 
The workshop was inspired by the negative responses to Shiʿism in Indonesia 
and the sectarian violence that had occurred in several places in Java, including 
the burning down of Pesantren al-Hadi in Batang Pekalongan, Central Java 
in 2000, and of Pesantren Misbah al-Huda in Sampang, December 2011. The 
chairman of IKMAL, Miqdad Turkan, saw these actions as resulting from the 
inappropriate implementation of daʿwa by Shiʿi propagators. Misunderstanding 
and miscommunication seem to have coloured the implementation of daʿwa 
within Shiʿi teaching in Indonesia. In the workshop, for example, Ahmad Fazeli 
warned the participants that the correct daʿwa contents would nevertheless 
engender misunderstanding if they were  communicated to the wrong people by 
incorrect methods.
In the field of religious culture, IKMAL has attempted to disseminate the 
writings of its members. It publishes an e-journal called Hauzah in which writ-
ings on Shiʿi doctrines, jurisprudence, Qurʾanic exegesis, history, traditions 
and other topics are provided. In this journal, the alumni express their religious 
thoughts, which are strongly based on Shiʿi ideology; scrutiny of its contents 
may lead one to conclude that the journal is ideological rather than truly sci-
entific in nature. Qom alumni also continue to produce writings in the form of 
books and articles, both translations and original compositions, independently 
from IKMAL. Similarly, their involvement in the field of daʿwa and education 
is not entirely dependent on their association with IKMAL, and much is carried 
out independently.
The Social Structures of Qom Alumni
Most Qom alumni have achieved the status of ustadz, or religious teacher. Early 
alumni, such as Umar Shahab, Husein Shahab and Ahmad Baragbah, have 
become very prominent Shiʿi figures. In Indonesia, the term ustadz commonly 
denotes religious teachers in traditional institutions of Islamic learning (pesant-
ren), formal Islamic schools (madrasas), or in religious gatherings (pengajian). 
To the Muslims in the country, particularly those of traditional institutions of 
Islamic learning, the term ustadz usually refers to the teachers who have not 
achieved the status of ʿālim (meaning a man of religious learning and prestige)15 
or kyai (“learned man”, or the leader of pesantren). Therefore, within the lead-
ership structure of pesantren, the position of ustadz is ranked below that of kyai. 
Among the Shiʿa in Indonesia, however, the term ustadz denotes both leaders of 
Shiʿi institutions and religious teachers, and this term is increasingly being used 
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among certain Indonesian Muslim groups to refer to ʿulama and Muslim leaders 
in general. In the context of Muslim society in Indonesia, some Shiʿi ustadz, 
such as Husein al-Habsyi, have achieved the status of ʿālim.
It is entirely possible that the growing tendency to use the term ustadz is 
due to the influence of the Arab descendants within the religious, educational 
and cultural fields of the Shiʿi community. This tendency is also evident in the 
so-called scripturalist segment of the Indonesian Muslim community, which is 
undergoing a process of “Arabisation”. This group prefers to use the term ustadz 
according its original meaning in Arabic, rather than using the local term kyai 
for ʿulama. In addition, from the perspective of the international Shiʿi intellec-
tual tradition, this may indicate that the education of Indonesian Shiʿi leaders 
and scholars has not reached the standard of the fully qualified scholars. It is 
evident that their position does not correspond to that of mujtahid or marjaʿ-i 
tāqlıd̄. Thus, in the field of jurisprudence, the word ustadz in Indonesia comes 
to refer to the muqallid (followers) of certain marjaʿ-i tāqlıd̄ in Iran or Iraq. 
Nevertheless, the ustadz still enjoys prestige within the Shiʿi community.
There are at least two general characteristics of the Shiʿi ustadz. First, the 
educational background of an ustadz generally involves a period at one of the 
institutions of Islamic learning where they acquired the various branches of 
Islamic knowledge. This means that the person is considered to have gained 
basic Islamic knowledge. Several Shiʿi ustadz in Indonesia studied at pesantren 
in Indonesia and then pursued further learning in the Middle East, particularly 
at Hawza ʿ Ilmiyya. Since their education in Qom only reached the muqaddamāt 
level, few Shiʿi ustadz have pursued their learning at other tertiary institutions 
in Indonesia or abroad – only the most prominent among them can lay claim to 
this achievement. A number of ustadz entered Islamic universities in Indonesia: 
as mentioned previously, four of them – Umar Shahab, Abdurrahman Bima, 
Muhsin Labib and Kholid al-Walid – completed doctoral programmes at this 
university. We should emphasise that the field of specialisation generally taken 
by the Shiʿi ustadz is “Islamic studies” in the classical meaning of the term. 
This is understandable, since they are engaged in the field of Islamic daʿwa and 
education, which requires a broad understanding of Islam in order to gain or 
maintain a prestigious position within the community. In a nutshell, further 
education in the field of religious knowledge contributes to establishing and 
increasing the prominence of the Shiʿi ustadz.
Secondly, the ustadz devote themselves to the field of daʿwa and educational 
activities at the Shiʿi institutions of learning. Many have established their own 
institutions and become leaders within them. Some are affiliated with Islamic 
institutions, and their main profession is as a religious teacher or even spiritual 
guide for the jamaʿa (congregation) of those institutions. They impart religious 
knowledge, give guidance and lead religious rituals; with the exception of heads 
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of institutions, however, they do not receive a regular salary from these institu-
tions, but instead receive payments for each section of the daʿwa activities they 
teach. Most of them rely for their living on endowments or payments from the 
institutions and their jamaʿa. This intensive religious instruction and guidance 
contributes to the close relationship an ustadz enjoys with the jamaʿa, who 
follow his instructions and guidance and pay their respects to him. “Many ustadz 
are living comfortably in Jakarta, which has become a center of attraction for 
many of them.”16
Although all Qom alumni are members of IKMAL and most of them are 
ustadz, the social structure in which they are embedded is complex, and can be 
properly understood only through examining a number of its aspects. We may 
distinguish the “older” or senior generation from the “younger” or junior genera-
tion based on the education system they followed in Qom. The older generation 
consists of those who followed the pre-university system of education, which 
mainly emphasised the mastery of books or texts in certain fields of Islamic 
knowledge – this group comprises those who studied at the Dar al-Tabligh, 
Hujjatiyya and Muʿminiyya schools. The younger generation studied in Qom in 
or after 1996, via the Imam Khomeini College for Higher Education, which was 
the main centre for international students and followed the modern system of 
having both undergraduate and graduate programmes. While the first group of 
alumni mainly graduated from the muqaddamāt level without diploma and title, 
the other group holds the title “licence” (or bachelor) for the undergraduate 
level, and a master’s degree or even a doctorate for the graduate level – similar to 
alumni from other universities in the Middle East and the West. Consequently, 
as noted by Muhsin Labib, a Qom alumnus from the first group, there is a gap 
between the two groups in terms of methodological and communication capa-
bilities, due to the different education systems and facilities: the junior group 
is more intelligent, critical and communicative than the senior. Muhsin Labib 
expresses his experience and concerns as follows:
As a member of the first wave into ḥawza in 1982, I can feel the luck of 
students of the 2000 era. Without intending to tell the sorrow of a “guinea 
pig”, the situation that I experienced when I first set foot in the city of Qom 
really made me, at the time fifteen years of age, shake my head. There was no 
reasonable preparation, let alone for the upper group. The madrasa building 
we entered was full of dust. Those days the Iranians were busy with military 
mobilisation to confront the aggression of Saddam. Here and there was an 
audible thump of bombs fired by MIGs 2000 and Mirages at the city. The 
residents of Qom seemed busy lining up to receive cooking oil and food. 
Classes were often closed suddenly because there were funerals of dozens of 
heroes who had died in the battlefield. The curriculum was always changing. 
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Apparently, the officials of Shura-ye Sarparasti Tolab-e Ghaire Irani were 
confused by the task of finding an educational format that suited foreign 
students with different competencies, from Indonesia, non-Shiʿi Arab coun-
tries, Africa, and even Europe. Regarding the facilities, do not ask because 
it will restore the bad memories. Armed with a chaotic and “confusing” 
educational system, the alumni born of the situation should be accepted and 
appreciated. Moreover, with their underprivileged education and facilities 
(non-diploma again!), they still have to start really heavy duties, clearing 
the forest and introducing the ahl al-bayt denominations, with all the risks, 
especially the political risks of the New Order which suspected Iran to be 
exporting the revolution.17
Despite these sentiments, it is clear from their educational accomplishments 
that some among the senior generation had pursued their study at tertiary 
institutions in Indonesia or abroad, unlike others from the older group who 
relied solely on their education in Qom. Some members of the senior group had 
received a diploma from a tertiary education institution in another country, 
such as Punjab University in Pakistan, while others had enrolled in undergrad-
uate programmes at the institutes for Islamic studies, whether state or private, 
which are scattered in the cities and towns of Indonesia. Many – such as Ikhlas 
Budiman, Musa Kazim and Husein al-Kaff – had master’s degrees in Islamic stud-
ies as well as in other fields. At least four of them – Umar Shahab, Abdurrahman 
Bima, Muhsin Labib and Kholid al-Walid – had completed doctoral programmes 
in Islamic studies at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta. For 
example, upon completion of his study in Qom in 1980, Umar Shahab contin-
ued his undergraduate programme at the Faculty of Islamic Theology, Raden 
Fatah State Institute for Islamic studies, Palembang, completing it in 1984. He 
graduated with a master’s degree and a doctorate in Islamic studies from Syarif 
Hidayatullah State Islamic University in 1991 and 2007, respectively. Similarly, 
Kholid al-Walid already held a bachelor’s degree in Islamic theology before 
spending about seven years studying in Qom. Upon his return home from Qom, 
he entered master’s and doctoral programmes at Sunan Gunung Djati State 
Islamic University, Bandung, and Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, 
Jakarta, respectively. By contrast, Abdurrahman Bima and Muhsin Labib were 
able to pursue their doctoral programmes at the State Islamic University, Jakarta, 
directly after the completion of their study in Qom thanks to the diplomas they 
had received from other institutions.
Due to their educational achievements, the above four figures enjoy cultural 
and social capital, which can be transformed easily into economic and symbolic 
capital. They have become prominent ustadz and lecturers at several universities 
and colleges in Jakarta. Furthermore, they were involved in founding, managing 
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and lecturing at Islamic universities, including STAIMI in Depok and Sadra 
College for Islamic Philosophy (STFI Sadra) in Jakarta.
Further education is not, however, a dominating factor that guarantees the 
success of a Qom alumni as an ustadz. Yet, in spite of the fact that they have 
not continued studying at a higher level, alumni have been successful in estab-
lishing, managing and teaching at Islamic institutions that attract students or 
individuals from the Shiʿi community. Take, for example, Ahmad Baragbah, 
who relies on his experience at the Hujjatiyya School, and who has succeeded 
in leading a pesantren in his hometown. Together with his Qom alumni col-
leagues, Baragbah, who spent five years studying Islamic knowledge in Qom, 
founded al-Hadi in 1989. Baragbah, an Indonesian non-Sayyid Arab, forged 
strong connections with the late Husein al-Habsyi, who recommended him 
for Islamic education in Qom and supported him in the establishment of the 
pesantren. Although Baragbah never studied at YAPI, his relationship with 
Husein al-Habsyi may be considered as a student–teacher relationship. Like 
him, other Qom graduates have also enjoyed several types of capital: cultural, 
social, economic and symbolic.
Other alumni have become renowned ustadz without being permanently 
affiliated with specific institutions. Husein Shahab’s case is a notable example. 
His career as an ustadz progressed even though he never completed his master’s 
degree at ISTAC Kuala Lumpur. After 1999, he chose to live in Jakarta where 
the largest numbers of Shiʿa reside. With his cultural capital (that is, his reli-
gious education in Qom and Kuala Lumpur), Husein Shahab began to establish 
his career by becoming involved in a number of daʿwa and educational activities 
in the capital. His good performance in daʿwa activities attracted an audience, 
including the organisers, or “leaders”, of Islamic institutions. He then became 
a preacher and lecturer at several Islamic institutions, both Sunni and Shiʿi, 
such as Paramadina, STAIMI, IIMaN Centre for Positive Sufism, Taqwa Nanjar 
Foundation, al-Batul and al-Husainy. In addition, he has become involved in 
the religious programmes of several national television and radio stations, and 
is a very popular ustadz. As a prominent ustadz, Husein Shahab is hardly ever 
absent from national Shiʿi activities in Indonesia: in a single month he might 
teach and preach at more than twenty Islamic institutions. Given this large 
number of daʿwa activities, he too may become one of those ustadz who can live 
comfortably in Jakarta.18
Setting aside the economically and socially successful ustadz, however, it 
must be noted that good fortune has not graced all the Qom alumni who are 
active in serving the Shiʿi community. This has created envy of the popular 
ustadz who are considered to be inactive in guiding the Shiʿi community. There 
are yet other Qom alumni who refrain from the main duties of ustadz, but who 
instead become involved in business activities.
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The social structure in which Qom graduates are located is notably complex 
with respect to the development of Shiʿi organisations in Indonesia. Although 
Indonesia is home to only a very small number of Shiʿa as compared with the 
vast Sunni majority, there are two national Shiʿi organisations. The first is 
Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia (IJABI; the All-Indonesian Assembly of 
Ahlulbayt Associations), established 1 July 2000 and created by Jalaluddin 
Rakhmat. The second is Ahlul Bait Indonesia (ABI), established in July 2011. 
In the early stages of the process, nearly all the Qom alumni supported the 
necessity of establishing a national Shiʿi organisation in Indonesia. Even such 
prominent ustadz as Umar Shahab, Husein Shahab and Ahmad Baragbah were 
involved in a series of meetings with Jalaluddin Rakhmat intended to formulate 
the characteristics and structures of the organisations. However, the general 
lack of involvement and support from the wider community, and the later devel-
opment of IJABI, has created discord within the Shiʿi community, which can in 
fact now be classified into the IJABI group and the non-IJABI group – the latter 
also known as the Qom group. Qom alumni such as Kholid al-Walid and Ikhlas 
Budiman, who had been active in managing IJABI for several years, later left it; 
now only a very small number of them are involved.
As I have noted elsewhere,19 there is a range of other related matters that 
lead the ustadz to reject IJABI. As Ahmad Baragbah has noted, three issues are 
particularly prominent. The first concerns the organisation’s name, which in 
this case is intimately related to the identity of the wider community. The critics 
of IJABI had proposed that the appropriate name for the organisation would be 
Ahlulbait (ahl al-bayt), because it is short and easy to remember, and frequently 
used by Shiʿa in general. The second, and more important, issue is the position 
of vilāyat-i faqı̄h, the political concept familiar from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
that assigns the faqı̄h (jurist) the highest authority over other segments of society. 
One widely adopted interpretation of this concept is that the leaders in Iran hold 
the highest leadership within the Shiʿi community worldwide, and not simply 
in Iran. The Shiʿa in Indonesia should therefore recognise this leadership. Thus, 
for these critics, the concept of vilāyat-i faqı̄h ought to be explicitly mentioned 
in the organisation’s statutes, thus manifesting its recognition of the authority 
of Iran’s Supreme Leader. In fact, the term does not appear in the IJABI statute, 
and the ustadz therefore regard IJABI as an opponent of vilāyat-i faqı̄h. The 
third issue also concerns authority. According to the IJABI’s statutes the highest 
authority is vested in the national congress. The opposing group argues, how-
ever, that the highest authority, such as the power to appoint the chair of the 
executive council, should rest with the advisory council (dewan syuro), and not 
be based on elections at the national congress, since the latter would not reliably 
produce excellent results – indeed, it is a fact that the first national congress was 
not well organised, as has been admitted by Jalaluddin Rakhmat.20
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 132 —
While rejecting IJABI, nearly all the Qom alumni have supported and been 
involved in establishing ABI. Since mid-2010, a “friendship forum” called 
Forum Silaturahmi Nasional Ahlul Bait, consisting of representatives from Shiʿi 
pesantren and foundations from all over Indonesia, has been calling for the cre-
ation of a mass organisational alternative to IJABI, and this, the ABI, launched 
on 15 June 2011. The members of the ABI advisory council are senior Qom 
alumni; its chairman is Umar Shahab, while its executive chief is Hasan Dalil 
Alaydrus. Since its establishment, ABI has been active in promoting the mass 
organisation, seeking friendship and cooperation with existing Sunni organi-
sations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and carrying out 
dialogues with Sunnis. One of its notable programmes is the promotion of the 
moderate face of Shiʿism through the publication of the so-called Buku Putih 
Mazhab Syiah (The White Book of Shiʿism) in 2012.21 Nevertheless, it faces obsta-
cles, as Formichi has noted: “It is of utmost interest . . . that ABI is struggling 
to obtain formal recognition from the government as they are unable to show 
a substantial difference with IJABI and thus demonstrate the need for a new 
organisation. Meaning that still now IJABI is the only public face of Indonesian 
Shiʿism.”22
Qom Alumni and Daʿwa
Graduates of the Qom seminaries have travelled all over the world in order to 
propagate Islam.23 Qom returnees in Indonesia have also contributed to the 
development of Islamic daʿwa. Daʿwa literally means “a call” or “an invitation”; 
in Indonesia, however, as in other countries, daʿwa has become a more complex 
term which includes the specific meaning of tablı̄gh (preaching) and a broader 
sense of “the propagation of Islam not only by preaching and publications, but 
also by deeds and activities in all areas of social life . . . [or] a comprehensive 
Islamization of society”.24 The major role of the Qom graduates in the field of 
Islamic daʿwa is in accord with the educational goal of Hawza ʿIlmiyya, namely, 
to train students to become missionaries and scholars.
Daʿwa carried out by Qom graduates has become widespread throughout 
Shiʿi institutions and organisations. The increasing number of Qom alumni 
returning to Indonesia corresponds with the growing number of Shiʿi founda-
tions in the country. Although the establishment of these foundations is not a 
direct result of the ustadz or the Qom alumni, it is clear that a large number of 
Qom alumni have established their own Shiʿi foundations. To name but a few, 
Fathoni Hadi established the al-Hujjah Foundation, Jember, in 1987; Ahmad 
Baragbah established al-Hadi in 1989; Abdullah Assegaf founded the al-Wah-
dah Foundation, Solo, in 1994; and Rusdi al-Aydrus established the Ath-Thohir 
Foundation, Surabaya, in 2000. Furthermore, most of the Qom alumni have 
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become leaders or ustadz at the existing Shiʿi foundations: these include Zahir 
Yahya at al-Kautsar Foundation, Malang, East Java; Husein al-Kaf at al-Jawad 
Foundation, Bandung; Abdullah Assegaf at IPABI, Bogor; Muhammad Syuaib 
at al-Mujtaba Foundation, Purwakarta, West Java; and Herman al-Muntha-
har at Amirul Mukminin Foundation, Pontianak, West Kalimantan. It seems 
that their missionary zeal has motivated these Qom alumni to establish Shiʿi 
 institutions so that daʿwa activities are institutionalised and organised.
The better-established foundations usually have one or more permanent 
ustadz whose main duty is to give religious instruction and guidance to the 
jamaʿa. In this regard, the ustadz becomes a muballigh (preacher) or dāʿı̄ (prop-
agandist, evangelist) in the broad meaning of the term. As mentioned before, 
in some cases an ustadz may be a co-founder or owner of an institution; in other 
cases, the ustadz occupies a high position within the organisational structure of 
the institution. This is in accord with the fact that the ustadz have a prestigious 
status in the Shiʿi community. In this regard, the term pembina (adviser) is 
sometimes used to indicate a position that is higher than its head. The position 
is rather similar to that of the kyai within the pesantren tradition. Like the kyai 
in the pesantren, the ustadz is influential in the development of the institution. 
In many cases, the ustadz, particularly the prominent ones such as Umar Shahab 
and Husein Shahab, are not affiliated with a certain institution, but are hired 
by several different institutions at once. As mentioned earlier, a large number 
of Qom alumni become ustadz, and many of them occupy high positions in the 
Shiʿi institutions throughout the country.
The position of ustadz is crucial for the existence and development of Shiʿi 
institutions. The ustadz are influential in planning and realising programmes 
within each institution, as well as in establishing connections with other insti-
tutions. The main duties of an ustadz can be described as follows: to give reli-
gious instruction and guidance, to preach, to lead rituals and ceremonies, and 
to give advice regarding the direction of the institution. For these duties, the 
qualifications required of the ustadz include a thorough knowledge of religion, 
and good skills in preaching and in leading religious rituals and ceremonies. It is 
not surprising that the positions of ustadz in most Shiʿi institutions are occupied 
by Qom graduates. As a person who is considered to have deep religious knowl-
edge, an ustadz is often seen by his jamaʿa as a figure whose guidance and advice 
is to be followed.
The position and role of Qom returnees cannot be dissociated from the 
establishment and management of the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC), Jakarta, 
formerly ICC al-Huda, which was founded by five Iranians living in Jakarta in 
2000. Its establishment involved the collaboration of several prominent Shiʿi 
figures in Indonesia with Iran, with the intention of fostering cultural under-
standing between Iran and Indonesia. The founding council includes Jalaluddin 
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Rakhmat, Haidar Bagir and Umar Shahab. Its current director is Seyed Murteza 
Mousavi (an Iranian), who succeeded Muhsen Hakimollah. Beneath the direc-
tor is a manager, who has always been a Qom alumnus. The present manager is 
Abdullah Beik, a graduate of the master’s programme at Imam Khomeini College 
for Higher Education. To run its activities, this – the biggest Shiʿi foundation in 
Indonesia – employs about thirty staff, some of whom, though not all, are Qom 
alumni. The organisation of the centre depends crucially on the character of the 
director, not only with regard to authority and responsibility, but also due to its 
financial dependence on Iran. Since its establishment, the ICC has organised 
celebrations for national Islamic festivals and holy days such as ʿAshuraʾ (the 
commemoration of the death of Imam Husayn), arabʿı̄n (the commemoration 
of the fortieth day after Husayn’s death) and mawlid (the Prophet Muhammad’s 
birthday), as well as various missionary activities. It also facilitates Indonesian 
students who wish to study in Qom and other cities. Additionally, ICC has been 
active in publishing books, journals and magazines, and provides regular courses 
in Persian and Arabic, and on the sciences of the Qurʾan and Islamic traditions. 
Another apparent function is that of mediating among the existing Shiʿi insti-
tutions and between Iran and the Shiʿi community in Indonesia – a function 
that used to be fulfilled by the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta. As Formichi notes, 
however, the “ICC had been rejecting co-optation attempts by the Iranian 
Embassy for several years, however a recent change in the centre’s directorship 
would suggest the beginning of a different relationship.”25
It is through ICC, the Islamic College and the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta that 
missionary activities in the form of discussions, seminars, dialogues and work-
shops are carried out in cities and towns throughout the regions of Indonesia. 
Cooperation agreements and friendships have been established with Muslim 
organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as with well-known uni-
versities. An important form of cooperation that is instrumental in promoting 
Iranian culture and Shiʿism is the establishment of the so-called “Iran Corner” 
at about twelve renowned universities in Indonesia, including UIN Jakarta, 
UIN Yogyakarta, UIN Makasar and Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta. 
The Qom alumni play a key role in facilitating such cooperation efforts.
Qom graduates have been active in varied types of daʿwa, which I have 
 summarised elsewhere as follows:
Since the concept of da‘wa is commonly understood in its widest sense that 
includes all missionary activities aimed at realising Islamic society, da‘wa 
activities provided by the institutions are quite varied. The varied da‘wa activ-
ities can be classified into three types: tabligh (preaching), ta‘lim (teaching, 
training or course) and social da‘wa. All these types are frequently intercon-
nected. They may be directed towards either internal or external orientation. 
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The realisation of the three types of da‘wa by the existing institutions may be 
formulated in the form of either regular or incidental programmes.26
Their missionary activities have, however, generated negative responses from 
some segments of Indonesian society, even though some prominent Muslim 
leaders have displayed a moderate attitude towards Shiʿism and the Shiʿa. 
Tension, conflict and even sectarian violence have marred Sunni–Shiʿi rela-
tions in Indonesia, and one of the important factors in these conflicts is fear of 
the “Shiʿitisation” of Sunnis. As a result, the practice of daʿwa, including its 
syllabi and methods, has become an important topic of discussion among Shiʿi 
figures, as in the workshop carried out by IKMAL mentioned previously. Several 
daʿwa training sessions have also been carried out in order to promote effective 
and successful daʿwa programmes.
Qom Alumni and Islamic Education
In the field of education, the role of the Qom alumni is enormous. This role 
can be classified into three aspects: first, they become teachers at existing 
educational institutions such as pesantren, madrasas and schools that may or 
may not be characteristically Shiʿi (it should be noted that the existing system 
of Islamic education in Indonesia comprises three institutions: the pesantren, 
the madrasa and the school). Secondly, they establish and manage their own 
educational institutions. Thirdly, they teach at the newly founded educational 
institutions.
The new educational institutions usually follow the ḥawza model. Pesantren 
al-Hadi, which was founded by Ahmad Baragbah in Pekalongan, Central Java, 
is a noted example. Since its establishment, al-Hadi has provided students only 
with religious education that primarily follows the Shiʿi educational system 
of Hawza ʿIlmiyya in Qom, where its founders and teachers had been trained 
–  particularly in terms of subject matter and instructional materials. The educa-
tional programme is organised into six levels with a variety of subjects and draw-
ing on a range of sources. The subjects offered include Arabic, ʿ aqı̄da, fiqh, tafsı̄r, 
hadith and Islamic history. All instructional materials are standard texts used 
in the institutions of Islamic learning in Qom. The basic teachings of Shiʿism, 
especially its doctrines and jurisprudence, are taught to the students of the first 
level, who are expected, if not required, to practice them in their daily life. As 
rituals and ceremonies practised in the pesantren are all Shiʿi, guidance and 
training regarding daily obligatory rituals are also provided. All the instruction, 
training and guidance of the Shiʿi teachings in al-Hadi are attempts to realise 
its main goal: to provide its students with the basic knowledge and skills to com-
prise a cadre of Shiʿi teachers throughout the country. Furthermore, with the 
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knowledge they gain at the institution, its graduates can pursue higher Islamic 
education at the institutions of Islamic learning in Qom.
Pesantren al-Hadi and its top leader Ahmad Baragbah have connections 
with Iran, with both the office of the Supreme Leader and some individual 
ʿulama. This pesantren, following an educational tradition similar to that in 
Qom, was said to send regular reports to Iran via its representatives or, at pres-
ent, the ICC in Jakarta – the latter keeps the pesantren under constant obser-
vation, attending to their development, including the execution of curricula 
and the activities of students and teachers. Important events that occur in the 
pesantren are all reported to the office of the Supreme Leader. The pesantren 
also receive financial assistance from Iran, as well as educational equipment, 
particularly books and periodicals.27 The interrelationship between them is also 
evidenced by the fact that a number of al-Hadi graduates go on to continue their 
Islamic education in Qom. Some of them have finished their studies and have 
returned to Indonesia: Muhammad in Purwakarta, Ali al-Aydrus in Bandung 
and Salman Daruddin in Jakarta, to name a few. All have been involved in the 
field of Islamic education and propagation. In addition, representatives of Iran’s 
Supreme Leader and individual Shiʿi learned men frequently take the opportu-
nity to visit the pesantren during their visits to Indonesia. On the other hand, 
with the Islamic knowledge he gained in Qom, Ahmad Baragbah has been 
recognised by Iran as an important Shiʿi figure in Indonesia, who is expected to 
play a major role in the spread of Shiʿism. Alongside other prominent figures 
such as Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Zahir Yahya, he was appointed a representative 
of the Supreme Leader in the accumulation and distribution of khums (tax) in 
the country. Together with other influential figures like Jalaluddin Rakhmat, 
Zahir Yahya and Umar Shahab, he was also expected to prepare for the estab-
lishment of other Shiʿi organisations in Indonesia.
Indonesia is also home to other Islamic education institutions that take 
the title ḥawza. One is called Hawzah Ilmiah Khatamun Nabiyyin, which was 
founded in Jakarta on 1 January 2000. Under the guidance of Grand Ayatollah 
Shaykh Husayn Wahid Khurasani in Qom, the ḥawza runs a two-year academic 
programme in Islamic studies, providing subjects like Arabic, mantiq, tafsı̄r, 
hadith, fiqh, usūl al-fiqh, kalām and history, as well as secular subjects like soci-
ology, philosophy and research techniques. The students are then expected to 
pursue their learning at the ḥawza in Qom or Najaf.
The famous YAPI of Bangil, known as Hawzah Ilmiah Imam Ash-Shodiq and 
headed by Ali Umar al-Habsyi, has also adopted the ḥawza institutional model. 
It was established on 23 July 2008, with an initial intake of forty students. It 
tutors its students in all fields of religious studies, such as kalām, fiqh, tafsı̄r, 
Arabic and history. They are also expected to continue their study in Qom or in 
another ḥawza in Iran.
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Additionally, the IPABI Foundation led by Abdullah Som has set up the 
so-called Hauzah Ilmiah Amirul Mukminin for male students and the Hauzah 
Ilmiah Az-Zahra for females. These are situated in an area in Puncak, Bogor, 
West Java. As a three-semester programme for senior high-school graduates, 
both ḥawza are designed to produce students with good reasoning skills and a 
good understanding of scientific practice, and also to prepare them for commu-
nity service. Guided by a cohort of teachers that includes Qom alumni, students 
are taught Arabic, English, mantiq, mathematics, kalām and fiqh. In addition, 
they are enrolled in a programme of character-building, and are even trained in 
skills like martial arts, computer science, journalism, public speaking and event 
organising.
The Qom alumni also take part in the establishment and organisation of 
Islamic higher educational institutions, including Madinatul Ilmi College for 
Islamic Studies (STAIMI) and the Sadra College for Islamic Philosophy (STFI 
Sadra). Founded on 23 May 1997, STAIMI has already produced more than 
500 alumni. It offers two subjects at undergraduate level: Islamic education and 
Islamic communication and information. Although its present rector is Mahdi 
Alaydrus, the STAIMI Foundation is headed by a Qom alumnus, Abdurrahman 
Bima. Recently, besides the regular system, STAIMI has implemented a board-
ing system for its students, who are provided with a number of learning and 
training activities such as Qurʾan memorisation, leadership training and martial 
arts. This was inspired by the model of Hawza ʿIlmiyya. It should be noted that 
STAIMI openly declares its identity as a Shiʿi university, which is designed 
to promote and implement the teachings of Shiʿism. As stated on its website, 
the STAIMI curriculum integrates the subjects outlined for universities by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs with local content based on the spiritual excel-
lence and character of ahl al-bayt, as well as promoting competency in English, 
Arabic and Persian. Furthermore, in addition to the formal curriculum, STAIMI 
strives to emphasise science and technology in religion and to create a religious 
atmosphere in campus daily life with the nuance of the ahl al-bayt tradition. A 
number of Qom alumni take part in teaching and guiding students in Islamic 
philosophy and Shiʿi rituals and tradition.
STFI Sadra differs from STAIMI in that it is reluctant to declare its Shiʿi 
identity. A number of Qom alumni are engaged in either management or teach-
ing roles at this institution, which is presently headed by the renowned Qom 
alumnus Umar Shahab. This is a newly founded institution, launched on 12 
July 2012, a date that was marked by an international seminar with a keynote 
speech by Professor Nasaruddin Umar, the Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs. 
With two undergraduate departments, that of Islamic Philosophy and of Qurʾan 
and Hadith Studies, it commenced classes in the academic year 2012. It is little 
wonder that an institution with this intellectual bent should have been founded, 
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as Qom graduates have a strong predilection for philosophy – a fact that is also 
closely related to Hawza ʿIlmiyya’s reputation as a world centre for Muslim 
philosophers.28 Umar Shahab and three other doctoral graduates of UIN Jakarta 
majored in Islamic philosophy, as is evidenced especially from their dissertation 
subjects – Umar Shahab having studied Khomeini’s thought; Kholid al-Walid 
having investigated Mulla Sadra’s eschatological views; Muhsin Labib having 
looked at Muhammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi’s philosophy; and Abdurrahman Bima 
having scrutinised the influence of philosophy on Khomeini’s political thought.
In addition, the role of Qom alumni in the field of Islamic education in 
Indonesia can be seen in their involvement in the development of the Islamic 
College Jakarta, which is sponsored by an Iranian charity. This was previously 
called the Islamic College for Advanced Studies (ICAS), set up in London 
in 1998, and the Jakarta branch was founded in 2003. Ali Movahhedi, the 
representative of ICAS London, as well as Professor Nurcholish Madjid (1939–
2005), the outstanding Indonesian Muslim intellectual who was then rector of 
the University of Paramadina, signed the Memorandum of Understanding on 
29 July 2002. The memorandum to run the Islamic Studies programme was then 
legalised by the Directorate General of Islamic Institutional Establishment (now 
the Directorate General of Islamic Education), the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
of the Republic of Indonesia, and later confirmed by the State Secretary of the 
Republic of Indonesia. In 2009, along with the establishment of al-Mustafa 
International University in Qom, it changed to its present name, the Islamic 
College Jakarta.
As stated in the web pages of al-Mustafa International University, the Islamic 
College Jakarta is one of the twenty-four colleges of al-Mustafa International 
University that are scattered around the world, including in Albania, Argentina, 
Denmark, Germany, India, the United Kingdom and Sweden. As a branch of 
the college, MIU issues diplomas for graduates of the Islamic College. Further, 
its director, Seyyed Ahmad Fazeli, is Iranian (the former director was Mohsen 
Mirri). The director is assisted by deputies in the areas of administration and 
research, in addition to being aided by staff from Iran especially with regard 
to financial affairs, and from Indonesia with regard to academic protocol. The 
Indonesians on the staff are usually Qom alumni, and these alumni also play a 
role as lecturers at the Islamic College. Thus, the important role of Qom alumni 
in the organisation and development of the Islamic College branch of MIU is 
very clear.
As for the academic programmes, the Islamic College relies on a raft of agree-
ments with other higher education institutions, all of which have been estab-
lished in view of the legal status that the programme is perceived to have in the 
eyes of Indonesian students and wider society. Since 2003–4 it has had a mas-
ter’s programme in the field of Islamic philosophy and Islamic mysticism based 
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on the abovementioned memorandum with the University of Paramadina. On 
23 October 2010, the University of Paramadina received legal permission from 
the Directorate General of Islamic Institution, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
to organise a master’s programme in Islamic studies. This was a renewal of the 
letter of 29 June 2001 from the Directorate of Islamic Institutional Establishment 
regarding cooperation, with the aim of establishing a dual programme and pool-
ing human resources between the University of Paramadina and the Islamic 
College for Advanced Studies, London.
Cooperation agreements were extended to other universities in Indonesia, 
such as Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University, Bandung; Alauddin State 
Islamic University, Makasar; and Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta. 
The Islamic College also cooperates with UIN Bandung in running a BA in 
Islamic studies, and cooperates with Alauddin State Islamic University in 
Makassar in running a doctoral programme in Islamic philosophy. While the 
licence for the doctorate programme is under the authority of UIN Alauddin, 
the Islamic College is responsible for budgeting and financing the programme. 
It is important to note that one of the doctoral students, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, 
is the most prominent Shiʿi intellectual in Indonesia, and worth noting also 
that his admission as a doctoral student at UIN Alauddin Makasar met with 
a harsh response from leaders in Indonesia who are anti-Shiʿi. In a meeting in 
Bandung held on 22 April 2012, the so-called Forum of Indonesian ʿUlama 
and Community (FUUI), led by Athian Ali Dai, proposed that the university 
should reconsider Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s status as a doctoral student because he 
is a known Shiʿi figure. The university dismissed the idea.
Thus, the role of Qom alumni in the field of Islamic education includes teach-
ing at, establishing and managing Islamic educational institutions at elementary, 
secondary and tertiary levels. Their educational experience in the Hawza ʿIlmi-
yya of Qom certainly influences their roles in these capacities, which include the 
transmission of knowledge, the adoption of the ḥawza model, and management 
and lecturing at the Indonesian branch of al-Mustafa International University.
Conclusion
The complex role of Qom alumni in Indonesia can be summarised as follows: 
in relations between Iran and Indonesia, particularly within the Shiʿi commu-
nity, Qom alumni occupy the position of mediator in the broadest sense. Geertz 
sees the kyai as cultural brokers engaged in filtering the appropriate informa-
tion to the Shiʿi community;29 however, due the massive access to informa-
tion technologies that characterise the national and international relationships 
canvassed in this chapter, Geertz’s view is not appropriate for understanding 
the role of Qom alumni in the Shiʿi community. Those alumni connect the 
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world’s centre of Shiʿi orthodoxy in Iran to the Shiʿi community in Indonesia 
either directly or via Iranian institutions in Indonesia: specifically, the Islamic 
Cultural Centre, Jakarta, and the Islamic College Jakarta. It should be noted, 
however, that Shiʿism has become a field in which competition and conflict 
have coloured the relations between the Qom alumni and others, and indeed 
among the Qom alumni themselves. Further, all this is happening in the context 
of the strong competition that the Shiʿi groups face from the rival Sunni groups 
in Indonesia.
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Chapter 6
Islamic Modernism, Political Reform 
and the Arabisation of Education: 




This chapter examines the relationship between al-Azhar University and 
the Moroccan nationalist movement. It argues that al-Azhar served as the 
institutional link between the Islamic modernist movement1 in Cairo led by 
Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida and the Moroccan nationalists led by 
ʿAllal al-Fasi. The infusion of Moroccan nationalism with the ideas of reli-
gious reform propagated by the Islamic modernists strengthened the ideological 
foundations of the independence movement and contributed to its success. 
Once these reformers found themselves in positions of authority in the post-in-
dependence government, Islamic modernist ideas continued to guide policy 
decisions, particularly with regard to educational priorities. This is most clearly 
demonstrated in the Arabisation of Moroccan education that took place during 
the second half of the twentieth century.
In addition to Islamic modernism’s influence on Moroccan nationalists 
and their subsequent policies, the Moroccan case is significant to scholars of 
al-Azhar for other reasons. First, the conversions of the most prominent early 
twentieth-century Moroccan nationalists to Islamic modernism illustrate the 
various ways that the ideologies taught at al-Azhar University became influ-
ential in another country. I highlight three particular ways that Islamic mod-
ernism spread to Morocco: (a) directly, through studies at al-Azhar University; 
(b) indirectly, through the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca, which required travel 
through Egypt; and, finally, (c) discipleship under a former al-Azhar student. 
Interestingly, it was not individuals who physically studied at al-Azhar, but 
those who contacted Islamic modernism through the third of these methods, 
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discipleship, who have played the most significant role in implementing Islamic 
modernist policy in Morocco. This suggests that the pedagogical methods of 
al-Azhar and Islamic higher education in general,2 which encouraged close rela-
tionships between teacher and student, have been at least as important as the 
content of ideology in the spread of Islamic modernism.
Secondly, the Moroccan case is significant to the study of al-Azhar’s regional 
impact because the earliest efforts to introduce Islamic modernism in Morocco 
failed. It was not until the second introduction of these ideas to the country 
that they took root. This situation presents ideal circumstances to assess how 
local conditions and power relations affect the ability of al-Azhar graduates and 
their disciples to propagate the ideas they gained abroad. Thus, while Islamic 
modernism’s role in the Moroccan nationalist movement is undeniable, it is an 
oversimplification to attribute its impact to the ideology itself. Rather, a particu-
lar constellation of economic, political and social factors created an opportunity 
that led to the ideology’s adoption and spread.
Argument
This chapter argues that the adoption of Islamic modernism as the ideologi-
cal foundation for the nationalist movement created the conditions of path 
dependence. Path-dependent arguments are rooted in the idea of “increasing 
returns”: small choices can have long-term and far-reaching effects if they close 
off other potential opportunities or “paths”.3 The changes in Moroccan society 
brought on by increasing European penetration at the end of the nineteenth 
century created the perception of an economic, political and social threat that 
made intellectuals and elites more open to new ideologies than they had been 
in previous decades. Fear of European domination of Moroccan industry and 
political institutions created the conception that Moroccan Islam and social 
organisation was in danger. The impact of this perception is evidenced in how 
differently Moroccan elites responded to the same ideology in the late 1870s, 
when they rejected Islamic modernism, and the first decades of the twentieth 
century, when they embraced it. Once Islamic modernism had been installed, 
and its position solidified through the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930, the choice 
had been made. Islamic modernism was locked in as the ideological foundation 
for the movement. The installation of this doctrine thus constitutes a critical 
juncture in Moroccan history and initiates a need to ask why this particular 
model of religious and political reform became influential above other possible 
alternatives. There is general agreement among participants that it was this 
combination of religious and political reform that contributed to the success of 
both movements. Once in a position of power, Moroccan nationalists began to 
make policy decisions related to the future of the country. As committed Islamic 
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modernists, the ideology became institutionalised in the country’s system of 
education. Education thus served as the mechanism through which Islamic 
modernism reproduced itself.
Organisation
The introduction concludes with a discussion of the term “Islamic modernism” 
and why I chose to use it in place of the term “Salafism”. The central body of the 
chapter has three sections: the first describes the development of the relation-
ship between al-Azhar University and Morocco, highlighting the role of trade, 
pilgrimage and education. The second examines prominent Moroccan Islamic 
modernists, including Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi, Abu Shuʿayb al-Dukkali, 
Muhammad ibn al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi and ʿAllal al-Fasi, and their connection to 
Islamic modernism. These four graduates are significant for several reasons. First, 
they exemplify the three ways that Moroccans came into contact with Islamic 
modernism enumerated above. Secondly, the varying success of their efforts to 
spread the ideology sheds light on how the conditions of the local community 
impacted upon how this ideology was received. Finally, the third part of the 
chapter examines the short- and long-term impact of these graduates, with an 
emphasis on the ideology underpinning Moroccan educational policy. I argue 
that the immediate impact of the spread of Islamic modernism was the combin-
ing of two movements, one for religious reform and one for political reform, the 
fusion of which strengthened both. Once granted independence, the nationalist 
movement became a modern political party that participated in governing the 
country. The Islamic modernist tinge of their educational policies provides evi-
dence that the installation of Islamic modernism as the ideological foundation 
of the Moroccan nationalist movement created the conditions of path depend-
ence and served as a critical juncture in Moroccan society, the implications of 
which remain visible today. The chapter concludes with reflections on what the 
study of the Moroccan case contributes to the study of al-Azhar University and 
its graduates’ impact on their home communities.
Islamic Modernism and Salafism in Morocco
There are some complications with describing the ideology deployed in the 
Moroccan nationalist struggle. Although much of the literature refers to 
Moroccan nationalists as Salafists, the ideology was rooted in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth-century Egyptian Islamic modernism of Jamal al-din 
al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida.4 This discrepancy is likely 
due to the fact that the major Moroccan nationalist ʿAllal al-Fasi himself used 
the term “Salafiyah” in his memoirs (1948). Subsequent scholars, presumably 
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relying on al-Fasi, have characterised the nationalists as Salafists. Because al-Fa-
si’s ideology was rooted in the ideas of al-Afghani, ʿAbduh and Rida, and 
because they did not refer to themselves as Salafists,5 I have chosen to use the 
term “Islamic modernist”.
Further, in the twenty-first century Salafism refers to groups with very dif-
ferent ideologies than it did at the time of the Islamic modernists and the 
Moroccan nationalists. In the twenty-first century, Salafism refers to a retro-
gressive, puritanical interpretation of Islam resistant to any innovation from the 
post-Rashidun6 period. Salafist belief is characterised by rejection of non-Islamic 
institutions and insistence on harsh punishments according to narrow inter-
pretations of the faith. The Islamic modernists, on the other hand, had a very 
different approach to reconciling their faith with the challenges of the day.
Muhammad ʿAbduh was the most influential of the Islamic modernists 
among the Moroccan nationalists. ʿ Abduh, the student of al-Afghani, studied at 
al-Azhar from 1869 to 1877 and taught there afterwards. ʿAbduh was interested 
in mystical theology and was contemplating an ascetic life before he met al-Af-
ghani. After a brief exile, he returned to Egypt where he became committed to 
the founding of schools and reforming al-Azhar. ʿAbduh did not reject modern 
institutions; rather, he sought to reconcile them to Islamic principles and in so 
doing chart a middle course:
ʿAbduh’s purpose, in all the acts of his later life as well as his writings, was to 
bridge the gulf within Islamic society [between those who accepted and those 
who rejected modern institutions and ideas], and in so doing to strengthen 
its moral roots. He thought this could only be done in one way. It could not 
be done by a return to the past, by stopping the process of change begun by 
Muhammad ʿAli. It could only be done by accepting the need for change, 
and by linking that change to the principles of Islam: by showing that the 
changes which were taking place were not only permitted by Islam, but were 
indeed its necessary implications if it was rightly understood, and that Islam 
could serve both as a principle of change and a salutary control over it.7
Since the Islamic modernists accepted European institutions and bodies of 
knowledge in the context of Islamic values, referring to their disciples as Salafis 
is misleading given the current understanding of the term as militantly against 
non-Islamic institutions. Finally, at a time when the media frequently uses the 
term “Salafist” as interchangeable with “terrorist” or “extremist” without con-
cern for the content of the ideology motivating the individual, it is prudent to 
employ the less politicised term “Islamic modernism”.
One caveat is in order, however. There is one way in which Moroccan 
nationalists resemble modern Salafis more than Islamic modernists, and that 
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is in their hostility towards Sufism.8 Due to the political and social context 
in which Islamic modernism was incorporated in Morocco, where Sufis were 
perceived as collaborating with the French colonisers, anti-Sufi elements were 
played up among the nationalists more than among the original Islamic modern-
ists. Al-Fasi’s claim that “the manner in which the Salfiyah movement had been 
conducted in Morocco had secured for it a degree of success unequalled even 
in the country of Muhammad ʿAbduh and Jamal al-Din, where it originated” 
should be interpreted as in reference to the success of the movement in taking 
a militant stand against Sufism.9 This is not to say that the Islamic modernists 
were successful in eradicating Sufism from Morocco, only that the nationalists 
opposed it in tangible ways.10 Further, al-Fasi’s stance against Sufism did not 
prevent him from instrumentalising French acceptance of the brotherhoods. 
In fact, an early nationalist secret society was known as a zaouia, a term used as 
a meeting place for Sufis, and al-Fasi was sometimes referred to as “Shaykh”, a 
term widely used in Morocco to connote the leader of a brotherhood.11
The Islamic modernists on the other hand, and particularly Muhammad 
ʿAbduh, were sympathetic to a certain kind of Sufism. ʿAbduh first encoun-
tered Sufism at the feet of his father’s maternal uncle, Shaykh Darwish Khadir, 
who was a disciple of the Moroccan founder of the Darqawiyya order, Mawlay 
al-ʿArabi al-Darqawi.12 There is also some support for the argument that ʿ Abduh 
was drawn to al-Afghani because of his views on Sufism. The two do appear to 
have held similar beliefs on the subject. Both men believed that Sufism could 
contribute to proper Islamic practice, but rejected many of the behaviours of 
their Sufi contemporaries:
For the true mysticism, as he conceived it, ʿAbduh had a great respect: it was 
right that Muslims should interiorize their obedience to the law. But another 
type of mysticism he regarded as dangerous to the mind and morals: that type 
which gave its devotion to the “saints” (friends of God, awliyaʾ) and their 
miracles, and so tended to divert attention from God and to place intermedi-
aries between God and man . . .13
ʿAbduh’s position is so ambiguous that it has led some scholars to conclude that 
he was a “salafi Sufi”, a term that is unthinkable in the context of the modern 
usage of “Salafi”.14 ʿAbduh’s careful discrimination between appropriate and 
inappropriate forms of Sufism has largely been lost by subsequent followers, 
including the Moroccan modernists, who were, in general, anti-Sufi.
Similarly, the father of Islamic modernism and ʿAbduh’s teacher, al-Af-
ghani, had a nuanced relationship with Sufism that is frequently oversimplified. 
ʿAbduh likely acquired his relationship with Sufism from his teacher, who 
both appreciated great Sufi thinkers while questioning the actions of his Sufi 
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contemporaries. ʿAbduh writes that al-Afghani was responsible for deepening 
his knowledge of Sufism. In particular, al-Afghani is known to have intro-
duced ʿ Abduh and several other disciples to the Naqshbandi mystical poet ʿ Abd 
al-Rahman Jami, an author whose works were not taught at al-Azhar.15 At the 
same time, al-Afghani saw Sufis as preventing the Islamic community or umma 
from modernising. Although he rarely criticised Sufis directly, his complaints 
about the relationship between shaykh and disciple, which required total obedi-
ence, and the style of instruction offered at al-Azhar Mosque university, which 
relied on rote memorisation, capture his concerns and situate them within his 
larger intellectual priorities. He was more concerned with the advancement of 
the umma than opposing the brotherhoods. Al-Afghani felt that both Sufism 
and rote memorisation prevented the development of the critical faculties and 
open mind necessary for rational debate and, hence, were a threat to the pro-
gress of the community.16 His anti-Sufi discourse should then be understood in 
the context of admiration for European rationalist thought and his hopes for the 
renewal of Islamic thought.
The socio-political context encountered by the Moroccan nationalists was 
quite different. In early twentieth-century Morocco, a number of Sufi shaykhs 
cooperated with the French in order to maintain their positions of authority.17 
Thus, the emphasis on the anti-Sufi strain of thought in Islamic modernism in 
the Moroccan context was rooted in resistance to French domination, while 
al-Afghani’s critique of Sufism was related to his concerns about the decay of the 
umma in failing to adopt European institutions and technologies. Although this 
anti-Sufism could be used as the basis of an argument that the Moroccan nation-
alists are best identified as Salafists, a brief review of ʿAllal al-Fasi’s memoir 
demonstrates that his ideology is closer to Islamic modernism than Salafism.
Al-Fasi clearly articulated his views of the ideology when he wrote:
The aim of the Salafiyah, as propounded by its founder, al-Hanbali, was the 
cleansing of religion from the superstitions that had crept into it and the res-
toration of its original purity . . . The movement, therefore, aimed at the 
reform of the individual as a prerequisite for the perfection of society. 
The success of the movement, it was realized, hinges upon the acceptance of 
an “open mind” towards innovations and their critical evaluation in light of 
the general interest. 18
In al-Fasi’s view, a strict adherence to the core doctrines of Islam will facilitate 
a type of personal revival that can serve as the basis for larger social changes. 
At the same time, this deep reverence for the faith as practised by the Prophet 
and the pious ancestors (or as-salaf as∙-s∙ālih∙ , hence the term “Salafi”) was married 
to a measured acceptance of advances in science and technology. Thus, like 
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ʿAbduh, it was not a blind acceptance of all things old as normatively good and 
all things new as normatively bad. Rather, al-Fasi’s Islamic modernism was a 
streamlining of religious belief, a simplifying of practice and a careful filtering of 
innovation to move the umma, or Islamic community, forward in a conscious 
and intentional way.
Al-Fasi’s Islamic modernism combined unity and tolerance with individ-
ual freedom of thought and belief. Politically, it called for self-determination; 
cooperation among separate Muslim nations (rather than a unified Arab polit-
ical entity); the installation of the Arabic language as the dominant language 
throughout the Muslim world; shariʿa as the basis for civil law “subject to con-
stant review and interpretation”; a popularly elected assembly; and liberation 
from foreign control “both material and moral”. Finally, it is worth noting, 
“Above all, the new Salafiyah rejects the idea of a secular state.”19 While there 
are some shared positions with modern Salafis, such as the rejection of Islamic 
mysticism and the insistence on the Islamic state, the nationalists’ openness to 
technological and non-Islamic institutions separate them from modern Salafism 
in a fundamental way, making it more appropriate to identify their ideology as a 
variant of Islamic modernism.
Although what is known about the relationship between Morocco and 
al-Azhar is described in the next section, it must be noted that the presence of 
Islamic modernist ideas in Morocco is the primary evidence of the connection 
between al-Azhar University and the Moroccan nationalists. While it is difficult 
to establish concrete connections between the modernists and particular indi-
viduals, it is known that Muhammad ʿAbduh maintained a healthy correspond-
ence with nationalist leaders across North Africa, and that he sent a number of 
his publications to North African religious leaders.20
I. Morocco, al-Azhar and Islamic Modernism
Moroccans have been travelling through Cairo on their way to Mecca for cen-
turies. Consequently, it is likely that Moroccan scholars have studied and taught 
at al-Azhar University in some capacity for hundreds of years. Early records of 
a Moroccan presence at al-Azhar date from the fifteenth century. During that 
time, there were at least thirty-six Maghribis at al-Azhar.21 Of those scholars, at 
least one is known to have been from the region of present-day Morocco. The 
scholar known as Zarruq22 ended up at al-Azhar while on hajj. It is said that his 
courses were attended by 600 students.23 Because he completed the pilgrimage 
many times and attracted such a following in his lessons, it is likely that he 
frequented the university. Ahmad bin ʿAli al-Jazuli (d. 1782) is also known to 
have studied at al-Azhar with the father of Egyptian historian al-Jabarti and a 
Fassi scholar, Shaykh al-Tawdi bin Suda, who was in residence there.24 These 
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scholars set out from Morocco with one another on the hajj, but ended up stop-
ping for a time to study at al-Azhar.25 Cairo’s location on the pilgrimage route 
between Morocco and the Hijaz thus encouraged contact between religious 
scholars from both regions.
It is not known how many Moroccan students attended al-Azhar, but there 
were certainly some.26 In 1902, there were twenty-two Moroccan students pres-
ent out of a total 645 foreign students.27 Of significant Moroccan nationalists, 
at least one is known to have attended al-Azhar university: Hassan Bouayad in 
1929–33.28 Although few in number, these students were involved in several 
important organisations related to Moroccan nationalism, including a secret 
Egyptian group hoping to assist in the liberation of North Africa from French 
influence. There are indications that Moroccan students at al-Azhar may have 
facilitated communication between the group and Moroccan activists.29 In addi-
tion, students at al-Azhar were involved in another Cairo-based group, al-Itti-
had al-Maghribi (Maghreb Unity), linked to the Egyptian nationalists Shaykh 
ʿAli Yusuf, Ahmad Pasha Sharaʾi and Mustafa Pasha Khalifa. The group, intent 
on encouraging rebellion in Morocco, launched an Arabic-language newspaper, 
al-Haqq, in Tangier, and the group was later implicated in a plot30 to foment 
rebellion in the final days of Ramadan.31 The presence of such a group suggests, 
on the one hand, the existence of strong connections between Egyptian and 
Moroccan nationalists, and, on the other, highlights how al-Azhar acted infor-
mally as a base for facilitating these connections.
In addition to being a centre of religious learning, Cairo was also an impor-
tant market for Moroccan leather goods. As a result, a large population of 
Moroccan merchants, numbering around 2,000, lived in Egypt at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.32 Even though not formally involved at al-Azhar, 
these merchants likely interacted with other Moroccans, since the Moroccan 
community in Cairo had a certain amount of cohesion and was not completely 
independent of the Moroccan sultan’s influence:
All of the Moroccan expatriate community in Egypt, scholars as well as 
merchants, were placed under a Wakil (representative) appointed by the 
Moroccan Sultan. In the absence of formal diplomatic relations between 
Morocco and the Ottoman empire, he functioned as a kind of ambassador, 
resolving disputes within the community, as well as with overseeing the 
 general welfare of Moroccans residing in Egypt.33
Presumably, he also monitored the activities, both subversive and benign, of his 
subjects living in Cairo.
Although the Moroccan community in Cairo appears to have been small, 
the links these residents facilitated between Moroccan nationalists and al-Azhar 
Shaping Global Islamic Discourses
— 150 —
were sufficient to result in a significant traffic in ideas between the two. This is 
most evident in the large number of subscriptions to Egyptian newspapers in 
Moroccan cities:
There were, for example, some fifty regular subscribers to the Pan-Islamic 
newspaper al-Muʿayyad (Cairo) at Fez alone in 1911, and those known to be 
taking the paper included the then Foreign Minister, Muhammad al-Muqri, 
the former Minister of War, Muhammad Ghibbas (usually rendered in 
French, Guebbas), and other important officials. Other Egyptian newspapers 
circulated among the élite at Fez, including al-Ahram (pro-French), al-Muqa-
ttam (pro-British), and al-Liwa (Pan-Islamic). Both the sultan, ʿAbd al-Hafiz, 
and his then Grand Vizier, Madani al-Glawi, are known to have been regular 
readers of both the Near Eastern and European press. Given the small size of 
the Moroccan political élite, and the fact that newspapers were undoubtedly 
widely commented on, the significance of the press in Morocco before 1912 
seems clear.34
In coming decades, other newspapers became more significant. Halstead, for 
example, found that “The leading periodicals were al-Manar, al-Fath, and al-Zahra 
from Cairo, and ech-Chihah from Constantine (Algeria), and by all odds the most 
widely read of these in Morocco was Rida’s al-Manar,35 a monthly review of 
philosophy, religion and social affairs reflecting about the same proportion of 
political overtones as the reform movement it represented.”36 Three of the four 
journals popular during the First World War were Islamic modernist in orienta-
tion,37 highlighting the significance of the press in spreading that ideology.
These journals were extraordinarily significant. Al-Manar was the primary 
means of conversion to Islamic modernism by nationalists who did not know 
al-Dukkali or al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi personally, and was particularly important in 
the lives of the following nationalists: Mohammed Hassan al-Ouazzani, Ibrahim 
al-Kattani, Omar Abdeljalil, Mohammed Lyazidi, ʿAllal al-Fasi, Ahmed 
Mekouar and Ahmed Benani.38 In addition, these publications prepared the 
ground for graduates of al-Azhar to spread the Islamic modernist message, par-
ticularly among students of al-Qarawiyyin Mosque University in Fez, Morocco.39 
The impact of these journals also demonstrates that the newspaper itself was 
effective in converting non-graduates and thus was a successful strategy under-
taken by Islamic modernists in Cairo.
II. Significant Moroccan Islamic Modernists
While a number of individuals were significant to the spread of Islamic modern-
ism in Morocco, four are of particular importance: Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi, 
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Abu Shuʾayb al-Dukkali, Muhammad ibn al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi and ʿ Allal al-Fasi. 
Al-Sanusi is credited with being the first to try to spread Islamic modernism in 
the country. Al-Dukkali was the first to win converts to Islamic modernism 
among Moroccan religious scholars, one of whom, al-ʿAlawi, would go on to 
be the teacher of many future nationalists. His student ʿAllal al-Fasi led the 
Moroccan nationalist movement and the independence party that participated 
in governing in the years after the French protectorate.
Abdullah ibn Idris al-Sanusi was a lecturer at al-Qarawiyyin University. 
Al-Sanusi reached a position of importance upon return from a pilgrimage to 
Mecca in 1870 when Sultan Mawlay al-Hassan appointed him to his Royal 
Learned Council.40 During his travels, al-Sanusi was exposed to the ideas of 
Islamic modernism, although it is not known how.41 His appointment to the 
council suggests that the sultan approved of al-Sanusi’s Islamic modernist 
principles. The other members of the council, however, including Ahmad bin 
al-Talib bin Sudah and ʿAbdullah al-Kamil al-ʿAmrani al-Hasani, both Sufis, 
accused al-Sanusi of being a Muʾtazilite42 and forced him into exile.43 Al-Sanusi 
demonstrates how even those who did not formally study at al-Azhar could 
come into contact with the ideas propagated there through the pilgrimage and 
so attempt to spread those ideas upon their return. More significantly, his expe-
rience demonstrates that the conditions in Morocco in 1870 were not ripe for 
the spread of a new ideology.
While al-Sanusi is emblematic of those who came into contact with Islamic 
modernism through the hajj, Abu Shuʾayb al-Dukkali (1878–1937) actually 
studied at al-Azhar following the implementation of ʿAbduh’s reforms.44 In 
addition, he was chosen by the rector of al-Azhar to teach in Mecca, suggest-
ing he was an exemplary student. He returned to Morocco in 1907 after being 
invited by then sultan ʿAbd al-Hafiz to serve on his Royal Learned Council.45 
He began teaching Qurʾanic exegesis (tafsı̄r) at Qarawiyyin University in 
1908.46 Al-Dukkali’s return was recorded by the nationalist leader ʿAllal al Fasi 
in his memoirs. He wrote, “The Sheikh had returned imbued with a burning 
desire to propagate the principles of the Salafiyah reform movement. A group 
of young enthusiastic supporters gathered around him. They distributed the 
publications of the Salafiyah movement in Egypt and accompanied him on his 
tours to pull down trees and shrines which had been made the object of popular 
veneration.”47 This quote identifies several strategies employed by al-Dukkali’s 
disciples, such as the distribution of Salafi literature and the destruction of sites 
venerated by Sufis. Further, these activities highlight the anti-Sufi tone of the 
Moroccan Islamic modernists.
Al-Dukkali’s activities focused on religious, not political, revival and were 
largely educational initiatives. The most significant of his activities was his 
involvement with the Free School movement. The name Free Schools refers 
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not to the cost of attendance, but rather to schools free of French ideology. The 
curriculum of these schools emphasised Qurʾanic studies with an Islamic mod-
ernist interpretation and employed textbooks from Egypt.48 Important graduates 
of the Free Schools and future nationalists included: “Abdelakder Benjellous, 
Mohammed El-Fassi, Mohamed Hassan Ouazzani, Ahmed Réda Guédira”.49 In 
order to raise funds for the schools, theatrical troupes toured the country discuss-
ing the need for educational reform and collecting donations for the schools.50 
Mohammed Lyazidi, one of al-Dukkali’s students, is responsible for spreading 
Islamic modernism from Fez to nationalists in Rabat.51
In addition to his involvement with the Free Schools, al-Dukkali was deeply 
concerned with the training of future religious scholars at Qarawiyyin Mosque 
University in Fez. Despite his opposition to Sufism, al-Dukkali cooperated with 
Sufi Abdelhay al-Kittani in opposing French efforts to reform Qarawiyyin in the 
1930s.52 He then enlisted the support of the sultan, ʿAbdul-Hafiz, to oversee his 
own reforms to the curriculum:
Through ʿAbdul-Hafiz’s help, Abu Shuʾaib succeeded in adding to the cur-
riculum of the Qarawiyin University the teaching of tafsı̄r; this was indispen-
sable if the Salafis were to have resort to ijtihad (individual interpretation), 
the door of which, they believed, contrary to the widely accepted attitude, 
was not shut. During the three years which al-Dukkali spent in Fez, he him-
self taught the subject in the Qarawiyin, and while there a group of enthu-
siastic disciples formed itself around him. It was to one of these disciples, 
Mawlay al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi, that he handed on the torch of the Salafiyya in 
Morocco.53
The most significant contribution to Islamic modernism made by Muhammad 
ibn al-ʿArabi al-ʿAlawi, al-Dukkali’s student, was transforming it from a move-
ment of religious reform to one of political reform. As such, he can be seen as 
the first Moroccan “neo-Salafi”.54 Al-ʿAlawi, a former member of the Tijaniyya 
brotherhood, was converted to Islamic modernism by reading Ibn Taymiyya’s 
The Separation between the Disciples of God and the Disciples of Satan as well as 
ʿAbduh’s al-Manar.55 He came into contact with al-Dukkali while a lecturer at 
Qarawiyyin. He was also a teacher at Collège Moulay Idriss.56 As a committed 
Islamic modernist, he participated in the reforms to Qarawiyyin University’s 
curriculum in 1933.57 Al-ʿAlawi’s students included many nationalists such as 
ʿAllal al-Fasi and Ibrahim al-Kittani.58 In his memoirs, al-Fasi described al-ʿAla-
wi’s activities: “Ibn al-ʿArabi’s reform circle at Fez and Sheikh Abu Shuʾayb’s 
group at Rabat carried on an intensive reform campaign through the media of 
public lectures, exchange of visitors, and articles in the press of Algeria and 
Tunisia; [since] Morocco did not at that time possess a single newspaper that 
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was not under French influence or control”.59 The groups that al-Fasi referred to 
were Islamic modernist circles, a type of reading group that had outreach activi-
ties such as those listed above. They also wrote op-eds in Islamic modernist pub-
lications such as al-Manar.60 It was under al-ʿAlawi’s leadership that Moroccan 
reformers went from consuming Islamic modernist publications to contributing 
to them. Further, in these reading groups Moroccan nationalists began to view 
their struggle against the French and their Sufi collaborators as part of a larger 
struggle for religious reform. This fusion of movements for religious and political 
reform would help them to gain public support for their position through the 
activities described above.
Finally, the fourth major Moroccan Islamic modernist was ʿAllal al-Fasi. His 
biography has been detailed elsewhere,61 so I will give only the relevant details. 
He was born into a wealthy Fassi family. His father was a teacher at Qarawiyyin 
University as well as a merchant who founded the Nasiriyyah Free School in the 
city of Fez. The school “offered Arabic and Islamic education based on Arabic 
literature and grammar, poetry, and the study of religion as opposed to the new 
French protectorate schools which used French as the medium of instruction and 
promoted French culture”.62 Al-Fasi was himself a student there, before attend-
ing Qarawiyyin University at the young age of fourteen. It was there that he 
met al-ʿAlawi and was exposed to Islamic modernist doctrine. He was involved 
in a number of nationalist activities from the age of seventeen, including secret 
societies and the publication of a nationalist newsletter titled Umm al-Banin, as 
well as communication with student organisations in France and Egypt.63 Like 
his father and his mentor al-ʿAlawi, al-Fasi was a teacher in the Free School 
movement. Al-Fasi’s popularity as a nationalist leader earned him the distrust 
of the French and he was exiled to Gabon for nine years. He returned in 1946, 
only to leave for Cairo a year later. While in Cairo, al-Fasi lectured regularly at 
al-Azhar University.64 These speeches are collected in the volume Min al-gharb 
il al-sharq (From the West to the East). He also gave a number of radio talks that 
are collected in the work Nida al-Qahira (The Call from Cairo). Al-Fasi’s concern 
for Moroccan students to receive an education that was in Arabic and founded 
on Islamist values became significant in the post-independence era when he 
supported the Arabisation of the Moroccan public school curriculum, discussed 
below.
One final actor deserves mention, though he was not Moroccan. Shakib 
Arslan, a Lebanese Druze prince and former student of Muhammad ʿAbduh,65 
maintained a strong relationship with a number of Moroccan nationalists, includ-
ing ʿAllal al-Fasi, Mohammed Hassan Ouazzani and Ahmed Balafrej. Out of his 
office in Geneva, where Ouazzani worked as his personal secretary from 1930 to 
1933, Arslan intermittently published La Nation Arab, a pan-Islamic newsletter 
between 1930 and 1938. In contradiction to the publication’s name, the main 
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goal of the paper was to promote the idea of pan-Islamism, not pan-Arabism.66 
Although Arslan had tremendous influence with Moroccan nationalists, it is 
unlikely that he is responsible for introducing Moroccan nationalists to Islamic 
modernism. By the time he began his publication, most Moroccan nationalists 
had already been converted to Islamic modernism as described above. His signif-
icance is in assisting them to translate their grievances into political action and 
in building a shared sense of struggle among Muslims across North Africa and 
the Middle East, and as far away as Indonesia.
III. Short- and Long-term Effects
Short term: combining religious and political reform
It is not surprising that Islamic modernism, a doctrine focused on the reform of 
the individual, became the ideological basis for a political movement. The doc-
trine itself, as specified above by ʿAllal al-Fasi, but also as described by its found-
ers, argued for an intrinsic relationship between the reform of the individual 
and a reform of society. At the same time, factors local to the Moroccan context 
provided an added impetus to the adoption of the ideology. In particular, the 
surrender of the great Riffian rebel Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karim al-Khattabi 
(d. 1963) in 1927 made it obvious to the nationalists that the French could not 
be defeated in military struggle, encouraging them to work for cultural reform. 
Some argue that Islamic modernism was then a tactical ideological choice, since 
the French attempted to allow the Moroccans a degree of autonomy with regard 
to their religious affairs.67 In practical terms, French efforts to not interfere with 
religion allowed the young nationalist ʿAllal al-Fasi to give distinctly political 
speeches under the veil of religious learning while lecturing at Qarawiyyin 
Mosque University, launching his political career.68 The adoption of Islamic 
modernism can be seen as a pragmatic choice, because a secular nationalist ide-
ology would not have been afforded the same kind of organisational autonomy. 
Secondly, there is general agreement among scholars that a secular nationalist 
ideology would not have been capable of mobilising the type of mass support 
that Islamic modernism did.
While the need to oppose the French culturally and unite Moroccans along 
religious lines are certainly contributing factors to the success of Islamic modern-
ism, the most compelling argument for the effectiveness of Islamic modernism 
was French policy and particularly the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930.69 This and 
other French policies turned religious reformers into political revolutionaries.70 
The Berber Dahir of 193071 was the height of French efforts to establish separate 
judicial systems for Berbers and Arabs. The nationalists viewed it as an effort to 
divide the umma and they vehemently opposed the reforms. Islamic activists as 
The Arabisation of Education
— 155 —
far away as Indonesia joined them in their efforts.72 The whole affair was further 
complicated by the fact that there was a vague ethnic and geographic division 
between Islamic modernists and Sufis. Islamic modernists tended to claim Arab 
descent and live in urban areas, while Sufis tended to claim Berber descent and 
live in rural areas.73 The divide between the two thus had political, religious and 
ethnic dimensions. These divisions, however, did not prevent their temporary 
cooperation during the Berber Dahir campaign of 1930.
The result of the Berber Dahir crisis of 1930 was the short-lived early cooper-
ation between Berbers and nationalists. “Thus, while staunchly Berberist orders 
like the Derqawa and its derivative, the Kittaniyya, originally opposed the 
French occupation, when they were later confronted by a reforming sultan who 
openly sympathised with the aims of the Salafiyyist nationalists, they often 
leagued themselves with the French authorities who promised, however ambig-
uously, to respect their prized autonomy, religiously as well as politically.”74 
The sympathy that Mohammed V showed for Islamic modernism thus had a 
significant impact on the alliances that developed in the post-1930 nationalist 
climate. Although Berbers such as ʿAbd el-Krim originally vehemently opposed 
the French presence in Morocco, the anti-Sufi position of Moroccan nationalists 
and their champion the sultan encouraged Sufis to cooperate with the French 
in the interests of self-preservation. This cooperation then provided fodder for 
political grievance between Islamic modernists and Sufis, since the former began 
to see Sufis as both political and religious rivals: they represented an impure 
Islam and were traitors. This merging of political with religious grievance only 
added intensity to the conflict between them. ʿAllal al-Fasi, Mohammed al-Fasi 
and Mohammed Lyazidi all argue that this combination of religious and political 
grievance is what made both Islamic modernism and nationalism successful in 
Morocco.75 While the conclusion of this chapter stresses how local conditions 
affected the reception of Islamic modernism, this brief section demonstrates 
how Islamic modernism also affected local power relations.
Long term: educational reform
If the short-term effect of the importation of Islamic modernism was the success 
of the Moroccan nationalist movement, the long-term effect was no less signif-
icant. Islamic modernism’s focus on the reform of the individual believer has 
consistently emphasised the role of education as the mechanism through which 
societal reform takes place. It is no surprise that a priority of the nationalist 
movement and the subsequent independence party, Istiqlal, was the Arabisation 
of education, or the transition from an educational system where French or 
Spanish was the language of instruction to Modern Standard Arabic (fus∙h∙ā). 
The proposal created such a controversy that it was not fully implemented for 
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thirty years. Istiqlal itself was divided over the form and priority of Arabisation, 
and the two factions were led by ʿAllal al-Fasi and Mehdi Ben Barka, a leftist 
intellectual whose disagreements with al-Fasi would lead him to form a separate 
party in the years after independence. Al-Fasi viewed Arabisation as a means 
through which to encourage the development of a distinctly Arab Moroccan 
culture. Arabisation was a priority for al-Fasi, as demonstrated in his letter- 
writing campaign in support of the measure, but it would be an overstatement to 
say that he wanted all subjects taught in Arabic. It was later activists (not al-Fasi) 
who demanded the “complete” Arabisation of the educational system.76 Indeed, 
his own hesitancy over Arabisation is probably best described in the fact that he 
chose to send his own children to mission schools, where the primary language of 
instruction was French.77 Al-Fasi did not, to my knowledge, publicly defend this 
decision. Ben Barka, on the other hand, did not disapprove of Arabisation, but 
he viewed it as a lower priority than educational development. For him, French 
was the necessary primary language for Moroccan students because of the gaps 
in the vocabulary of Arabic.78 He supported some Arabisation, but viewed the 
mastery of French as an economic necessity.
The Arabisation of Moroccan public education began in the early years of the 
post-independence government, when ʿAllal al-Fasi’s cousin, Mohammed, was 
minister of education. He announced the policy at a press conference on 25 June 
1956. Beginning the following year, the first year of elementary schooling (cours 
préparatoires) was to be given in Arabic, followed by two years of schooling split 
between Arabic and French instruction.79 However, there were so few proficient 
Arabic speakers in the country that it was necessary to import a large number 
of Arabic teachers from Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq.80 In less than a decade, the 
process was paused by then Minister of Education Mohammed Benhima due to 
concerns over the quality of instruction, not to mention the ideological influ-
ence of the teachers from the Middle East, and French was once again made the 
language of instruction.81
The process was reinstated under the leadership of Hassan II, not because of 
his support for the policy, but due to pressure from various social actors such as 
the Istiqlal party, the Union of Higher Education, the National Association of 
Moroccan Writers and the public at large, as well as his concern over the spread 
of leftist ideologies.82 The World Bank and UNESCO also supported the meas-
ure “based on the sound pedagogical notion that literacy is best spread when the 
language of instruction is the language of the home”.83 However, the belief that 
the language of Arabisation, Modern Standard Arabic, was similar to spoken 
Moroccan Arabic or Darija was mistaken.
Istiqlal was at the forefront of the Arabisation campaign. In a communiqué 
published on 3 January 1973 in the Istiqlal newspaper al-Alam, ʿAllal al-Fasi 
appealed to the Moroccan people to demand that the prime minister Arabise 
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education.84 The appeal instigated six months of petitions published in multiple 
Moroccan newspapers in both French and Arabic. The campaign was success-
ful. By 1978, Hassan II had become fully committed to Arabisation, stating 
that “Arabization should be the irreversible point of departure for educational 
reform”.85 Hassan II’s support for Arabisation was rooted in his concern over the 
rise of leftist movements on university campuses and the desire for a strength-
ened Islamic opposition to serve as a bulwark against them.
The process was complete by the early 1990s. The Istiqlal party and specif-
ically ʿAllal al-Fasi are responsible for making Arabisation a national political 
issue, but Hassan II is responsible for its actual implementation. Arabisation had 
been a priority of the Istiqlal party for decades, but it did not become national 
policy until the king threw his support behind it.
Consequently, while al-Fasi fought for Arabisation as part of a larger com-
mitment to Islamic modernism, Hassan II supported the reforms due to his own 
political motives, namely, his desire to prevent the development of a unified 
opposition. Hassan II’s ulterior motives in implementing the reforms highlight 
how the long-term impact of the ideology of Islamic modernism on Moroccan 
education and politics was shaped by the political, economic and social context 
into which it was imported.
Conclusions: The Moroccan Case
Many scholars have argued that Islamic modernism was accepted in Morocco due 
to the country’s tendency to accept ideologies of religious reform. ʿAllal al-Fasi 
himself commented: “It appears that Morocco is predisposed more strongly than 
any other country to accept reform movements advocating a return to true 
religion and the tenets of the faith.”86 Halstead, a scholar who knew many of 
the leading Moroccan nationalists, came to a similar conclusion, although he 
did not think this proclivity towards religious reform was sufficient to explain 
the appeal of Islamic modernism: “Morocco had always leaned towards funda-
mentalism in religion – the Malekite ritual prevailed there – and hence was 
potentially receptive to a movement such as Salafiyya, but during the time of 
Djamal al-Din and ʿAbduh it had made little headway because the other condi-
tions were wanting.”87 What were the conditions to which Halstead is alluding? 
What conditions explain why Islamic modernism was rejected in one period 
but accepted later? What does the Moroccan case demonstrate about why some 
graduates of al-Azhar were successful in spreading the ideologies they acquired?
The most important reason why Islamic modernism was rejected when first 
propagated by al-Sanusi, but welcomed in later years, was the political context 
in which it was introduced. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, intel-
lectuals and scholars did not yet feel threatened by Europe. The country had not 
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experienced foreign occupation for over 1,200 years:88 the Ottomans were never 
able to occupy Morocco, nor had the country been colonised by a European power. 
The first loss of territory to the French did not occur until 1900.89 However, the 
first decade of the twentieth century, when al-Dukkali preached Islamic mod-
ernism, was characterised by efforts to resist French political involvement, and 
by civil war between two competing sultans.90 Thus, the environments in which 
al-Sanusi and al-Dukkali called for religious reform were remarkably different. 
Calls for religious reform by al-Sanusi were likely rejected because the country 
was stable, and there was not yet any reason to believe that that stability was 
threatened either internally or externally. By the time al- Dukkali began preach-
ing Islamic modernism at Qarawiyyin in 1908, the Moroccan state had begun to 
lose territory to the French and there were serious misgivings about the sultan’s 
ability to protect the country from foreign intervention, not to mention chal-
lenges to his own political legitimacy. These misgivings are evident in the fact 
that the Moroccan ʿulama chose to depose the sultan the year before.91
In terms of social context, the lack of an educated Western elite limited the 
spread of reform ideologies in the late nineteenth century. “It now seems clear 
that the weakness of the currents of reform, Islamic modernism, and pan-Islam 
in Morocco is to be ascribed to the rudimentary level of the system of educa-
tion.”92 Without this elite, the bureaucracy was less cohesive and the country 
lacked non-religious institutions to assist in uniting the educated class. At the 
same time, Sufi brotherhoods remained the primary means for social organisa-
tion, particularly in rural areas. As the case of al-Sanusi demonstrates, leaders 
of these brotherhoods held important advisory positions into the twentieth 
century and were willing to oppose ideologies that threatened their existence. 
Finally, the dispersed nature of religious leadership meant that coalitions formed 
by powerful scholars could side-line ideologies supported by the sultan in the 
1880s. This would not be the case several decades later, as Moroccan sultans 
came to rely increasingly on European advisers, and Moroccan religious schol-
ars’ influence on affairs of state declined.93
In addition to political and social factors, several economic conditions dis-
couraged the spread of Islamic modernism during the late nineteenth century. In 
a general sense, Morocco lacked a middle class or aristocracy.94 Further, the elite 
were alienated by a series of reforms undertaken during that time.95 There was 
thus no one to embrace or implement reforms spoken in a modernist language. 
At the same time, this period saw a near collapse of the Moroccan economy. 
Losses in the Hispano-Moroccan war of 1892 required the sultan to pay large 
indemnities to Spain, while foreign loans – in 1901, 1902, 1909 and 1910 – fur-
ther increased Moroccan dependence on European powers.96 In the year before 
al-Dukkali began preaching Islamic modernism at Qarawiyyin, Morocco had 
experienced a significant economic crisis.
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The contexts in which al-Sanusi and al-Dukkali preached Islamic modernism 
were radically different. In a general sense, al-Sanusi was preaching a reformist 
ideology in a time of stability and continuity, a time marked by excitement 
rather than fear. Al-Dukkali, on the other hand, preached religious reform in 
a time marked by instability and a widespread sense of helplessness. European 
encroachment seemed inevitable. Leadership from the sultan was weak. It is not 
surprising, then, that al-Dukkali attracted a number of followers. The doctrine 
preached that practices of personal piety would lead to wider social reforms. 
At a time when the course of events seemed out of control, Islamic modern-
ism offered a means for individuals to feel that their efforts were contributing 
to larger social goals. Thus, while the context into which Islamic modernism 
spread created an opportunity for the ideology, it would be an oversimplification 
to say that simply any ideology could have taken root at that time. Islamic mod-
ernism was unique in that it identified concrete steps for individual believers to 
contribute to the well-being of their society.
The Moroccan case demonstrates that the atmosphere of political and eco-
nomic crisis created opportunities for al-Azhar graduates and their disciples to 
spread ideologies from Cairo to their home communities. The success of the 
spread of the ideology, though, seemed to depend less on their activities or strat-
egies and more on the power relations of the home communities, the sources 
of political leadership, and the existence of a class of people willing to embrace 
and implement reforms. Finally, the Moroccan case suggests that ideologies 
of religious reform can be particularly influential when tied to movements for 
political reform.
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From Mecca to Cairo:  
Changing Influences on Fatwas in Southeast Asia
Yuki Shiozaki
Muslim scholars (ʿulama) and Sufis have long been accustomed to undertaking 
extended trans-regional journeys in pursuit of Islamic knowledge. Historically, 
such peregrinatory ʿulama have played a significant role in transplanting ideas 
and practices to Southeast Asia from the Middle East. Some returned home 
after spending years in the Middle East, while others who remained contin-
ued to influence the discourse at home by sending written fatwas (replies to 
questions on shariʿa issues) in response to questions sent to them from their 
originating communities.1 This chapter shows how the shift in intellectual influ-
ence away from Mecca and towards Cairo, and in particular towards al-Azhar, 
impacted upon the interpretation of shariʿa and the issuing of fatwas within 
Southeast Asian Muslim communities. The chapter focuses on the fatwas issued 
by Southeast Asian ʿulama from the late nineteenth century to the end of the 
1960s. Emphasis is placed on tracing the influence of factors such as the Shafiʿi 
School, Salafi methodology and the isnād (genealogy of intellectual succession) 
of the Southeast Asian ʿulama in the Middle East2 in order to present a clearer 
picture of the transformation in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) methodology and 
the networks of ʿulama who used them.
The development of Islam in Southeast Asia has long been influenced by 
trends in the Middle East,3 and tracing isnād is thus essential for researching 
the exogenous influences upon Islam in Southeast Asia over time, as well as 
understanding the endogenous transitions that have also occurred. Although 
important texts have been written on this theme,4 there are not many studies 
of the intellectual networks connecting scholars within Southeast Asia, the 
Middle East and South Asia, especially as regards the field of fiqh. This chapter 
aims to illuminate these networks.
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The period from the late nineteenth century through to the 1960s was a 
time of tremendous change in both Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It 
was during this period that modernisation swept through Muslim societies as a 
result of their encounter with European colonisation and intervention.5 In the 
case of Malaysia, which achieved independence in 1957,6 the institutionalisa-
tion of Islam in government administration and the establishment of Muslim 
associations of various sorts changed the relation between Islam and the state.7 
In the early twentieth century, the Malay sultanates established administrative 
institutions to control Islamic activities; and in the same period there was a 
mushrooming of private Muslim associations designed to integrate the existing 
Muslim networks. These institutions were intended to act as central platforms 
for entrenching Islamic life in society, while also helping people to adapt to the 
demands of modernity. Research by Roff8 and Feener9 has demonstrated that 
these institutions made efforts to preserve the hold of Islam when confronted 
with modernisation, and has documented how they took advantage of new 
technologies associated with modernity, such as printing and the mass media, 
to advance their message. This chapter discusses the issuing of fatwas and the 
adjustments in jurisprudential methodology that can be observed therein; this, I 
argue, was another aspect of the struggle to adapt to modernity. This adaptation 
can be observed in the fatwas issued by certain influential individual ʿulama, as 
well as in those issued by the Majlis Agama Islam (Islamic Religious Council) in 
each state of Malaysia.10
The historical period in question was also an era of intellectualism and new 
thinking. In the early twentieth century, significant new ideas were brought 
from al-Azhar to Southeast Asia, including new methodologies for the interpre-
tation of shariʿa; and these differed from the traditional jurisprudence based on 
the Shafiʿi School that was popular in Mecca, the place where Southeast Asian 
scholars traditionally went in search of higher learning. This shift influenced 
not only the thinking of individual ʿ ulama, but also had a profound effect on the 
newly established Muslim institutions in Southeast Asia.
Mecca as the Gathering Place for Shafiʿi ʿUlama 
from Southeast Asia
As the centre for Islamic learning for Southeast Asian Muslims, Mecca reached 
its peak in the late nineteenth century. In every mosque in Mecca, students 
would read Islam’s classic texts under the guidance of renowned ʿulama. The 
halaqah (reading groups) were to be found in every mosque, especially the one 
that was most revered, the Masjid al-Haram. The four corners of the Masjid 
al-Haram were dedicated to the four Sunni madhāhib (legal schools; sing. madh-
hab): Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafiʿi.11 In most Muslim countries, this 
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traditional system of learning began to face competition in the early twentieth 
century due to the spread of a modern, Western-style, education system in the 
Muslim world. Some semi-modern schools were even established in Mecca, 
mainly by non-Arab ʿulama, especially Indians.12 In 1912, Madrasa al-Falah, a 
prominent reformist madrasa that aimed to combine the teaching of Western 
subjects with a religious curriculum, was established by an Arab merchant 
named Muhammad ʿAli Zaynal Rida. This madrasa became a school for many 
Southeast Asian ʿ ulama in the twentieth century.13 Following Madrasa al-Falah, 
some Indonesian ʿulama established madrasas for Southeast Asian Muslims in 
Mecca. The most prominent examples of these were Madrasa al-Indonesiyya 
al-Makkiyya, established by Janan Muhammad Thaib in 1923, and Madrasa Dar 
al-Ulum al-Diniyah, established by Sayyid Muhsin al-Musawwa al-Palimbani in 
1934. Such Indonesian madrasas were significant in attracting Southeast Asian 
Muslim students to Mecca.14
Mecca was not only the most important centre for the Shafiʿi School, but 
also a sanctuary for politically involved ʿulama from Southeast Asia who were 
sent into exile when their societies were colonised by Europeans (e.g., Ahmad 
Muhammad Zain al-Fatani from Patani and Abdul Qadir al-Mandili, described 
below). In 1800, the Dutch East Indies colony was established in Indonesia, 
and in 1824 the Anglo-Dutch Treaty was concluded. As a result of this treaty, 
the British expanded their rule in the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch concen-
trated their administration in the East Indies.15 In 1826, Britain and Thailand, 
a significant local power, agreed to the first treaty concerning the division of the 
Malay Peninsula (the Burney Treaty); and after long confrontation and nego-
tiations, most of the Malay kingdoms in the Malay Peninsula came under the 
protection of the British, with the exception of the Sultanate of Patani which 
was annexed to Thailand in 1908.16 The rapid increase in the Southeast Asian 
Muslim population in Mecca, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, was partly caused by the political incursions of non-Muslim forces 
into Muslim lands, especially Patani in southern Thailand and some parts of 
Indonesia. Patani ʿulama would thus play a leading role in educating Southeast 
Asian Muslims in Mecca.17 At the same time, this increase in the number 
of Southeast Asian Muslims in Mecca was also a product of the technologi-
cal innovations brought by the Europeans, especially the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869. Steamships promoted the emigration of Arabs – especially from 
Hadramaut in Yemen to Southeast Asia – as well as the emigration of Southeast 
Asian Muslims to Mecca. Those who migrated to the Middle East for Islamic 
education played an important role in the development of Islamic learning in 
Southeast Asia, especially in the Malay Peninsula.
Ahmad Muhammad Zain al-Fatani (1856–1908) was a Patani ʿālim who lived 
in Mecca and taught many students from Southeast Asia.18 His disciples from 
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Kelantan, such as Muhammad Yusuf Ahmad (known as Tok Kenali), would go 
on to play crucial roles in Islamic education in their homeland.19 Ahmad al-Fa-
tani’s influence was exerted not only through his students, however, but also, and 
equally, through his publications. In collaboration with the Ottoman govern-
ment, he established a publishing house, Maktab al-Turki Majdiyya al-ʿUthmani-
yya, in Mecca. He also established his own private publication enterprise, Maktab 
Fataniyya, through which he edited and published Islamic literature in Malay and 
Arabic, both classic manuscripts and contemporary writings including his own, 
as well as the works of the most prominent scholar from Patani, Daud ʿAbdullah 
al-Fatani. Printed texts were imported to the Malay Peninsula and used as text-
books in local Islamic boarding schools (pondok; pl. pondok-pondok). Although 
Singapore and Penang also later became centres for Islamic publishing, Mecca 
was the main supplier of printed Islamic texts in Malay (kitāb jāwı̄) until the early 
twentieth century.20 Another important Southeast Asian ʿālim living in exile 
was Abdul Qadir al-Mandili, from Sumatra. Abdul Qadir migrated to Mecca after 
studying in Kedah, the northern region of the Malay Peninsula. At the same time 
as he educated Southeast Asian Muslims in his school in Mecca, he also criticised 
British and Dutch colonisation through his publications and fatwas.21
Until the early twentieth century, it was commonplace for Southeast Asian 
Muslims to request fatwas from the ʿulama in Mecca. The oldest printed col-
lection of fatwas issued for Muslims in Southeast Asia is Muhimmat al Nafaʾis 
fi Bayan Asʾilah al-Hadith, which was published by Maktab al-Turki Majdiyya 
al-ʿUthmaniyya. The fatwas in this collection were issued mainly by a mufti of 
the Shafiʿi School in Mecca, Ahmad ibn Zaini Dahlan (1817–86).22 There are 
also two more collections by Ahmad al-Fatani among the other printed collec-
tions of fatwas for Southeast Asian Muslims: al-Fatawa al-Fataniyya and Fatawa 
Binatang Hidup Dua Alam. These fatwa collections were published around the 
end of the nineteenth century or early in the twentieth century.
The collection in al-Fatawa al-Fataniyya consists primarily of answers to ques-
tions from Muslims in Southeast Asia in the period of transition that character-
ised the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The collection included 
answers on new problems faced by East Asian Muslims due to the consequences 
of colonial policies – many questions, for example, focused on the classifica-
tion of non-Muslim residents – whether they are dhimmı̄ (protected people, 
non-Muslims under the protection of Muslim governance), potential dhimmı̄ or 
idolatrous non-believers. The fatwas also answered questions regarding measures 
to be applied in engaging in social relations with them. The late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries brought a period of social change and modernisation to 
Southeast Asia. In the Muslim society of the Malay Peninsula, which fell within 
the scope of the protection treaty signed with the British, modernisation dis-
played peculiar features. Although the process of modernisation was dependent 
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on technological innovations such as transportation, communication and print-
ing, just as it was in other regions, the most prominent phenomenon here was 
the flow of non-Muslim labourers such as Chinese and Indians, and the rapid 
expansion of their presence in socio-economic terms.
Within Muslim communities in East Asia, ʿulama were historically consid-
ered to be experts on social problems and were required to issue appropriate 
fatwas based on their Islamic knowledge. ʿUlama were trusted not only because 
of their expertise in shariʿa, but also because of their overseas experiences. 
Although the ʿulama had limited experience of Europe, they knew significantly 
more about relatively modernised Muslim nations such as India, Turkey and 
Egypt. They were expected to find solutions to modern problems based on their 
knowledge of similar phenomena in other Muslim contexts, and this was espe-
cially the case for those ʿulama with experience of other Muslim societies.
In addition to these developments, another crucial issue for the region’s 
Muslims during this period was the rise of Sufi orders such as Ahmadiyya-
Idrisiyya in the Malay Peninsula. Questions and responses concerning these 
real-life everyday issues feature prominently in al-Fatani’s fatwa collection. 
Al-Fatani’s answers were mostly based on the traditional Shafiʿi School, and 
the citations upon which he based his arguments referred to the Qurʾan, hadith 
and Shafiʿi texts, especially those from Ibn Hajar al-Haythami. The following 
fatwa, for instance, was first published in Singapore in 1908.23
Question 44:
What is your opinion on kuffār [infidels] such as the Siam, Chinese, Kuci 
[from the southern area in Vietnam], Batak [an ethnicity in Sumatra], or 
Pangan [aboriginal residents in forests]? What name is appropriate for them? 
Is it permissible for us to buy their daughters, and make them mistresses 
[gundik] both in the case when they are purchased from their parents and in 
the case when they are purchased from other people? Under what conditions 
may they be taken out of their country? What is the rule for such an action? 
We request your answer based on shariʿa.
Answer 44:
Kuffār in Siam and China, along with kuffār in Cambodia and Kuci, are called 
idolatrous unbelievers [kuffār watanı̄yı̄n], because I heard that they worship 
idols. There are two categories among groups such as the Batak and Pangan.
1st Category: If they do not embrace Islam, although the call of Islam has 
already reached them, their disbelief [kufr] is certain. If they worship idols or 
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do not believe known [maʿarūfat] religions, they are man lā dı̄n lahu [people 
without religion].
2nd Category: If the call of Islam does not yet reach them, and they do not 
believe in Judaism, Christianity, or similar religions, and if they are related 
to ahl al-fatra [people in a period without a prophet], they are not categorised 
as disbelievers.
 All of the kuffār mentioned above are called h∙arbı̄yūn [people of dār al-h∙arb, 
the abode of war], as long as they do not have our leaders [al-h∙all wa al-ʿaqd] 
among them [e.g., there are no diplomatic residences nearby] and they do not 
have a treaty of protection [ʿaqd dhimma] or a treaty of peace [ʿaqd amān].
If they do not have Muslim captives [ası̄r] or a peace treaty with us, it is per-
missible for us to buy their children. It is permissible to buy children, except 
from their parents, outside of their country or in a situation without guaran-
teed security, as in the cases of smuggling and unprotected entry.
 If we enter their country under their guarantee of security, any actions 
prohibited by them, for example, theft of their assets, murder and purchase of 
their children after prohibition by their leaders, are impermissible. Purchase 
of children from their parents is also prohibited. In such cases, children 
are purchased forcibly with the intention of possession [qas∙ad tamalluk]. 
Possession of acquisitions in their country is only permissible when entry 
occurred without guarantee of security [taʾamı̄n].
 To make purchased daughters mistresses [pergundik] is permissible after 
they embrace Islam, because Muslims may only have intercourse [wat∙ʾ] with 
non-Jewish or non-Christian [bukan kitābı̄ya] female slaves [amah] if Islam is 
embraced by the slave.
 Non-purchased acquisitions obtained by permissible means [e.g., captives 
in war] may only be possessed after takhmı̄s [obligatory payment of 20 per cent 
of booty to the ruler]. To take daughters out of their country is not a sufficient 
condition for making them a mistress. Allah knows best.24
Ahmad al-Fatani issued the above fatwa in response to a question concerning 
the best way to respond to the flow of non-Muslims into the Malay Peninsula. 
Ahmad al-Fatani classified all non-Muslim newcomers as idolatrous non- 
believers (kuffār watanı̄yı̄n), except for ahl al-fatra (those who are ignorant 
of Allah’s message). Therefore, they were not considered dhimmı̄ (protected 
people, non-Muslims under the protection of Muslim governance) or potential 
dhimmı̄.
In another fatwa, Ahmad al-Fatani strictly regulated commercial transac-
tions with non-Muslims. In a fatwa first published in Singapore in 1908, and 
in line with Ibn Hajar’s al-Fatawa al-Kubra al-Fiqhiyya ʿala al-Madhhab al-Imam 
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al-Shafiʿi, Ahmad al-Fatani banned the rental of property to non-Muslims if they 
could be expected to commit sins therein such as idolatry and selling alcohol.25
Question 50:
A person built a house and lent it to a kāfir [infidel] who exploited it as a shop. 
The kāfir sold permissible goods such as cloth. He also sold impermissible 
goods such as alcohol. He placed idols in the house and worshipped them 
according to Chinese custom. What is the rule for such an action? Is it per-
missible to lend it [the house]? If it is not permissible, what is the best way to 
make lending permissible?
Answer 50:
If the Muslim, the owner of the house, gathers or infers that the tenant sells 
alcohol or worships idols, it is impermissible for the owner to lend it to the 
tenant, whether the tenant is Muslim or kāfir or kāfir h∙arbı̄ [infidel of the 
abode of war, or non-Muslim out of Muslim governance], because lending 
means participation in sin without indispensability [darūrāt].
 In a fatwa collection that prohibits [h∙aram] guiding a kāfir who has lost his 
way to a place of idolatrous worship, Ibn Hajar explains that such assisting is a 
very great sin. In addition, lending is conditional. It is impermissible to lend, 
if the property lent does not bring good results. Therefore, jurists [fuqahā] 
explain [men-tas∙rı̄h∙ ] that it is impermissible to employ a worker for convey-
ance of alcohol, or to borrow female slaves to have intercourse [di-wat∙ʾ], and 
other similar sins are also impermissible.
 The way to avoid such lending is to contract between the owner of the 
house and a tenant in front of witnesses. The better way is to contract in front 
of a judge [h∙akı̄m] and to agree on conditions such as the prohibition of selling 
alcohol and pork, and the prohibition of setting idols and worshipping them. 
If the tenant agrees to the contract, and the owner trusts in the fulfilment of 
the contract by the tenant, it is permissible to lend the shop to him. Allah 
knows the best.26
Ahmad al-Fatani based these fatwas entirely on the theories of the Shafiʿi 
School rather than responding to the changing conditions of life in Singapore. 
This meant that by the early twentieth century, many of his fatwas had effec-
tively become inapplicable to life in the Malay Peninsula. Non-Muslims, espe-
cially the Chinese, had become a significant economic force in the peninsula, 
and as such they were essential for the British economy and required even by 
Malay establishments. Under such conditions, Malay Muslims would suffer seri-
ous economic hardship if they followed Ahmad al-Fatani’s fatwa. This lack of 
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relevance of the fatwas issued by the Shafiʿi scholars based in Mecca is one of 
the factors that led to a demand for an alternative interpretation of shariʿa on 
the social issues faced by Muslims in the Malay Peninsula.
The establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1924 and rise of 
Wahhabism had a further devastating impact on the Southeast Asian ʿulama 
based in Mecca. The rise of these new Islamic thinkers and their control over 
Mecca made the Southeast Asian Muslims uneasy. Another shocking incident 
was the Wahhabis’ killing of ʿAbd Allah al-Zawawi (1850–1924), the Shafiʿi 
mufti in Mecca at that time. Before his appointment as the mufti in Mecca, he 
had served as the Mufti of Pontianak in Kalimantan (Borneo) Island: he was 
therefore well known and widely adored by Southeast Asian Muslims. Although 
his death was accidental,27 it nevertheless drove hundreds of Southeast Asian 
Muslims to flee Mecca. About 150 Muslims arrived in Singapore and spread 
news of the incident throughout the Malay Peninsula.28 These developments 
markedly reduced the importance of Mecca as the gathering place for the 
 Southeast Asian ʿulama.
From Mecca to Cairo: The Influence on Fiqh Methodology
After the acceptance of the first Malay student at al-Azhar in the 1870s,29 the 
number of Malays enrolled there increased slowly but steadily. Dodge claims 
that in 1902 there were only seven jāwı̄ students among the 645 foreign stu-
dents at al-Azhar;30 according to Roff, in 1919 there were “fifty or sixty students 
in Cairo from Indonesia (mostly West Sumatra), with perhaps an additional 
twenty from Peninsula Malaya and Southern Thailand”, and by 1925 there were 
at least 200 Southeast Asian students there. Roff supposes that the main cause 
of this increase in the 1920s was the improvement in rubber prices and the cor-
responding growth in parental cash incomes that occurred towards the middle 
of the decade.31
Although the increased number of Southeast Asian Muslims at al-Azhar 
certainly boosted its influence in the region, the influential reformist Muslim 
magazine al-Manar, published by Rashid Rida, also had a significant impact in 
shaping the Islamic discourse in East Asia in the early twentieth century. The 
reformism advocated by Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida has often been 
described as Salafi due to their emphasis on direct reference to the Qurʾan and 
hadith as sources (dalı̄l), and rejection of the four madhāhib, even though their 
approach was very different to that of Wahhabi Salafism. This emphasis on 
going back to direct references to the Qurʾan and hadith rather than strictly 
following one madhhab appealed to certain groups of ʿulama in Southeast Asia, 
who saw in this methodology a stronger possibility of finding real-life solutions 
than taqlı̄d of the Shafiʿi School.
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Table 7.1 Chronological table of events in the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt and 
Southeast Asia
Arabian Peninsula Egypt Southeast Asia
1800 Establishment of the 
Dutch East Indies
1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty
1831–2 Rebellion against 
Thailand in Patani
1869 The opening of the 
Suez Canal
1892 The publication of 
Muhimmat al-Nafaʾis 
fı̄ Bayan Asʾilah 
al-Hadith
1898 The launch of 
al-Manar
1906–8 The launch of 
al-Imam
1908 The fall of the 
Sultanate of Patani
1915 The establishment 
of the Majlis Agama 
Islam in Kelantan




1922 The founding of 
the kingdom of 
Egypt
1918 The launch of 
Pengasuh
1924 The occupation of 
Mecca by Wahhabis
1928 The establishment 
of the Muslim 
Brotherhood
1934 The establishment 
of Madrasa Dar 
al-ʿUlum al-Diniyya 
1952 The Egyptian 
Revolution by the 
Free Officers
1945 The Indonesian 
declaration of 
independence
1961 The establishment 
of the Islamic 
University of 
Medina
1957 The establishment 
of the Federation of 
Malaya
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From 1906 to 1908, al-Azhar-educated ʿulama such as Muhammad Tahir 
Jalaluddin (1869–1956)32 and others published a pioneering magazine named 
al-Imam. These ʿ ulama were based in Singapore and promoted reformist thought 
in Southeast Asia. Published weekly in its first year and monthly in the second, 
al-Imam had the largest circulation ever attained by a Malay journal prior to the 
Second World War. At its height, 5,000 copies were circulated in Southeast 
Asia every month. Many of the articles in al-Imam were either an elaboration 
or a translation of articles taken from al-Manar.33 The reformist thought of 
ʿAbduh and Rida made major inroads into Southeast Asia and became widely 
accepted.34
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Cairo came to be considered the 
centre of reformism based on the Salafi methodology. More and more Malay stu-
dents were attracted there, leading some Malay rulers to express concerns about 
“views which are not desirable from the point of view of the Government”35 
spreading to East Asia from Egypt. While the ʿulama involved in the publication 
of al-Imam were promoting the Salafi methodology within East Asia, proponents 
of the Shafiʿi School were still prevalent in the northeastern region of the Malay 
Peninsula, especially in Kelantan. In Kelantan, disciples of Ahmad al-Fatani 
(e.g., Tok Kenali and Abdus Samad bin Muhammad Shalih al-Kelantani, known 
as Tuan Tabal) were influential in administration and education. In fatwa col-
umns in Pengusah (1918–), a magazine published by Majlis Agama Islam Kelantan, 
the main authoritative sources for shariʿa interpretation were the Shafiʿi School 
classics, especially Ibn Hajar al-Haythami, Sharbini, al-Qastalani and al-Mali-
bari. The contentions of the following fatwa, issued by the Majlis Agama Islam 
Kelantan and published in Pengasuh in 1921, were, for example, entirely based on 
the generally accepted theories of the Shafiʿi School. Responding to a question 
that suggests a slightly anti-Sufi bent on the part of the interlocutor, the fatwa 
defends Sufism (tas∙awwuf) and the tradition of the Shafiʿi School:
Question:
From Mr Daud bin Hajj Muhammad Nor in Kajang, Selangor, 14.5 batu [14.5 
miles] from Kuala Lumpur
1. Is Tarsih36 a book written by a Sufi ʿālim or the ʿālim of fiqh and hadith? If 
the book contains words written by a Sufi ʿālim and unsuited to the rules of 
Islam, may I follow and practice his texts?
2. According to page 182 of Minhat al-Qarib al-Mujib, as described by Ibn 
Hajar in Tuhfah,37 a Prophet’s hadith cited on page 238 of chapter 3 of Mugni 
Khatib Sharbini,38 and an explanation by Nawawi in Sharh Muslim,39 it is 
written that angels do not bring grace to a house that displays the figure of 
an animal.
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Answer:
1. Tarsih is a book of fiqh. You can follow it, because the contents of the book 
are based not only on the author’s ijtihād but also on texts by ʿ ulama and other 
famous books. In addition to that, Tarsih has been accepted by contemporary 
ʿulama.
2. The contents can be characterised as words of ʿulama in fiqh. The parts 
containing discourse on tas∙awwuf can be characterised as words of ʿulama in 
the Sufi path.
3. The author was well versed in fiqh, Sufi thought and other similar realms. He 
was faithful and taught Sufi teaching in the Masjid al-Haram. Contemporary 
ʿulama participated in his lectures. By these facts, we can know the superior-
ity and rightness of the author.
4. If there are words written by Sufi ʿulama which are unsuitable to rules of 
Islamic law, you must not follow them. However, only the companions of a 
Sufi can judge whether the words are unsuitable or not. People like us are not 
allowed to judge that they are unsuitable. We just follow words accepted by 
famous ʿulama.
5. It has been written that ʿulama admitted the possession of goods with 
animal figures on page 184 of Minhat al-Qarib. “And among ʿulama there is 
an opinion that ‘goods of animal figures’ means figures drawn on dishes etc.” 
Ibn Hajar wrote “Figures which are not h∙aram are carriable” in Tuhfah. Please 
read carefully. However, Minhat al-Qarib did not mention the four different 
opinions. In Tarsih, the author introduced words by al-Qastalani40 concern-
ing this problem. Therefore, we can say Tarsih is more solid than other books.
6. The author of Minhat al-Qarib explained that there are various interpreta-
tions of the phrase “angels do not bring grace to a house that displays the figure 
of an animal”. Some people interpret this to mean that angels do not bring 
grace to houses which place h∙aram ones among figures of animals. However, 
other people think there is no room for compromise on this principle. Page 
184 of Minhat al-Qarib, Tuhfah, and Bujayrimi41 should be referred to.42
In contrast to Pengasuh, which was published in Kelantan, the fatwa columns 
published in the Singapore-based al-Imam were based entirely on Salafi method-
ology. Some fatwas in al-Imam criticised Sufi orders. The following fatwa provides 
an example of such criticism and was published as an article in al-Imam in 1908:
Question: From Abbas Haj Abdul Rahman, Rawa, Penang
1. During a seloka [suluk, concentrated training in a Sufi order for certain 
period] a person asked his master for permission to visit his sick mother. 
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However, the person wasn’t allowed to visit his mother until after she passed 
away.
2. A lady’s husband became sick during [the period] she was in seloka. She 
requested her master’s permission to meet her husband. However, she was not 
allowed to meet him until after he passed away.
3. Parents hoped to visit their child during the period of seloka; however, the 
child’s master did not allow him to meet his parents.
4. Is it recommended in Islam to practice seloka even if practitioners do not 
have knowledge on the proper way and the necessary conditions for prayer?
Answers to Four Questions:
There are people who hold off meeting with parents, husbands, wives and 
other family members because they are in the situation of seloka. It is not 
recommended in the shariʿa of Islam. If you think something is wrong in the 
sacred shariʿa of Islam, the wrong is done only by lazy and ignorant people 
in seloka. Therefore, we must teach them that they must not be lazy, because 
they need to get a livelihood and the real seloka and Sufi order of the reli-
gion lead people to success in this world and the hereafter. The seloka you 
mentioned in your question is “the pulling and binding” [tarik ikat, restriction 
under the master], not a Sufi order [tariqa].
 On matters like rules of prayer and the ways of purification, which are 
written in small books [kitāb], you should ask knowledgeable people in your 
district. Please ask al-Imam about more difficult matters and problems for 
which you cannot find explanations.43
The Salafi methodology of direct reference to the Qurʾan and hadith, its reluc-
tance to follow traditional madhāhib as an authority in jurisprudence and its 
unfavourable outlook towards Sufism led to the development of Salafi method-
ology in fiqh-influenced Sufi activities in Southeast Asia.44 However, the imple-
mentation of Salafi methodology was not limited to discourse on Sufism: the 
period of transition and modernisation demanded further innovations in Islamic 
jurisprudence. During this period, as Ahmad al-Fatani’s two fatwas regarding 
non-Muslims revealed, the traditional Shafiʿi School was often hard to apply. In 
the generally accepted opinions of the Shafiʿi School, only Christians and Jews 
could be dhimmı ̄and coexist in the dār al-Islām (abode of Islam). Here, then, 
the Salafi methodology was more suitable for innovative jurisprudence or ijti-
hād. However, the innovative jurisprudence regarding classifying non-Muslims 
should not only be considered the result of the application of Salafi methodol-
ogy; it must also be noted that political and economic adjustments had facili-
tated such innovative interpretations of the position of non-Muslims.
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A 1955 fatwa by the Mufti of Terengganu, on political coalitions with 
non-Muslims, justified the ruling coalition formed by the United Malays 
National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association 
(MCA). By the mid-twentieth century, classification of non-Muslims as kuffār 
watanı̄yı̄n or ḥarbı̄yūn had disappeared. Even the classification of non-Muslims 
as dhimmı̄ was considered politically incorrect after the 1960s. In the fatwa, 
non-Muslims in the Federation of Malaya were referred to as kāfir dhimmı̄ 
without any further explanation. It was said that because of the mas∙lah∙ah, or 
the public welfare, realised through the coalition, the coalition satisfied the 
objective of shariʿa.45
Salafi methodology was able to provide innovative ways of meeting the 
demands of the age through direct reference to the Qurʾan and hadith; indeed, 
the flexibility of the Salafi methodology was often considered its most innova-
tive dimension. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, when modern 
political systems attempted to involve Islamic authority in government, Salafi 
methodology was frequently applied in fatwas issued by pro-government ʿulama.
Salafi Methodology and the Formation of the Official Fatwa 
Institutions in the Malay Peninsula
The institutionalisation of Islamic affairs in the Malay Peninsula can be traced 
back to the 1874 Pangkor Engagement, signed between the Malay ruler in Perak 
and the British. Article 6 of the treaty declared that the Malay ruler must follow 
a British official called the Resident, and only Islamic affairs and Malay customs 
remained under the jurisdiction of the Malay ruler.46 As similar treaties were 
negotiated between other Malay rulers and the British, by the 1920s the Malay 
rulers in each state had reinforced their jurisdiction over Islamic affairs through 
the establishment of the Majlis Agama Islam (the supreme body of Islamic 
administration). Since the first establishment of the Majlis Agama Islam, in 
Kelantan in 1915, fatwas and other Islamic affairs such as education, zakat, insti-
tutions such as mosques, awqāf, family law, the shariʿa court, penal enactments 
and doctrinal interpretation had come under the authority of sultans and state 
governments.
In Kelantan, a notice to regulate issuance of fatwas was issued by the Majlis 
Agama Islam in 1917. The notice forbade the issuance of fatwas without the 
approval of the Majlis Agama Islam, and provided that all fatwas issued to 
followers of the Shafiʿi School must conform to generally accepted opinions of 
that school.47 In 1918, the Meshuarat Ulama (ʿUlama Council) was established 
as an organ for issuing fatwas under the Majlis Agama Islam of Kelantan (since 
renamed the Jemaah Ulama).48 In 1952, the state government of Selangor 
passed the Enakmen Pentadbiran Undang-Undang Islam (Administration of 
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the Muslim Law Enactment), the basic law underpinning the Islamic admin-
istration and judiciary. This enactment provided for the appointment of the 
mufti by the sultan and the formation of a Fatwa Committee under the Majlis 
Agama Islam, while also detailing the process of issuing fatwas and requiring the 
observance of the generally accepted opinions of the Shafiʿi School. In addition, 
the enactment prescribed that all Muslims in Selangor must follow the fatwas 
announced in an official gazette. The law also established a penalty for Muslims 
who defied or denigrated fatwas, authorised Islamic teachers, Islamic teaching 
and the madhhab or the religion of Islam (this penalty was a fine not exceeding 
500 ringgit, imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both). Similar 
enactments were also legislated in other states, including Malacca (1959), Pulau 
Pinang (1959), Negeri Sembilan (1960), Kedah (1962), Perlis (1964) and Perak 
(1965).49
By the middle of the twentieth century, state governments in the Malay 
Peninsula had developed a system to monopolise fatwas, which led to Malay 
Muslims requesting fatwas from inland ʿulama and facilitated the localisation of 
fatwa and shariʿa interpretation.50
The “Islamisation policy”,51 initiated in the 1970s, boosted the number of 
Malaysian students studying at al-Azhar (see Chapter 8). One of the reasons 
why al-Azhar could attract so many Malaysians was that since the 1950s it had 
transformed itself into a modern university that conferred degrees on its gradu-
ates. As a result of the bureaucratisation of Islamic administration in Malaysia, 
degree certification became indispensable for working in a variety of jobs, 
including the Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM; Islamic Development 
Agency)52 of the federal government, the Majlis Agama Islam in each state, and 
religious schools all over the country. By the end of the 1970s, there were over 
3,000 Malaysian students enrolled at al-Azhar.
The institutionalisation of shariʿa interpretation by the government and the 
rise of Salafi methodology occurred in the Malay Peninsula almost simultane-
ously with the expansion of the number of Malay students at al-Azhar University. 
The innovative characteristic of Salafi methodology – its flexibility – was suit-
able for issuing fatwas that favoured the policies of the federal government.53 
In particular, policies on ethnic relations and economic development required 
justification via Islamic jurisprudence. In the 1950s and 1960s, an  ʿ ulama-based 
opposition party, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (the party was later renamed 
the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), the Islamic Party of Malaysia) criticised 
the ruling coalition (the Alliance), which consisted of Muslims, Chinese and 
Indians. The opposition party asserted that the Federation of Malaya under 
the Alliance was not an Islamic state, because they believed the coalition was 
dominated by non-Muslims.54 The Majlis Agama Islam in Terengganu contra-
dicted the assertions of the opposition party by issuing a fatwa in 1963. The 
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fatwa, which had official status, justified collaboration with non-Muslims such 
as Buddhists and Hindus without mentioning the theories of the Shafiʿi School. 
As the basis for this justification it cited a hadith and adopted the concept of 
the public interest.
The following excerpt is from a fatwa issued by Majlis Agama Islam 
Terengganu in 1955, the year in which UMNO and MCA formed the Alliance 
for the Federal Legislative Council Election (the first national-level election 
in the Malay Peninsula). PAS criticised the Alliance for its collaboration with 
non-Muslims, while, in the fatwa, Majlis Agama Islam Terengganu defended 
the formation of the Alliance:
Question:
. . .
(2) Is it permissible in Islam to ally with non-Muslims, for example, the 
Alliance of UMNO and MCA?




(2) The alliance with non-Muslims such as the Alliance of UMNO and 
MCA is permissible, because it will bring benefit to the residents of this 
country.
(3) Because non-Muslims in this country are loyal to the state law and their 
religions do not oppose Muslims, they are kāfir dhimmı̄ [non-Muslims under 
protection]. Islam does not prohibit cooperation with such kāfir dhimmı̄ 
nor voting for non-Muslim candidates for state legislative councils, because 
all the nations are under just one ruling system, the democracy, and the 
democracy recommends respect for creeds and religions. Non-Muslims can 
be elected as members of the state legislative councils, because they are ahl 
al-dhimma [people under protection] and have the same rights as Muslims. 
They can be elected because their experiences and abilities can make a con-
tribution to all of this country through cooperation.55
This official fatwa mentioned no classical theory of the Shafiʿi School. It jus-
tified the governmental policy by reference to public benefit. In addition to 
the Salafi methodology, the reference to the concept of the public interest, 
or mas∙laḥah, emerged as another influential methodology of fiqh in Malaysia 
after the 1960s. Mas∙laḥah is one of the maqās∙id al-sharı̄ʿa, or the jurisprudential 
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objectives of shariʿa. Many official fatwas issued by Majlis Agama Islam and 
the National Fatwa Committee after the 1960s mentioned maqās∙id al-sharı̄ʿa 
as a source of jurisprudence. In particular, the concept of mas∙laḥah was men-
tioned frequently as the ground for fatwas in line with government policies on 
issues such as economic development. The fiqh methodology based on maqās∙id 
al-sharı̄ʿa was also disseminated in Malaysia by graduates of al-Azhar, and the 
increase in the number of official fatwas which referred to the concept indicates 
the expansion of the influence of Azhari graduates in Islamic administration in 
Malaysia.
In the 1950s and 1960s the ruling Alliance continued to be successful in 
gaining an elected majority in parliament, while PAS continued to criticise the 
coalition and the collaboration it embodied between UMNO and non-Muslims. 
To underscore the injustice it perceived in UMNO’s actions from the Islamic 
perspective, PAS insisted that UMNO members had become turncoats through 
their collaboration with non-Muslims, and labelled the UMNO members kuffār, 
or non-believers, according to a text issued by ʿAbdul Qadir Muttalib al-Man-
dili.56 In 1963, the Majlis Agama Islam Terengganu again issued an official fatwa 
designed to rebut the denunciations issuing from PAS, and from which the 
following extract is drawn:
Question:
What is the regulation on accusing another Muslim of being kāfir?
Answer:
1. The religion of Islam prohibits Muslims from accusing another Muslim 
of being kāfir, because according to a hadith narrated by Abu Zarrah [a 
companion of the Prophet Muhammad] recorded in Sahih Bukhari and Sahih 
Imam Muslim [both among the most authoritative hadith collections], the 
messenger of Allah asserted that somebody who accuses another of being fası̄q 
[disbeliever] or kāfir himself becomes fası̄q or kāfir, if the accusation is wrong. 
All the ʿulama in Islam have arrived at a consensus that such an action is 
a major sin, albeit not one of the biggest sins, because the accuser himself 
becomes kāfir as a result of a wrong action. . . .
2. The issue of whether it is permissible to vote for non-Muslims as members 
of parliament is not a religious matter. In the states of Malaysia, the regu-
lations of elections are accepted by all the political organisations and are 
fitting for the objectives of the Federal Constitution of the Malay land. In 
the Constitution, either Muslim or not, all the citizens are admitted to have 
the same rights and duties under the state law, if they are loyal to the state 
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law and follow it. The Constitution delegates authority on Islamic affairs to 
the sultans.
 In the light of these facts, we cannot overlook how large is the maslihat 
am [public interest] in the election of non-Muslim members of Parliament. 
Therefore, from the viewpoint of shariʿa, it is permissible for Muslims to vote 
for non-Muslims who are admitted as citizens under the conditions of the 
Constitution.57
This official fatwa cited hadith as the basis for its justification; there was no 
mention of the classical theory of the Shafiʿi School, and the concept of the 
public interest was also deployed. This fatwa shows that by the 1960s the official 
institutions of the Islamic administration were no longer bound by the Shafiʿi 
School. Most of the official fatwas were based on the Salafi methodology and 
turned on direct references to the Qurʾan and hadith, as well as the concept of 
maqās∙id al-sharı̄ʿa. This transition in the methodology for shariʿa interpretation 
brought with it new flexibility, and in official fatwas this flexibility was applied 
mainly to the justification of government policies such as inter-ethnic coopera-
tion and economic development.58
Islam is declared “the Religion of the Federation” in Article 3 of the Malaysian 
Federal Constitution. The provision of Islam as the official religion of state, and 
shariʿa as the main source of legislation, can be found in the constitutions of 
many Muslim countries, including Egypt. However, Malaysia has the peculiarity 
that the Malay ruler is designated as “the Head of the Religion of Islam” in the 
Federal Constitution (Article 3), and also that it provides for the unlimited 
authority of rulers, and of the Majlis Agama Islam under those rulers, regarding 
Islamic affairs. As a result of the governmental authority over Islamic affairs, 
fatwas have been strictly controlled by the government; and, historically speak-
ing, such unlimited authority over fatwas has been very rare in the Muslim 
world. Malaysia is peculiar even within Southeast Asia, and contrasts with 
Indonesia where there are Muslim organisations with millions of members – 
such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah59 – but no formal state control. 
The other characteristic of Malaysia is that it has the highest number of gradu-
ates from al-Azhar University, and their influence is manifest in administration, 
education and fiqh methodology. This phenomenon is primarily the result of the 
government’s promotion of study at al-Azhar.
Conclusion
The period of domination of the Shafiʿi School in Southeast Asia came to an 
end after the occupation of Mecca by Wahhabis in 1924; although the Shafiʿi 
tradition has remained influential in some institutions such as the Majlis Agama 
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Islam in Kelantan, it no longer exercises a monopoly on the interpretation 
of shariʿa. Underpinning the spread of the Salafi trend, we may observe the 
increasing institutionalisation of the Islamic administrative organisations as a 
part of the modernisation of governance in Southeast Asia – the establishment 
of the official religious authorities such as Majlis Agama Islam in the Malay 
Peninsula is just one example of this. Such religious authorities required a flexi-
ble form of shariʿa jurisprudential interpretation in order to justify government 
policies. In official institutions such as the Fatwa Committee under the Majlis 
Agama Islam, the Salafi methodology was implemented because of its flexibility 
and capacity for innovation. The transition of the centre of Islamic learning 
from Mecca to Cairo laid the foundations for the absorption of Islamic jurispru-
dence into the state system, and led to a form of Islamic jurisprudence that was 
in line with the Malaysian government’s projects for social engineering. This 
example shows how, historically, southeast Asian Muslims have absorbed the 
intellectual movements in the learning centres in the Middle East and adjusted 
them for their own benefit.
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Chapter 8
“Azharisation” of ʿUlama Training in Malaysia
Hiroko Kushimoto
If one wishes to understand the global influence of al-Azhar, few countries 
present a better case study than Malaysia. Of Egypt’s approximately 11,000 
Malaysian students, al-Azhar University hosts more than 4,000 in the depart-
ments of Religious Studies and Arabic Studies alone.1 The number of Malaysian 
students at al-Azhar surpasses even the 3,239 Indonesian students who study 
there, and the implications of this become more pronounced when one consid-
ers the population size of each country: Malaysia has only 17.3 million Muslims, 
comprising 61.3 per cent of the country’s population,2 while Indonesia has the 
largest Muslim population of any country, 177 million.3 The difference is tenfold.
The reasons for the popularity of al-Azhar among Malaysian students become 
apparent when one looks at the Malaysian system of ʿ ulama training.4 Malaysian 
ʿulama are trained through a religious school system that is separate from the 
national system, and the outstanding feature of these religious schools is that 
the religious studies and Arabic curriculums follow the system at al-Azhar. The 
textbooks are imported from al-Azhar and reprinted in Malaysia; the certifica-
tion given upon passing the final examination (called STAM)5 for the al-Azhar 
curriculum is recognised upon entrance to undergraduate courses at al-Azhar;6 
and after the STAM examination, Malaysian students who wish to continue 
their study at al-Azhar are provided with orientation information by the state 
religious office and sent in groups to Egypt. Most of the students receive schol-
arships from the various religious bodies within their respective states,7 and the 
majority live together in hostels provided by the state religious offices. These 
official forms of support make their lives at al-Azhar quite comfortable.
This chapter attempts to provide answers to two broad clusters of questions. 
The first cluster concerns why Malaysia developed an education system that 
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draws so heavily upon al-Azhar, and why there is such extensive official support 
for sending students there. The second cluster concerns what it means for indi-
vidual students to study at al-Azhar, and how the relationship with al-Azhar is 
viewed by Malaysian society. In response to the first cluster of questions, this 
chapter shows how the adoption of the al-Azhar curriculum in the nation’s 
religious education system was the result of the efforts both of individual ʿulama 
and local communities. After Malaysian independence in 1957, however, the 
state governments became involved in the religious schools, and subsequently 
the federal government also strengthened its role in their administration and in 
sending students to al-Azhar. Two factors in particular were responsible for this 
growth of support for al-Azhar education at the community, ʿulama and govern-
mental levels: first, the complicated social and educational context of Muslims 
in multi-ethnic Malaya (Malaysia); and, secondly, the context of an Islamic 
resurgence in Malaysia after the 1970s that stressed the political importance of 
Islamic education.
As for what it means to study there, the chapter shows that the increased 
access to al-Azhar has dramatically changed the dividends that students can 
draw on their return from Egypt. In the 1960s, studying at al-Azhar was a rare 
occurrence, and precisely because they were so rare, the generation of Malaysian 
students who studied there went on to play important roles both in Islamic 
organisations and the government in the 1970s. However, as a result of the 
rapid increase in their number, the graduates of al-Azhar now face difficulties in 
finding even rather basic jobs such as being a religious teacher in an elementary 
school. From the 1960s to the 2010s, what it has meant to study at al-Azhar has 
undergone significant change, both at the level of the individual and for society.
The first section of this chapter explains the process of “Azharisation” expe-
rienced by the Malaysian religious education system, from its beginnings in 
individual efforts in the 1910s, up to the federal involvement of the 2000s. The 
second section describes the transformation of the individual experience of stud-
ying at al-Azhar, comparing different generations of Malaysian students in terms 
of their reasons for studying at al-Azhar, their lives in Egypt, and the roles they 
played upon returning to Malaysia. In the conclusion, the chapter analyses the 
direct and indirect results of Azharisation. The evidence in this chapter is based 
on fieldwork, interviews and archival research conducted in the state of Kedah 
in the northern Malay Peninsula from March 2006 to July 2008, and in Kuala 
Lumpur from July 2008 to March 2011.
The “Azharisation” of Malaysian Institutions of ʿUlama Training
The early Malay students of Islam regarded Mecca as the climax of their jour-
ney for knowledge, and this situation endured for centuries (see Chapter 7 for 
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details). Students from the Malay Peninsula would learn the basics of Islam in 
the local traditional institutions of Islamic learning, called pondoks in Malay 
(sing. pondok, pl. pondok-pondok), then move on to centres of advanced Islamic 
learning in northern states such as Kelantan and Patani. After many years of 
study in Masjid al-Haram, they would return to Malaya to teach in mosques 
or pondoks, or to open new pondoks. These students of Islam from the Malay 
archipelago were called jāwı̄ students.
It was in the early twentieth century that the preference for Mecca as the 
main destination for higher Islamic education began to change, and many Malay 
students began to study at al-Azhar in addition to Mecca. One of the earliest 
Malay or jāwı̄ students at al-Azhar was Wan Ahmad Zain al-Fatani (1856–
1908).8 Ahmad al-Fatani is still regarded as one of the most prominent sources 
of traditional Islamic learning in East Asia, having edited and published numer-
ous religious writings (kitab, lit. “book”) of the old Malay ʿulama, especially 
those who were active in the eighteenth century. The majority of jāwı̄ who 
were active ʿulama in the twentieth century and who were educated in Mecca 
had studied under Ahmad al-Fatani. However, Malaya began to see a gradual 
increase in the number of returning students who had absorbed the reformist 
ideals represented by Muhammad ʿAbduh. This approach favoured engagement 
with the original Islamic sources with a view to interpreting them in the light 
of reason and modern needs, as opposed to taqlı̄d of the Shafiʿi School, which 
was the traditional practice in the region. Although this approach was Salafi 
in its methodology – given its emphasis on going back to the original texts – it 
was considered modernist because it preferred the reinterpretation of the core 
texts in the light of modern concerns instead of strict adherence to the positions 
taken by a specific school of thought. Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1956) was the first 
such graduate of al-Azhar, and was well known for the propagation of reformism 
in the style of Muhammad ʿ Abduh through his journal al-Imam (1906–8). Tahir 
Jalaluddin and other writers for al-Imam also contributed to the establishment of 
modern Islamic schools, which, as with the reforms initiated at al-Azhar under 
Muhammad ʿAbduh, combined religious education with modern education. 
The first example of these Islamic schools was the Madrasa al-Iqbal, established 
in 1907 in Singapore. This model for a modern Islamic school gradually spread 
throughout Malaya in the first three decades of the twentieth century.9 Due to 
their being modelled on al-Azhar, these modern Islamic schools began to attract 
more Malay students to al-Azhar itself.
The spread of modern religious schools and their adoption of the al-Azhar 
model should be analysed with two factors in mind. The first is the Malay edu-
cational environment, and the other is the modernisation of al-Azhar. Modern 
education was introduced to Malaya by Western missionaries in the early nine-
teenth century. The first of these schools to be opened was Penang Free School, 
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established in 1815. These missionary schools were established in urban areas, 
using English as the main language of instruction; this, though, made these 
schools less accessible for Malay, the majority of whom lived in rural areas. 
Malay schools that taught in the Malay language began to be established after 
1854, when the British East India Company adopted a new policy for enhanc-
ing mother-tongue education in their colonies.10 Malay schools rapidly spread 
throughout Malaya at the turn of the century, yet Malay education remained 
limited to the elementary level, and secondary education was only provided in 
English, excepting certain teacher training colleges that used Malay.
The transformation of al-Azhar into a modern institution for religious edu-
cation began in the 1870s, with the introduction of new subjects and new 
methods of examination. The first significant change in the system came with a 
law passed in 1896 under the influence of Muhammad ʿAbduh, who had argued 
for the modernisation of al-Azhar. The law introduced a new system of eight 
years of secondary education and four years of higher education, with certificate 
examinations at each level. However, it was not until 1911 that the process of 
drastic transformation into a modern institution really began for al-Azhar. Eccel 
refers to the transformation that occurred after the law of 1911 as “bureaucra-
tisation”, and points out that numerous institutions for religious instruction all 
over Egypt were arranged into a hierarchy that placed al-Azhar at the top.11 The 
whole system was divided into three levels: elementary, secondary and higher 
education, which were each allocated four years.12 The economic base of the 
education system also changed during this period. After the independence of 
Egypt in 1922, the Egyptian government began to control the waqf income that 
had supported the autonomy of the ʿulama of al-Azhar. This policy, designed to 
break the economic base of the ʿulama, was completed in 1954 under the Nasser 
regime.13
The reform contained in the law of 1930 was equally important: it aimed 
to ensure employment for the university’s graduates. It was at this time that 
the name of the four-year higher educational institution was changed from 
“mosque” (jāmiʿ) to “university” (jāmiʿa); the university’s degrees were also 
made equal to that of national universities.14 The elementary and secondary 
levels were rearranged into four years of elementary (ibtidāʾı̄yya) and five years 
of secondary (thanawı̄yya) education. Students who passed the last examination 
in the secondary school were given a certificate titled shahāda al-thanawı̄yya, 
and the portion of secular subjects was increased to up to 30 per cent of the 
curriculum. Eccel refers to this feature of the transformation in the 1930s as 
“professionalisation”.15
The development of modern religious schools in Malaya strongly reflected 
these shifts. Muslim leaders saw the British schools as problematic, not only 
because of the limited opportunities they provided for Muslims, but also because 
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of the lack of religious education. Thus, ʿulama trained in the Middle East took 
initiatives to establish modern religious schools to provide alternative educa-
tional opportunities for Malay children. For example, Madrasa Hamidiah (now 
known as Maktab Mahmud) was opened in Alor Star, Kedah, in 1914. The 
initiative was taken by Wan Sulaiman Wan Sidik (1874–1935), who studied 
in Mecca and served as shaykh al-Islam in Kedah. Wan Sidik invited two Arab 
ʿulama, from Mecca and al-Azhar, respectively, to teach in the madrasa, and 
imported textbooks from Egypt as well.16 In 1938, a teacher who had grad-
uated from al-Azhar was appointed as principal. He reformed the system of 
the madrasa into a seven-year curriculum based on the model of the al-Azhar 
secondary school. In 1955, the system was further developed into a twelve-year 
programme to prepare students to enter al-Azhar University. The courses were 
divided into three levels – elementary, lower secondary and upper secondary – 
and each level was four years in length.
Another example is Madrasa Muhammadiyah (now known as Maahad 
Muhammadi), opened by the Kelantan Council of Religion17 in 1917. In the 
beginning, it had only three grades for boys aged 9–15 years old and used Malay 
as the medium of instruction – some textbooks were imported from Egypt and 
translated into Malay for that purpose.18 However, in 1937 it was developed 
into a four-year course based on the agreement and support of al-Azhar.19 The 
madrasa was further reformed into a nine-year curriculum based on the three 
levels of al-Azhar education, elementary (ibtidai), lower secondary (idadi) and 
upper secondary (thanawi),20 which were each allocated three years. Maahad 
Muhammadi’s certification was recognised by al-Azhar in 1960 and some stu-
dents from the school entered al-Azhar University for the first time at the end 
of the 1960s.21
The application of the al-Azhar system was not limited to schools – such as 
Maktab Mahmud and Maahad Muhammadi – that were related to the religious 
administration of the state government. In the 1930s and 1940s, many similar 
schools were established on the model of these famous schools. Most of these 
schools were supported by donations from the local community or from the pri-
vate property of the family of the supreme leader of the school (tok guru). They 
received no official support and there were no offices to supervise their adminis-
tration and curriculum – this was, then, a totally independent effort on the part 
of religious leaders to adopt the model of al-Azhar.
However, the schools’ curricula were not necessarily imported directly from 
the al-Azhar system, at least not at this stage; rather, they were the product 
of a mixture of that system with other models, including traditional Islamic 
learning. The modern system of religious schools – with standards, a curriculum 
organised by years and examinations – was generally called the nizami (organ-
ised) system, in contrast to the traditional umumi (general) system, whether it 
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originated from the al-Azhar system or not. The origin of the name nizami is 
unclear, but one possibility is that it stems from dars-e-nizami, the systematic 
religious curriculum developed in eighteenth-century India.22 The influence 
of the Indian madrasa can also be traced through the connection with Mecca. 
There were some madrasas in Mecca that had a modern system and accepted 
students from Malaya, and one of the famous destinations for these students was 
Madrasa Saulatiyah, which was established by an Indian Muslim. Some of the 
teachers who developed curricula for the madrasas in Malaya in the 1920s and 
1930s were graduates of this madrasa and applied this school’s system in their 
own institutions.23
By the 1960s this combination of influences had been transformed into a 
single al-Azhar stream of influence. Among the factors playing a role in this 
transformation were the new policies of al-Azhar, as well as the establishment 
of privileged preparatory courses for al-Azhar in Malaysia. Al-Azhar was fur-
ther reformed as a modern university under Nasser in the 1950s – al-Azhar 
University and its elementary and secondary schools having come fully under 
the control of Nasser’s government after the revolution in 1952. The budget 
for al-Azhar came to be distributed by the government and its funding was 
increased.24 In general terms, opportunities for education and employment 
were expanded under the new government. A standardised examination system 
was introduced to prepare for the expansion of higher education. This pushed 
al-Azhar to place more stress on non-religious subjects in order to ensure the 
employment of graduates and attract students. In 1960, al-Azhar opened new 
faculties of Commerce, Engineering, Agriculture and Medicine, in addition 
to the traditional Arabic and Islamic departments. A 1961 law decreed that a 
certificate from the al-Azhar secondary school would qualify a student to enter 
any university in Egypt, making the al-Azhar school stream entirely equal to the 
government school system. The modern reform of al-Azhar made the institution 
part of Egypt’s national education system and so made the ʿulama part of the 
bureaucratic school system.
In tandem with this transformation, since the 1920s al-Azhar had been 
accepting more and more foreign students. This policy was further accentuated 
in the 1950s when al-Azhar provided generous scholarships for foreign stu-
dents, contributing to a rapid increase in their numbers, especially from Asian 
countries.25 The preparatory course for foreign students (Maʿahad Buʿuth) was 
established as well. The first college for female students was opened in 1962, and 
the number of female foreign students increased in the 1970s.26
The establishment of Islamic higher education institutions in Malaya based 
on the al-Azhar model was linked to the developments at al-Azhar itself. In 
1955, the Kolej Islam Malaya (Malay College of Islam) was established as the 
first institution for Islamic higher education in Malaya. It was the fruit of long 
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effort, reaching back to the 1920s, on the part of the Muslim leaders of Malaya; 
but although a variety of Muslim individuals and groups were involved, it would 
not have been achieved without the support of the sultans (rulers of Malay 
states), especially the sultan of Selangor. It should be noted that the sultans’ 
attitude towards studying at al-Azhar was not necessarily positive. For example, 
Roff notes, based on a record of discussions among the rulers in 1927, that there 
had been a suggestion from the sultan of Selangor to establish a local college of 
higher Islamic education.27 He disapproved of sending students to Egypt, not 
only because of the expense, but also “because it introduces them to undesirable 
matters” – where the phrase “undesirable matters” implied political influences 
such as anti-colonialism and movements towards an alliance with Indonesia as a 
result of communication with students from the Dutch East Indies. On the other 
hand, Pengasuh, a journal of the Kelantan Council of Religion (the sultans’ 
advisory council) consistently published articles that recommended sending 
students to al-Azhar for higher education and provided reports on students’ life 
there.
Irrespective of the intentions behind its establishment, however, Kolej Islam 
Malaya functioned as the main gate to al-Azhar due to the consonance between 
their curricula. In the beginning, the school had two years of preparatory courses 
and five years of higher education. In 1961, Mahmud Saltut, the rector of 
al-Azhar appointed by Nasser’s government, was invited to Kolej Islam to dis-
cuss the curriculum. He agreed to recognise the higher certificate of Kolej Islam 
as equal to al-Azhar’s bachelor’s degree, and to accept holders of that certificate 
onto al-Azhar’s master’s course. Al-Azhar also agreed to send two teachers to 
Kolej Islam. As a result, ten graduates of Kolej Islam succeeded in entering 
al-Azhar master’s course in 1963.28 However, Kolej Islam soon transformed 
its educational system in order to concentrate on secondary education, since 
it could not maintain its students’ achievements at the higher level. Since 
then, Kolej Islam has played a role in gathering superior students from all over 
Malaysia in order to provide them with preparatory training and send them to 
al-Azhar.29
The establishment of Kolej Islam had the effect of promoting the stand-
ardisation of the curriculum of the religious schools, since such schools now 
had an opportunity to send their students to universities by preparing them 
to enter Kolej Islam, even if by themselves they could not prepare their stu-
dents for university life. In 1963, the Yayasan Pengajian Tinggi Islam Kelantan 
(YPTIK; Kelantan Foundation for Higher Islamic Education) was established in 
Kelantan, where it played a role similar to that of Kolej Islam. These institutions 
made studying at al-Azhar far more accessible for Malay students.
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Introduction of the al-Azhar Curriculum by 
State (Local) Governments
Up to this point, the introduction of the al-Azhar curriculum had been an inde-
pendent effort without any institutional support. The first active official initi-
ative for standardisation based on the al-Azhar curriculum began in the 1970s. 
The state religious councils, which first appeared in Kelantan in 1915, had been 
established in all thirteen states by the early 1970s. These religious councils 
began to provide financial support to the independent religious schools, and in 
some cases provided these schools with concrete sets of guidelines. Kelantan 
was one of the earliest states to import the standardised curriculum based on 
al-Azhar. One of the reasons for this initiative was the declining popularity 
of religious schools, which had resulted from the expansion of educational 
 opportunities for Muslims in the government school system.
Educational opportunities for Muslims, the majority in Malaysia, rapidly 
expanded after the late 1960s. This transformation was connected to the 1961 
Education Act and the 1963 Language Act, both of which were designed to 
integrate the multi-ethnic citizenry30 and give substance to Article 152 of the 
Constitution (1957), which provided that the national language should be 
Malay. The language of secondary schools was gradually switched from English 
to Malay, and the number of Malay students increased from 2,315 in 1957 to 
28,067 in 1964. The abolition of entrance examinations for secondary schools 
in 1964 caused the number of students to jump to 294,832 in 1975.31 In addi-
tion to the language policy, the New Economic Policy (NEP), initiated in 1971, 
further promoted educational opportunities for Malay students. The NEP aimed 
to correct the socio-economic imbalance between ethnic groups, particularly 
between the Chinese and the Malay, which was believed to have been a factor 
in the traumatic ethnic conflict of 1969. These policies led to the establishment 
of various universities and colleges in the early 1970s, and to a rapid increase in 
the number of Malay Muslim students.
This expansion of educational opportunity in the government school system 
resulted in a decrease in the number of students in religious schools. Kelantan, 
for example, which for centuries had been the largest centre of religious learn-
ing, had 182 religious schools in 1962, but the number dropped to 158 in 1968 
and 89 in 1972.32 One of the responses to this was an initiative on the part of 
religious schools and state religious offices to introduce the al-Azhar curriculum 
more systematically, in order to ensure greater opportunities for higher educa-
tion. The Kelantan state religious council introduced a standardised curriculum, 
examinations and a certificate in 1971. The introduction of a standardised cer-
tificate abolished the certificates that had previously been issued individually by 
each school. Although other states soon introduced similar policies, the pressure 
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for standardisation remained weak. In Kedah, the religious council only offered 
guidelines such as a list of textbooks and the choice of curriculum, while the 
certification was issued by each religious school.
The situation changed drastically in the 1990s. Although it is rare for the sta-
tistics recorded in schools and religious offices to be entirely accurate, it is clear 
that the number of students in religious schools had begun to increase in the late 
1980s – Madrasa an-Nahdhah, for instance, one of the famous religious schools 
in Kedah, never had more than 300 students before 1983, but this number had 
doubled by 1986 and reached 1,400 in 1988. This increase was caused by the 
Islamic resurgence in Malaysia that emerged in the 1970s, and the so-called 
Islamisation policy intensively promoted by the Malaysian government after 
the 1980s.33 In the early 1970s, the leaders of Islamic movements – especially 
the members of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM; Malaysian Muslim 
Youth Association) – began to criticise the education provided in government 
schools, which conveyed little Islamic knowledge and had few classes for reli-
gious education. Mahathir’s government, established in 1981, employed many 
leaders of such movements so as to include Islamic elements in various aspects 
of government policy.34
In terms of education, a new curriculum was introduced that stressed Islamic 
values, with almost twice as many school hours (240 minutes per week) now 
set aside for religious subjects, as well as the integration of Islamic elements 
into other subjects and elements of school life. Opportunities to receive Islamic 
higher education inside the country were also expanded. The establishment of 
the International Islamic University, in 1982, was one of the most symbolically 
important results of the Islamisation policy under Mahathir’s government, and 
it was a development that elevated parents’ expectations of religious education. 
In order to answer the growing demand for Islamic education, the government 
not only facilitated Islamic higher education, but also created employment for 
graduates of religious schools. These measures enhanced the future options for 
the graduates of religious schools, and made religious education, including study 
at al-Azhar University, important for finding jobs as religious teachers or in 
government offices.
The introduction of the new standardised al-Azhar curriculum at the state 
level, which occurred around 1994, further popularised study at al-Azhar. 
For example, in 1994 the Department of Religious Affairs of Kedah offi-
cially imported an al-Azhar curriculum based on an agreement between the 
department and al-Azhar University. It launched a new curriculum called the 
“Maʿahad Buʿuth curriculum”, which followed the system of Maʿahad Buʿuth, 
the al-Azhar secondary school for foreign students. The examination referred to 
as the Sijil Tinggi Agama (Higher Religious Certificate) was also introduced, 
and the certificate was issued in the name of the department. The textbooks of 
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Maʿahad Buʿuth were imported from Egypt and reprinted in Kedah bearing the 
logo of Kedah Council of Religion.35 The textbooks were distributed to the reli-
gious schools by the departments. Now it was clear to everyone that studying in 
a religious school was, in effect, preparation for studying at al-Azhar; and if they 
did not go to al-Azhar, the graduates of religious schools would enter the depart-
ment of Islamic studies at a local university, which ensured that they would 
at least become a teacher of religion in an elementary school. The number of 
students in religious schools peaked in the 1990s. Looking again at the example 
of Kedah, the number of students in the independent religious schools there 
was 21,175 in 1994, and reached a peak of 23,556 in 1995. The number slightly 
declined after 1996, but remained in excess of 20,000 until 2001.36
This new curriculum and the associated examination system resulted, for the 
first time, in the bureaucratic standardisation of independent religious schools. 
Prior to this, the independent religious schools had basically been free in their 
choice of educational content: there had been loose guidelines as a condition of 
financial assistance from state religious offices, but there was little bureaucracy 
in their implementation. Nevertheless, this standardisation was achieved with-
out obstruction, because the independent religious schools already had similar 
systems in place as a result of their having adopted the al-Azhar curriculum. In 
other words, al-Azhar, as the model for religious education, prepared the inde-
pendent religious schools in Malaysia for the standardisation and bureaucratisa-
tion that was later to come.
National (Federal) Control of Religious Schools 
and Study in al-Azhar
In the late 1990s, standardisation did finally begin at the federal level. The 
first drastic change was the introduction of a federal standard examination, 
the Sijil Tinggi Agama Malaysia (STAM; Malaysian Higher Islamic Religious 
Certificate), in 2000. It was based on the memorandum of understanding signed 
on 18 November 1999 between al-Azhar and the Ministry of Education Malaysia 
to launch the single certificate system in Malaysia. According to officers of the 
ministry, al-Azhar had complained that some of the Malaysian students were 
entering al-Azhar with a lower level of ability and were taking longer to gradu-
ate. Thus, the purpose of introducing the STAM was to “ensure that all of our 
students who enter al-Azhar are excellent”.37 The memorandum included the 
provisions that al-Azhar would accept only the STAM, instead of the exist-
ing twenty-six certificates issued by various religious departments and schools; 
the curriculum for the STAM examination would be that of Maʿahad Buʿuth 
al-Islamiyya al-Azhar; textbooks used for this curriculum would be those taught 
in Maʿahad Buʿuth; al-Azhar would give copyright over the textbooks to the 
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Ministry of Education Malaysia; and the examination would be prepared by the 
ministry with the assistance of al-Azhar if necessary.38 Moreover, as a part of 
the condition for al-Azhar’s acceptance of STAM students, the memorandum 
included the provision that students must also pass the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia 
(Malaysian Certificate of Education), the certificate for completion of the sec-
ondary education curriculum of the Ministry of Education Malaysia. This meant 
that, for the first time, students who had studied only religious subjects were 
not allowed to enter al-Azhar; it also meant that the religious schools had to be 
serious about the government curriculum for non-religious subjects if they were 
to send their students to al-Azhar.
The final move from the federal government to control the religious schools 
came with the sudden announcement by Prime Minister Mahathir that in 
October 2002 he would withdraw the financial support provided to independ-
ent religious schools. The Ministry of Education had provided a modest amount 
of financial support to the independent religious schools since the end of 1957, 
but the government now said that it was necessary to withdraw that support 
in order to review the undesirable level of achievement by their students. It 
was also stated that some of these schools were inspiring students with radical 
and anti-government sentiments. Although the amount was not so large that 
its loss immediately created financial crises for these schools, this withdrawal 
of official support made parents hesitant to enrol their children because they 
were now afraid of being labelled anti-government. The number of students 
in religious schools rapidly decreased, and some small schools were forced to 
close. The federal government set up a committee to discuss a resolution to the 
situation, and offered the religious schools a choice: they could either be fully 
government-supported schools under the Ministry of Education or fully inde-
pendent schools without any support from the ministry. As a result, by January 
2006, 134 out of the 305 independent religious schools had registered as fully 
government-supported;39 this meant that the religious schools that chose to be 
government-supported became fully integrated into the state bureaucracy.
This Azharisation of ʿulama training was closely linked with the processes of 
modernisation and bureaucratisation of religious instruction. Training ʿulama 
had been an independent activity since before the introduction of the modern 
education system. With the development of the modern secular education 
system, religious learning for ʿulama training gradually adopted modern organ-
isational forms. Al-Azhar provided the best model for the new type of ʿulama 
training, supplanting the traditional kitab learning which had been based on 
the model of Masjid al-Haram. As a result of independent efforts on the part 
of some schools to import the al-Azhar model, religious schools throughout 
Malaya/Malaysia became more similar to each other, and this paved the way 
for the standardisation at the state level based on the al-Azhar curriculum. 
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Moreover, the introduction of the al-Azhar curriculum at the state level in turn 
conditioned the standardisation at the federal level, again based on al-Azhar. 
The Azharisation of ʿulama training was thus first promoted by individual lead-
ers, then by the state religious offices, and finally by the federal Ministry of 
Education. At the same time, this process of Azharisation promoted the integra-
tion of ʿulama training into the bureaucracy of the modern education system. In 
other words, the Azharisation of ʿulama training led to government control of 
the ʿulama, so reducing the latter’s scope to criticise the government.
The Experience of Studying in al-Azhar and its 
Meaning for Individual Students
The earliest generations, 1900s–1940s
The establishment of an ʿulama training system in Malaysia based on al-Azhar 
has changed the experience of the students who study at al-Azhar, while also 
transforming the social role and life course of al-Azhar graduates in Malaysia.
The first generation of Malay students who went to al-Azhar in the early 
twentieth century prepared the foundations for student life there. They also 
provided the first examples of the celebrated careers that could follow such an 
educational experience, playing important social roles in Malaya from the first 
decade of the twentieth century onwards. Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1956) was 
among the earliest of the outstanding returnees. Born in West Sumatra, he 
moved to Mecca in 1880 and studied there for thirteen years. He then contin-
ued his study at al-Azhar for four years until 1897. As discussed above, al-Azhar 
at that time was experiencing the beginning of significant reform under the 
influence of Muhammad ʿAbduh. Jalaluddin took Arabic Studies, Shariʿa and 
Mathematics. During his stay in Cairo, he was significantly influenced by the 
progressive ideas of al-Afghani, Muhammad ʿAbduh and Rashid Rida.40 After 
studying again in Mecca for several years, he finally went back to Malaya in 1900 
and joined the journal al-Imam, which contributed to the spread of reformist 
ideas. He also worked as a teacher and headmaster in various religious schools 
in Penang and Perak, and was the administrator of the state religious schools in 
Johor.
Returnees from al-Azhar at that time did not necessarily contribute to the 
promotion of reformist ideas. There were some returnees from al-Azhar who 
played important roles in the Kelantan Council of Religion, which was in favour 
of social reform, but clearly kept a traditionalist position in terms of a legal 
methodology that adhered to the opinions of the Shafiʿi madhhab. Muhammad 
bin Khatib Mohd Said is a salient example here. He was born in 1888 and stud-
ied in Mecca and at al-Azhar for ten years before returning to Kelantan in 1914. 
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Soon after his return, he worked to establish the council and was appointed as 
its first secretary in 1915. He was later promoted to be the prime minister of the 
state in the 1920s.41
In addition to these examples of emerging prominent figures, the Malay 
al-Azhar students in the 1920s also began to relate their activities through 
Malay journals. In the mid-1920s, for example, Pengasuh, the journal published 
by the Kelantan Council of Religion since 1918, often published news from the 
Middle East. The journal covered a variety of topics, including the life of Malays 
in Egypt and what it was like to study at al-Azhar, through the perspective of 
Malays in Egypt. Pengasuh repeatedly referred to the benefit of an education at 
al-Azhar, possibly contributing to the widespread public sense of longing for 
that institution as the place of the highest learning.42 In addition to the reports 
in journals published in Malaya, jāwı̄ students in Egypt published their own 
journals. One of the most famous of these was Seruan Azhar (Call of Azhar), 
first published by jāwı̄ students in October 1925 and circulated among religious 
leaders and students throughout the Malay archipelago.43
Through these prominent figures and journals, people in the Malay Peninsula 
learned about al-Azhar as a destination for religious knowledge and came to 
recognise its authority. The rising reputation of al-Azhar is reflected in the news 
about Hijaz during the war between Sharif Hussain and Ibn Saʿud. Pengasuh 
repeatedly published the opinions of al-Azhar ʿulama in order to convince 
Malays that “Wahhabis” were part of the Sunni Muslim community and not 
contrary to any of the four madhhabs.44 The same attitude can be found in 
another article which makes reference to al-Azhar ʿulama in support of their 
criticism of the secularisation policies of Mustafa Kemal.45 Pengasuh’s attitude 
is significant because it was among the few journals that took a clear position 
in defence of the traditional method of adhering to the madhhab. Because of 
this position, Pengasuh was preferred not only by the Muslim leaders who were 
educated in government schools, but also by the traditional ʿulama who had 
typically learned in Mecca and taught in pondoks.
The first important development among Malay students in the early twen-
tieth century was the establishment of structures and systems for supporting 
their student life. In 1922, jāwı̄ students formed an association, the Jamaʿat 
al-Chairiah al-Talabijja al-Azhariah al-Jawiah (Welfare Association of Jawa 
students).46 Roff estimates that there were at least 200 Southeast Asian stu-
dents in Cairo by 1925, while Pengasuh also reports that there were about 150 
students from the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and other places.47 
The increasing numbers of Southeast Asian students in the Middle East at this 
time was strongly supported by the boom in the price of rubber. The number of 
pilgrims from British Malaya increased in the 1920s, with the minimum annual 
number being 12,184 in 1927.48 In addition to the financial factor, the unstable 
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situation in Mecca, caused by the war, also contributed to redirecting students 
from that erstwhile centre of learning for jāwı̄ students to Cairo, at least for the 
period around 1925.
However, the increase in the number of jāwı̄ students and the formation of 
their student associations did not immediately improve their life. As far as stu-
dents from the Malaya Peninsula were concerned, it was not until 1924 – when 
Syed Hassan bin Ahmad al-Attas, a Hadrami descendant from Johor, visited 
Cairo – that the effort to improve the students’ lives began. Syed Hassan al-At-
tas was born in Pahang in 1832, the son of a rich trader, Syed Ahmad Hassan 
al-Attas. After studying in Malaya, he travelled to the Middle East and received 
part of his education at al-Azhar. He stayed in Egypt for twelve years and then 
returned to Malaya to contribute to developing religious institutions, such as 
Madrasa al-Attas Johor in 1914 and Madrasa al-Attas Pahang in 1923.49
Syed Hassan visited Cairo in 1924 to find qualified teachers to teach in his 
schools. Meeting some senior Malay students, he found their circumstances far 
from satisfactory. In making efforts to help them, he came to learn that there 
had been a waqf specially donated by a wealthy Egyptian for the sake of jāwı̄ 
students; the purpose of the waqf had, however, been forgotten over time, and 
it had eventually turned into a general waqf. On discovering this, Syed Hassan 
met with several well-known Egyptian ʿulama, such as Muhammad Jawhari 
al-Tantawi, in order to find a means to use the waqf to help jāwı̄ students. With 
the help of these famous ʿulama, Syed Hassan had a meeting with the Minister 
of Waqf and Prime Minister Saad Zaghlul to address the problem, as well as to 
ask for funds to send teachers to Malaya. After the discussion, the ministers 
decided to appoint a committee (lajnah), consisting of various ʿulama as well 
as Syed Hassan, to take care of the matter. The committee also pledged that, 
instead of sending Egyptian ʿulama to Malaya, they would educate Malay stu-
dents in Egypt to a sufficient level for them to meet the requirements for teach-
ing in Syed Hassan’s madrasa. Thus, they agreed to make efforts to improve the 
situation of Malay students both in their daily lives and with respect to their 
studies. Syed Hassan had rented a house to accommodate about ten Malay 
students who had been living in the dormitory (riwāq) at al-Azhar, but its con-
dition was not satisfactory. With the help of the committee, they were not only 
provided with accommodation, but teachers also came to give special lectures 
in their new abode.50
This active support provided by al-Azhar corresponded with the general 
policy of that time for promoting the university’s influence all over the Islamic 
world. In the 1920s, the Egyptian government and al-Azhar had agreed upon 
the gradual increase of the al-Azhar budget and to increase the number of for-
eign students.51 In fact, the committee that had discussed the matter of the jāwı̄ 
students had been established as one of the branches under the “committee for 
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Eastern students”.52 Under these circumstances, the Malay students were able to 
prepare the basic facilities which would be expanded upon by later generations. 
Nevertheless, the support they received from Egyptian sources was not suffi-
cient, and the students and the committee repeatedly called for donations from 
their homeland.53 It was during this period that the customs were established of 
Malay students living together in the hostel and having tutorial studies there in 
addition to their formal classes.
Study in al-Azhar in the mid-twentieth century
The number of Malay students at al-Azhar continued to increase, albeit grad-
ually, until the end of the 1960s.54 The experience of studying at al-Azhar in 
the mid-twentieth century was strongly related to the development of a modern 
education system in Malaya in the 1950s. One of the most important events was 
the establishment of the first university, the University of Malaya, in Singapore 
in 1949. The main language of secondary and higher education in Malaya had 
been English, and thus the educational opportunities for Malay Muslims were 
still limited.55 It was not until 1963 that a government Malay secondary school 
opened. Despite the limited opportunities for Muslims,56 the establishment of a 
university in their homeland motivated Islamic leaders and religious students to 
seek higher education in Islamic knowledge. This was the prime motivation for 
those students who studied at al-Azhar from the 1940s to the 1960s. Religious 
secondary schools, and local institutions of Islamic higher education, such as 
Kolej Islam Klang and al-Azhar, played an important role in providing Muslim 
students with alternative opportunities for higher education.
The Malay students who had left their homeland by the 1960s had various 
routes by which they might reach al-Azhar. The most celebrated path to al-Azhar 
was through Kolej Islam Klang. This school was only for the best students from 
religious schools in Malaya. Most of the students who studied at al-Azhar in the 
1960s and 1970s obtained positions in local universities, government offices or, 
at the very least, as religious teachers in government secondary schools, and it 
was not uncommon for them to be offered scholarships for further studies at 
Western universities in order to obtain master’s degrees and doctorates.
Abdul Hamid Othman (1939–2011) was an example of an al-Azhar graduate 
who played a key role in the Islamisation policy of the Mahathir government.57 
He was born to a poor family in rural Kedah and finished his elementary edu-
cation in a government elementary school. His circumstances did not allow 
him to proceed to the government secondary school, and thus his only option 
was to study in a religious school in Kedah. When he finished his fourth year 
at that school, he moved to a more famous religious school in Perak and then 
entered Kolej Islam Malaya, which had opened in 1955. He arrived at al-Azhar 
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in 1961 and studied in the Faculty of Shariʿa until 1965. Upon his return to 
Malaya, he was first offered a teaching position at Kolej Islam and then at the 
National University of Malaysia – the latter having been established in 1971 as 
the second university in Malaysia that had a department of Islam. He was also 
appointed to teach in the first Islamic teacher’s college when it was opened in 
1975. This was during an intense period in the establishment of Islamic higher 
education in Malaysia. During this time, he began to be consulted by Mahathir, 
then minister of education, on religious matters, and this was the beginning 
of his life-long relationship with Mahathir, who served as prime minister from 
1981 to 2003. Abdul Hamid was appointed to lead various government depart-
ments on religion, such as the Department of Islamic and Moral Education 
in the Ministry of Education, and the Religious Matters Section of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, which was later upgraded into a department due to his efforts. 
Abdul Hamid’s career studying in religious schools and at al-Azhar in the 1960s 
thus allowed him to become a pioneer in the expansion of Islamic education and 
administration.
Razali Nawawi, three years younger than Abdul Hamid Othman, made a 
different kind of contribution to the development of the Islamic movement 
in Malaysia, although he had a similar trajectory from religious schools to 
al-Azhar.58 Born in 1942, in a peasant family of Kelantan, Razali was sent to the 
government Malay elementary school. Despite his good results and interest in 
English and science, his father did not allow him to go to the English secondary 
school because he believed it educated children to be unbelievers (kāfir). He was 
sent to a religious school and then continued his studies at Kolej Islam Malaya. 
After achieving a bachelor’s degree there, he was sent to al-Azhar for his mas-
ter’s degree in 1964. He received a scholarship from the Kelantan govern-
ment, which was sufficient to fund part of his subsequent travels. Since study at 
al-Azhar was “only for the degree” and he could not learn anything for spiritual 
improvement there, he wished to leave Egypt as soon as possible. He never made 
contact with Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was 
banned and strictly monitored by the Egyptian government. Moreover, he was 
reluctant even to interact with Egyptians in general. The majority of Malaysian 
students were afraid of the secret police who regularly monitored students’ 
activities.
When he achieved a master’s degree from al-Azhar – with an additional 
diploma of education from Ein Shams University – he decided to move to 
England. It had long been his desire to study English in order “to be rich”, 
because of the hardships of his impoverished childhood. With his saved money 
and newly achieved scholarship granted again by the government of Kelantan, 
he studied English for a year in London, and then took a course for the diploma 
in law at the University of London. He then moved to Birmingham University 
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for a Master of Comparative Law degree, and returned to Malaysia to be a lec-
turer in the Faculty of Islam at the National University of Malaysia.
It was in England that he discovered the international Islamic movements 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaʿat-i-Islami through their books 
and activities. In London, he began to organise small discussion groups, called 
usrah (family), and formed an association of Malaysian Muslim students. This 
experience involved him in the establishment of the Malaysian Muslim Youth 
Association (ABIM), and he became its first president in 1972. Under the 
leadership of Anwar Ibrahim during the 1970s, ABIM became the largest and 
most influential organisation in Malaysia. Anwar Ibrahim joined Mahathir’s 
government in 1981, and served in various ministerial positions, ultimately 
as the deputy prime minister, until he was dismissed in 1999.59 Even though 
he never served as a government officer, Razali Nawawi was one of Anwar’s 
closest colleagues and was a member of many government committees related 
to Islamisation policies. Razali Nawawi is one of the first generation of students 
to have studied both at al-Azhar and at universities in the West. This would 
become a typical career trajectory for Islamic academics in the 1980s and 1990s, 
as Islamic higher education rapidly expanded in Malaysia.
These examples show that al-Azhar functioned as an alternative venue for 
higher education, providing Malay students with the opportunity to achieve 
higher social status. Prior to the early 1960s, it was only wealthy Malay children, 
such as members of the royal family, who had the chance to study at foreign uni-
versities, but the existence of al-Azhar and the Malay support system provided 
the opportunity for ordinary Malay students to study at a university as well. 
Kolej Islam Malaya became a destination for excellent students from religious 
schools who wished to secure their access to higher education. However, it was 
not the only door to al-Azhar, and in the 1960s Malay students had other ways 
to reach that university after their study in religious schools. One of the major 
paths was via South Asia. Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the supreme leader of the 
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (1930–), was born in Kelantan and studied in local 
pondoks before continuing his study in Darul Ulum Deoband in India from 1952 
to 1957. He then moved to al-Azhar to major in Arabic as an undergraduate 
and in Islamic law in his master’s course. He returned to his homeland in 1962 
to teach in religious schools and soon emerged as a political leader.60 Nik Aziz’s 
pattern of studying in South Asia before going to al-Azhar became a model for 
students in the 1970s, partly due to their admiration of him.61
Indonesia was another destination for Malay students seeking Islamic higher 
education. Ustaz R (pseudonym) served as a teacher of religion in government 
secondary schools from 1977 until he retired in 1999.62 Born in Kedah in 1944, 
he studied at a religious school in Kedah until he achieved the fourth-grade 
certificate of secondary education (Shahadah Empat Thanawi). In 1969, he 
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decided to continue his study at the al-Washliah University in Medan, Sumatra. 
The religious school in Kedah had connections to other universities in Medina, 
Egypt and Indonesia, but he chose Indonesia because it was cheaper, and offered 
the additional advantage of allowing him to study in both Indonesian and 
Arabic. After achieving the Bachelor of Shariʿa and Diploma of Education 
in Medan in 1973, he was sent to al-Azhar by the university to be admitted 
to the third year of undergraduate courses. Although there was a dormitory 
for Malaysian students (riwāq), he did not stay there because he was married 
to a Malaysian woman from the same university in Medan. His three years in 
al-Azhar were filled mostly with intensive study. All the Malaysian students 
were very close to each other, and he often attended tutorials conducted by 
senior Malaysian students outside the formal lesson schedules. He also joined 
the activities of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and took 
part in some excursions during semester breaks that not many other Malaysians 
joined.
He intended to continue his studies at al-Azhar in order to become a teacher, 
believing this to be the ideal job to realise Islamic morals that stress the impor-
tance of sharing knowledge. As soon as he returned from al-Azhar, he was 
employed as a teacher of religion in a government secondary school and served 
in various locations around peninsular Malaysia until he retired to Kedah.
By the 1960s, the opportunities for Malaysian students to study at al-Azhar 
had gradually expanded, thanks to such official supports as the preparatory 
courses in Kolej Islam, scholarships and the student hostels in Cairo. In addition 
to the official modes of support, foreign institutions for Islamic learning in coun-
tries such as Indonesia and India also provided other avenues through which to 
prepare for study at al-Azhar. Students were returning with university degrees 
that were still rare for Malaysian Muslims just at the moment when the struc-
tures for religious education and administration were expanding. The degrees 
gave them higher social status and crucial roles in the Islamic resurgence and 
Islamisation policies of the 1970s and 1980s.
Study in al-Azhar after its popularisation
The popularisation of study at al-Azhar began in the 1970s. One new phenom-
enon at this time was an increase in the number of female Malaysian students 
studying there. Al-Azhar opened a women’s college in 1962, and in the 1970s 
the number of female students rapidly increased.63 In the early 1970s, there were 
some female graduates of al-Azhar who taught in famous religious schools such 
as Maktab Mahmud in Kedah. The increasing number of female students is evi-
dence of an improvement in the Malaysian students’ environment at al-Azhar, 
including student hostels and associations.
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Rates of enrolment in religious schools in the early 1970s were generally 
stagnant because of the rapid increase in educational opportunities for Muslim 
students in the government school system; religious schools tended to become 
an alternative for students who had failed in government schools. However, the 
children of religious families, such as those of religious teachers, generally still 
enrolled in religious schools even though some religious teachers themselves 
preferred to send their children to government schools. One of the important 
changes of this period was the increasing attainability of higher education. 
By the late 1970s, going to college, whether religious or secular, had already 
become an achievable dream for most Malay people. Study at al-Azhar was 
now only one of a number of choices available for higher education, and was no 
longer considered as special as it had been for the previous generation. Student 
life was more relaxed, with an increasing number of students and an expansion 
in the amount of support they were offered.
Badrulamin Baharum,64 one of the leaders of the People’s Justice Party 
Malaysia (Keadilan), was among the al-Azhar students of this time. He was born 
in 1961, the son of the imam of the masjid in Tawau, Sabah. He was an excellent 
student in the religious school in Sabah and was thus sent to a famous religious 
school in Selangor, and then to the Kolej Islam, where he received his certificate 
in 1978. According to him, this certificate was more respected than the current 
STAM, because it evidenced a level of skill in reading and speaking Arabic that 
was sufficient for study at al-Azhar. He entered the Faculty of Shariʿa in 1979 
along with eight friends. His student life had been supported by a scholarship 
from the Sabah Foundation worth up to 10,000 RM a year. All the students from 
Sabah received the same scholarship, while students from elsewhere received 
scholarships from their respective states or the federal government.
Students in Cairo at that time could enjoy certain freedoms. The city of 
Cairo tempted many of the Malaysian students to stay out and enjoy themselves 
until the small hours; even for serious students, it was unusual to finish their 
studies in four years. Badrulamin was one of the rare students who did finish 
his course in four years and with good results. However, it was only in the first 
year that he attended all his university classes, because attendance was not 
obligatory. Once registered, students did not need to do anything other than 
to sit the examinations – these examinations were difficult, but the students 
could prepare themselves adequately by reading alone. In the third and fourth 
year, Badrulamin taught other Malaysian students privately more often than he 
attended his own classes. In fact, the first thing for new students to do was find 
senior students who were good at teaching. Some of the more famous teachers, 
including Badrulamin, retained their popularity upon their return to Malaysia.
Although his daily interactions were mostly with the Malaysian students, he 
also joined in with some activities of the Indonesian Bugis students’ association, 
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because his father was of Bugis origin. Generally, the Malaysian students were 
more intimate with students from southern Thailand than with Indonesians; 
they often held joint events such as soccer games and Thai boxing, but there 
were no activities related to Islamic movements. Although the Islamic resur-
gence in Malaysia had begun in the early 1970s, its influence was still limited 
to the Malaysian universities and urban high schools. Badrulamin had been 
exposed to ABIM in Kolej Islam, where many of the students actively partici-
pated in the movement. Despite his interest in Islamic movements, he did not 
have an opportunity to join any Malaysian or Egyptian movements in Egypt. 
Only a few Malaysian students joined the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
although it was not rare for Malaysian students to attend the open lectures or 
sermons by leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in mosques.
Badrulamin became actively involved in the Malaysian Islamic youth move-
ment ABIM only after further study in Britain. Soon after his return to Malaysia, 
he was employed as a lecturer at the newly established International Islamic 
University Malaysia. He was sent by the university to continue his master’s and 
doctorate courses in the United Kingdom, and worked as an associate professor 
in the International Islamic University until 1999. Since he resigned from the 
university as a result of a political dispute, he has worked as a “free preacher” 
who teaches in places such as prayer houses and offices, and also as a politician of 
the opposition party Keadilan. A “free preacher” is someone who teaches upon 
invitation without official association with any institution; thus, the authority 
of a free preacher is based only upon his speaking ability, character and religious 
knowledge. To be a graduate of al-Azhar is important in achieving this level of 
authority.
In the 1980s, the Malaysian students at al-Azhar numbered in the thousands. 
A wide range of factors motivated these students to study at al-Azhar, including 
becoming teachers of religion, following the model of Islamic leaders in the 
Islamic movements or Islamic party, curiosity about life in a foreign country, 
and, above all, an appetite for religious knowledge. By this point, it was not 
only the preparatory courses such as Kolej Islam that were issuing certificates 
for al-Azhar, but also the independent religious schools. In 1977, for example, 
Madrasa an-Nahdhah, in Kedah, became one of the first independent religious 
schools to establish an agreement with al-Azhar University for their certificate 
to be recognised, with the first student entering al-Azhar with this certificate in 
1979.
The graduates of al-Azhar in the 1980s and the early 1990s did not have 
difficulty finding work. The religious schools were in need of teachers to meet 
the rapid increase in students. This is clear from the fact that many Indonesian 
graduates of al-Azhar and other higher Islamic institutions had been employed 
in these schools in the 1980s. One of the Indonesian teachers, for instance, 
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who is still teaching in a religious school in Kedah, graduated from al-Azhar in 
1982. While at al-Azhar, he made friends with Malaysian students from Kedah 
and after graduation was asked to teach in a religious school there. Although 
there were eight Indonesian religious teachers when he started teaching in his 
current school in 1989, currently only two remain because most such teachers in 
Malaysia worked on a ten-year contract. As the increasing number of Malaysian 
graduates filled the teaching positions in the 1990s, they went home.65
The introduction of the Maʾahad Buʾuth curriculum and new standardised 
examinations at state level in 1994 made it easier for students to continue their 
study at al-Azhar. The support system for student life in Egypt was improved by 
each state government as well. In addition to the federal student association, 
the Malay Association of the Arab Republic of Egypt (PMRAM), the student 
association of each state was officially recognised and provided with a budget 
from the state government. The students’ hostel was also expanded and rebuilt 
by the state governments to accommodate the increasing number of students.66 
Government officers were sent by both federal and state governments to take 
care of their students, and, in addition to this official support and protection, 
the news from seniors and friends who were already studying at al-Azhar moti-
vated junior students who were still in religious schools to study there. Today, 
most of the candidates for study at al-Azhar already have close friends, siblings 
or cousins there who provide them with information and will help them when 
they arrive.
However, this popularisation inevitably also provided opportunities for stu-
dents with lower levels of ability to study at al-Azhar. Although the achieve-
ments of Malay students in al-Azhar had not been a problem for the earliest 
generations, this rapid increase of students now caused new problems, including 
a large number of failing students. Moreover, by the end of the 1990s, the posi-
tions for religious teachers or officers had already been filled by graduates of 
al-Azhar and domestic higher education institutions; in the 2000s, therefore, 
unemployment became visible among al-Azhar graduates, and especially so after 
the withdrawal of financial assistance to religious schools. While the unemploy-
ment of university graduates in general emerged as a serious problem in the same 
period, the unemployment of al-Azhar graduates was linked to unique factors 
such as competition with graduates of local universities and the decrease in the 
number of religious schools.
The story of one couple from Kedah, who studied together at al-Azhar begin-
ning in 1998, is illustrative of the problem. The couple were married in Egypt, 
and the wife finished her studies in five years; the husband, however, was unable 
to pass one of his subjects and so extended his study until the eighth year. 
While waiting, the wife opened small Malaysian restaurants to earn a livelihood. 
Finally, the husband gave up and the family returned to Malaysia in 2005. They 
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looked for employment in religious secondary schools, but could not find work: 
most of the schools were hurt by the decreasing number of students and were 
being forced to fire teachers. While looking for jobs as teachers, they opened a 
home Qurʾanic school to meet the minimum needs of a humble life.
The introduction of a programme called J-Qaf in government primary schools 
helped many such unemployed graduates of al-Azhar. It was initiated by the 
new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, who replaced Mahathir in 2003. The 
J-Qaf programme was a new arrangement for Islamic education in government 
schools, with a focus on jawi (Malay language written in Arabic script), Qurʾan 
study, Arabic and fardu ain (basic knowledge of Islam that is obligatory for 
everybody). When the Ministry of Education employed new teachers for this 
programme, the graduates of al-Azhar and other universities in Arab countries 
were given priority in order to improve the teaching of Arabic. Many of the 
unemployed graduates took advantage of this opportunity.
Since popularisation, graduating from al-Azhar no longer entails privilege. 
However, it remains important to have studied at al-Azhar if one wishes to be 
recognised as a religious authority. For example, the teachers of senior classes at 
religious schools that follow the al-Azhar curriculum should still be graduates of 
al-Azhar or other famous Arab universities. Nevertheless, because of the popu-
larisation of higher education in Malaysia, in many cases the bachelor’s degree 
from al-Azhar is no longer enough. Since it is rare for Malaysian students at 
al-Azhar to continue their studies in the graduate schools of al-Azhar, those who 
seek higher education degrees normally enter master’s courses in other univer-
sities in Malaysia or abroad. Today, a majority of the graduates of al-Azhar who 
are working as academics, senior officers, famous preachers or political leaders 
hold qualifications higher than the master’s degree.
Students’ experiences of al-Azhar, and indeed the meaning of studying there, 
have both changed in accord with the Azharisation of religious schools in 
Malaysia and the popularisation of study at al-Azhar. Al-Azhar is no longer the 
exclusive choice for higher Islamic learning, and the university’s graduates are 
no longer celebrated as people with special knowledge. However, al-Azhar still 
attracts a large number of Malaysian students, not only because of the accessibil-
ity and official support they are provided, but also because it represents the high-
est level of Islamic learning. Malaysian universities do provide various courses 
in Islamic studies, but their students are rarely fluent in Arabic – though it must 
also be noted that even the students at al-Azhar are not entirely fluent, since 
they generally interact only with Malaysians. Some students who are serious 
about studying Arabic choose Jordan, Syria or other Arab countries where there 
are smaller numbers of Malaysian students. Nevertheless, al-Azhar remains a 
destination for serious students because there they can look for opportunities to 
study under famous shaykhs not only in the classroom, but also in the masjid and 
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elsewhere. The combination of its reputation as the highest centre for Islamic 
learning and the accessibility and availability of support contributes to the flow 
of Malaysian students to al-Azhar today.
Conclusion: The Result of “Azharisation”
By the late twentieth century, Malaysian students had become the largest group 
of foreign students at al-Azhar. This increase was both the cause and the result 
of the “Azharisation” of ʿulama training in Malaysia. The development of 
al-Azhar into a modern religious institution, on the one hand, and the lack of 
educational opportunities for Muslims in Malaya, on the other, had contributed 
to the development of the al-Azhar-based religious education system in Malaya. 
Al-Azhar began to attract students from Malaya in the early twentieth century, 
and some returnees from al-Azhar established modern Islamic schools that took 
al-Azhar as their model. These modern religious schools provided alternatives 
for Muslim students in Malaya whose educational opportunities were restricted; 
al-Azhar was the only chance for most of them to obtain a higher degree. 
The development of the al-Azhar-based religious school system, together with 
financial and material support, motivated students to study at al-Azhar. The 
al-Azhar-based religious school curriculum was established as the standardised 
examination system, first at state level and then at federal level. The religious 
secondary schools, which had almost exclusive responsibility for the basic train-
ing of ʿulama in Malaysia, were completely “Azharised” with the official adop-
tion of the curriculum and examination system.
The Azharisation of religious secondary schools transformed the careers of 
the graduates of al-Azhar, and resulted in a marked change in the impact they 
could have on their return from Egypt. The returnees from al-Azhar in the early 
twentieth century played key roles as the founders and higher officers of religious 
schools. When the Islamic institutions for higher education were established in 
the 1970s, the graduates of al-Azhar were employed as the first generation of 
professors. The graduates of the 1980s and early 1990s did not have to worry 
about future jobs because of the many positions as teachers of religion or other 
officers that became available as a result of the Islamisation policy. However, 
the supply of al-Azhar graduates surpassed demand in the late 1990s, and in the 
early years of the new millennium the returnees from al-Azhar began to face 
difficulty in finding jobs.
As previous studies have emphasised, the returnees from al-Azhar did indeed 
bring back new ideas and ideologies to their homeland in the early twentieth 
century. However, the increased number of students did not result in religious 
disputes or political instability. Rather, the students were sent out with the 
support of state governments and state religious offices, and took advantage of 
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the Islamisation policy on their return. Students at al-Azhar rarely had contact 
with Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Although a small 
portion of the student body was indeed close to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
later played a role in the Islamic political movements active in Malaysia, few of 
them imported any political ideas or Islamic movements directly from Egypt. 
Rather, it was the Malaysian students who studied in Western universities and 
joined international Islamic movements there who had a more direct impact on 
the Islamic revival movements in Malaysia in the 1970s, as in the cases of Razali 
Nawawi and Badrulamin Baharum above.
The Azharisation of ʿulama training had a great influence on the develop-
ment of Islam in Malaysia. The immediate result was the establishment of a 
standardised modern religious education system in Malaysia. In the beginning, 
the importation of the al-Azhar curriculum was an independent initiative on 
the part of the religious schools, but later this was promoted by state and federal 
governments. This indirectly led to government control of the ʿulama. Indeed, 
it is not unusual for the governments of Muslim-majority countries to integrate 
the ʿulama training system into the national bureaucracy in order to place 
ʿulama under government control. However, the unique characteristic of the 
process of bureaucratisation in Malaysia was that it was facilitated by importing 
the system of al-Azhar: in other words, Azharisation indirectly resulted in the 
bureaucratisation and control of ʿulama in Malaysia.
The Azharisation of the religious school curriculum resulted in the populari-
sation of study at al-Azhar. Together with the increasing level of official support, 
this made studying at al-Azhar easier and more accessible. This increase in the 
number of students inevitably entailed an increase in the number of failed stu-
dents. In addition to the general deterioration in student quality, the expansion 
of domestic institutions for Islamic higher education resulted in the relative 
depreciation of the value of the graduates of al-Azhar in Malaysia. As one of 
the officers in the Malaysia Department of Islamic Development commented, 
until the early 1980s the graduates of al-Azhar had been distinguished with the 
title ustaz (male teacher of religion), while the graduates of local Islamic depart-
ments were called encik (general title for male); but now there is no distinction 
between the two, and ustaz (fem. ustazah) is used for anyone who has been 
 educated at a religious school to at least secondary level.
Al-Azhar has significantly influenced ʿulama training in Malaysia. However, 
the ideological and political influence was not as significant as previous studies 
have assumed. This influence was limited to the early twentieth century and the 
1980s. The more important, and long-term, influence was exerted through its 
institutional aspects. It was al-Azhar itself, as the model of a modern religious 
school system and an alternative destination for higher education, that resulted 
in the Azharisation of ʿulama training in Malaysia. Although the value of 
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al-Azhar as an alternative higher education institution has declined with the 
expansion of higher education in Malaysia, the al-Azhar-based religious second-
ary school system still functions as an almost exclusive institution for preparing 
students to major in Islamic studies at universities both locally and abroad. The 
influence of al-Azhar as an institutional model, especially at the secondary level, 
has remained undimmed, even when higher religious education in Malaysia was 
taken over by local universities.
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